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Pakistan Eyes Microreactors To Transform Energy Future

Facing chronic energy woes and shifting geopolitics, Pakistan looks to small modular reactors and new alliances to redefine its nuclear strategy and economic prospects.

7 min read

For decades, Pakistan’s nuclear program has been cast in the stark light of survival. The nation’s pursuit of atomic capability—ignited by India’s 1974 nuclear test, ‘Smiling Buddha’—was famously summed up by then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s vow that Pakistanis would “eat grass” if that’s what it took to match India’s bomb. The logic was simple: nuclear weapons would deter aggression and guarantee national security. Yet, as geopolitical winds shift and the country faces mounting economic and environmental pressures, Pakistan stands at a crossroads. The question now is whether the bomb’s role should remain confined to deterrence, or whether it’s time for a broader vision—one that leverages nuclear technology for stability, prosperity, and even international respect.

According to Dawn, Pakistan’s energy landscape is fraught with chronic problems: circular debt, stranded capacity, and an overreliance on imported fuels. These structural weaknesses have left the economy exposed and vulnerable, with blackouts routinely stifling productivity and growth. For years, the search for a solution has revolved around megaprojects or temporary tariff tweaks, but these have failed to deliver lasting relief. Now, a new answer is emerging: advanced nuclear technology, specifically micro and small modular reactors (SMRs), which promise reliable, clean, and decentralized power.

The timing couldn’t be more opportune. Recent improvements in relations with the United States—driven by Washington’s desire to balance China’s influence in South Asia—could open the door to a strategic energy partnership centered on microreactors. Rather than seeking aid or debt relief, Islamabad could pursue tangible infrastructure deals, turning diplomatic goodwill into lasting assets. If played wisely, this could mean access to long-term fuel supply contracts, regulatory cooperation, and cutting-edge modular reactor designs, similar to arrangements being made with Canada and Poland.

Unlike the massive nuclear plants of the past, SMRs are compact, factory-built units designed for rapid deployment and modular scaling. A single 10-megawatt microreactor could power an industrial cluster or a remote district; several linked together could support an entire city. As Dawn reports, US-based NuScale Power received final approval in 2025 for its 77 MWe reactor design—the first fully certified SMR of its kind. GE Hitachi’s BWRX-300, a 300 MWe simplified boiling-water reactor, is already being rolled out in North America and Europe. Meanwhile, Westinghouse’s eVinci microreactor—a transportable, five-megawatt “nuclear battery”—can run for up to eight years without refueling, making it ideal for remote or military applications.

Even tech leaders are taking notice. In his October 3, 2025 article “The Future of Energy is Subatomic” on Gates Notes, Bill Gates highlighted TerraPower’s Natrium reactor, a 345 MW sodium-cooled fast reactor being built in Wyoming to replace a retiring coal plant. “Such reactors provide consistent baseload power, integrate with renewables, produce far less waste, and significantly reduce accident risk compared with legacy plants,” Gates wrote. His advocacy underscores that SMRs are no longer just theoretical—they’re viable, near-term technologies with global precedent.

Of course, critics often point to the high upfront costs of nuclear power. While a single microreactor may run $5–6 million per megawatt, modular factory construction slashes site-specific risks, shortens build times, and reduces labor costs. By contrast, utility-scale solar plants cost $0.8–1 million per megawatt to install, but their intermittent nature means expensive storage or backup is required for 24/7 reliability—often doubling or tripling the real cost. Microreactors, on the other hand, provide steady baseload power using roughly one-thirtieth the land needed for solar and consume far less water, a crucial advantage in arid regions like southern Pakistan. When factoring in storage, transmission losses, and land constraints, the effective cost of dependable solar can approach or even exceed that of a factory-built microreactor.

For Pakistan, the calculus extends beyond simple generation costs. Microreactors could displace costly imported LNG and furnace oil, while their proximity to consumption hubs would minimize transmission losses. The economic ripple effects—from increased industrial uptime to job creation and enhanced local power reliability—could easily outweigh the initial investments.

Yet, financing and regulatory adaptation remain significant hurdles. Western private investment in Pakistan’s nuclear sector has long been hampered by security and credit risks. But as Dawn notes, improved US-Pakistan ties under the Trump administration might unlock technology transfer and export-credit guarantees, making the sector more attractive to US and allied investors. A trilateral model—combining American technology, Chinese construction expertise, and Pakistani oversight—could distribute risk and balance strategic interests.

Public skepticism about nuclear energy, particularly fears of radiation, is another obstacle. However, research from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency and the US Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratory indicates that modern SMRs, equipped with TRISO fuel and passive safety systems, can contain fission products even in extreme scenarios, virtually eliminating the risk of large-scale releases. The International Atomic Energy Agency classifies the accident risk of advanced reactors as orders of magnitude lower than legacy systems. While microreactors still generate radioactive waste, sealed fuel cartridges can be removed, stored, or reprocessed under international supervision. Transparent monitoring and robust community engagement will be essential to address safety concerns before they morph into political roadblocks.

Transitioning to modular reactors also demands changes in Pakistan’s regulatory culture. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority have decades of operational experience, but their frameworks are geared toward large, state-run plants. Moving to SMRs will require streamlined licensing, digital oversight, and standardized safety validation. International cooperation, especially with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, could help accelerate this shift.

Human capital is equally critical. Institutions like the Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences and the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology are well-positioned to lead the way in specialized training for reactor operations, digital controls, and emergency response, ensuring a skilled workforce for the nuclear future.

Meanwhile, the broader context of Pakistan’s nuclear program is also evolving. As Arslan Mehndi Nekokara and Shahan Munir wrote in Dawn, the old India-centric paradigm is being challenged by new realities—geopolitical shifts, financial constraints, and regional alliances. Incidents like Kargil (1999), the Indian Parliament attack (2001-02), Mumbai (2008), Balakot (2019), and the recent Pahalgam event in 2025 have shown that nuclear weapons may deter all-out war, but they have not brought lasting peace. India’s technological edge, unfavorable international non-proliferation treatment, and climate change all threaten to erode Pakistan’s strategic position.

Still, there are opportunities. Pakistan’s nuclear capability can be redirected toward civilian power, with nuclear already accounting for 8% of the national supply and ambitions to reach 20% by 2050. The evolving security alliance with Saudi Arabia, which includes defense cooperation and potential nuclear consultations, signals a wider strategic realignment. If managed wisely, this partnership could boost Pakistan’s regional relevance and economic prospects; if mishandled, it could increase international suspicion and entangle Islamabad in conflicts beyond its borders.

Ultimately, the future of Pakistan’s nuclear program hinges on whether the country can transcend its old identity—always in India’s shadow, focused solely on survival—and embrace a vision of nuclear technology as a force for stability, development, and dignity. Microreactors, once a futuristic fantasy, now offer a practical path forward. With disciplined governance, transparent financing, and sustained political commitment, Pakistan can harness nuclear innovation to light its cities, power its industries, and free its economy from the chains of energy insecurity.

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