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World News
03 January 2026

Pakistan Credits China And Trump For India Ceasefire

A year after Operation Sindoor, shifting claims over mediation reveal deepening rifts and new alliances among India, Pakistan, China, and the United States.

The year 2025 will be remembered as a turning point in South Asian geopolitics, with the region’s major players—India, Pakistan, China, and the United States—jockeying for influence amid military confrontations, shifting alliances, and dramatic policy changes. The events following the Pahalgam terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir on April 22, 2025, which killed 26 tourists, triggered not only Operation Sindoor but also a diplomatic scramble that exposed the fault lines of global power politics.

Operation Sindoor, India’s swift military retaliation against 11 terrorist and military bases in Pakistan, sent shockwaves through the international community. The specter of conflict between two nuclear-armed nations drew immediate attention from world leaders. According to reporting by multiple outlets, the situation escalated so rapidly that the possibility of a broader war seemed alarmingly real.

In the aftermath, the question of who truly brokered the subsequent ceasefire became a matter of international debate—and a source of national pride and political leverage for several capitals. Initially, Pakistan heaped praise on US President Donald Trump, even nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize, crediting his diplomatic efforts as the decisive factor in averting war. The Pakistani government asserted that Trump personally engaged both New Delhi and Islamabad, ensuring the ceasefire and preventing a catastrophic escalation. As Tahir Andrabi, spokesperson for the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, stated at the time, "President Trump’s mediation was key to restoring peace."

Yet, as 2026 dawned, Pakistan’s narrative shifted. On January 1, 2026, Andrabi confirmed at a press briefing that Chinese leaders had maintained "constant communication with Pakistani authorities during the tense period" and had also engaged with Indian leadership. Andrabi described China’s efforts as "diplomacy for peace, prosperity, and security," and for the first time, Pakistan officially recognized China’s mediation role. Andrabi added, "Pakistan fully supports the statement of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi," who had earlier emphasized China’s historic role in resolving global conflicts and specifically cited its mediation between India and Pakistan in May 2025.

This new acknowledgment came as Pakistan’s strategic and military ties with China deepened. As outlined in a recent Pentagon report, since 2020, China has supplied Pakistan with 36 J-10C fighter jets, continued joint production of JF-17 fighters, and delivered advanced drones and naval equipment. In December 2024, the two countries conducted a joint counter-terrorism military exercise, and the possibility of Chinese military bases on Pakistani soil has been floated, raising concerns about China’s impartiality as a mediator. China’s Western Theater Command also conducted special military exercises in high-altitude areas near the Indian border in 2024, further underscoring the growing strategic partnership between Beijing and Islamabad.

India, for its part, has consistently rejected claims of third-party mediation. According to the Indian government, the May 2025 confrontation was resolved directly through military-to-military communication. Indian officials maintain that after suffering losses, Pakistani military leaders reached out to their Indian counterparts, and the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of both countries agreed to halt all military operations on land, air, and sea from May 10, 2025. As Indian sources have reiterated, "No third country was involved in resolving the May 2025 confrontation."

The diplomatic drama was further complicated by the unpredictable foreign policy of US President Donald Trump. After being sworn in as the 47th president, Trump’s administration adopted isolationist and mercantilist trade policies, imposing punitive 50% tariffs on India and Brazil in April 2025. Ostensibly, these tariffs were a response to the purchase of discounted Russian oil, but many analysts saw them as a message of American displeasure at India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. Notably, the US did not impose similar tariffs on China or the European Union, even though both continued to buy Russian energy.

Trump’s approach extended beyond trade. He revoked India’s sanction waiver for Iran’s Chabahar Port in September 2025, undermining India’s regional connectivity with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Although India secured a six-month exemption, the move was widely interpreted as an attempt to coerce New Delhi into aligning more closely with US foreign policy interests.

Meanwhile, Trump’s relationship with Pakistan became increasingly warm. He hosted Pakistani military leader Asim Munir—now Chief of Defence Staff after constitutional changes—multiple times at the White House between June and September 2025. During one visit, Munir threatened India with nuclear retaliation from US soil, a provocation that drew no public reprimand from the US administration. Trump even signed a treaty with Pakistan to explore oil and rare earths in Baluchistan, solidifying the burgeoning partnership.

This perceived favoritism toward Pakistan, coupled with Trump’s public criticism of India on social media and in official statements, led to a significant erosion of trust in Indo-US relations. As one analyst put it, "Trump’s jilted-lover-like behaviour towards India eroded the element of trust in Indo-US relations." India’s rejection of Trump’s mediation claim in the May conflict only deepened the rift, prompting Pakistan to further embrace the US narrative—and, later, the Chinese one.

On the international stage, India found itself at a crossroads. Prime Minister Modi’s attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin, China, in August-September 2025, where he was seen in informal discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, sent a clear signal to Washington: India had other options. Some geopolitical analysts interpreted the tripartite meeting as the emergence of a new world order, with Russia, India, and China forming a counterbalance to American and European hegemony.

The regional landscape was further unsettled by political upheaval in India’s neighborhood. Bangladesh experienced a regime change in July-August 2025 after a student movement forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to flee. An interim government led by Nobel laureate Mohammad Yunus took charge, but growing Islamist influence and anti-India sentiment raised new security concerns for India’s eastern border. In Nepal, the Gen Z Uprising in September 2025 led to the formation of an interim government under former Supreme Court Chief Justice Sushila Karki, with elections scheduled for early 2026. India, adopting a wait-and-watch policy, is closely monitoring both transitions.

Throughout 2025, India’s foreign policy was tested by the dual pressures of American unpredictability and Chinese assertiveness. As Dr. Sudhir Kumar Das observed, quoting poet Mathew Arnold, India found itself "wandering between two worlds, one dead/The other powerless to be born." The events of Operation Sindoor and its diplomatic aftermath have left India in a precarious position, unable to fully embrace new power centers or wholly reject old alliances.

The shifting narratives over who mediated peace in South Asia—first the US, then China—are more than just diplomatic posturing. They reflect the larger contest for influence in a region where alliances are fluid, and the stakes are existential. As the dust settles, one thing is clear: the old order is changing, and the new one is still taking shape, with India at its uncertain heart.