In a decisive turn of events, Pakistan has once again banned the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a hardline Islamist party notorious for its violent protests and exploitation of the country’s blasphemy laws. The move, announced on October 29, 2025, comes just weeks after the federal government launched an intensive crackdown on the group following a wave of deadly unrest in Lahore. This marks the second time in four years that the TLP has been outlawed, underscoring the government’s struggle to contain religious extremism that has deeply penetrated society and politics.
The immediate catalyst for the ban was a series of violent demonstrations that turned Lahore, Pakistan’s cultural and political heart, into what Dawn described as a “virtual battlefield.” Public property was destroyed, law enforcement officers were attacked, and several people—including policemen—were killed or wounded. According to Dawn, this was the worst incident of religiously motivated violence in Lahore in recent memory. The government, facing mounting public pressure, declared that it would not yield to “any kind of threat or blackmail this time,” signaling a tougher stance than in previous years.
The TLP, despite its violent reputation, commands significant mass support in Punjab, the country’s most populous province. Its rise to prominence has been meteoric: in the 2023 general elections, the party emerged as Pakistan’s fourth largest in terms of votes, a remarkable feat for a group with such a controversial record. This electoral success, as Dawn notes, reflects how deeply religious extremism has seeped into the mainstream, with the TLP drawing much of its backing from semi-educated and economically marginalized communities.
But the roots of the TLP’s influence run deeper than electoral politics. The party’s origins trace back to a movement supporting the assassin of Punjab’s former governor, who was himself murdered after being falsely accused of blasphemy in 2011. The TLP’s notoriety soared after its infamous 2017 sit-in (or dharna) in Islamabad, which paralyzed the federal capital for more than a month. The government eventually capitulated to the protestors’ demands, signing an agreement that bore the signature of a senior ISI intelligence officer—a detail that later drew sharp scrutiny from Pakistan’s Supreme Court. Photographs of a senior army officer distributing money to dispersing crowds after the agreement only fueled public skepticism about the state’s willingness to confront extremist groups head-on.
The weaponization of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws has been central to the TLP’s strategy. These laws, which date back to the British colonial era, prescribe punishments ranging from fines and prison terms to the death penalty for offenses deemed disrespectful to Islam or the Prophet Muhammad. Since 1990, accusations of blasphemy have led to the extrajudicial killings of dozens, with mob lynchings becoming alarmingly frequent. Morning Star News reports that rights groups have persistently called for reform or repeal of these harsh laws, which are often misused to settle personal scores or target minorities.
Recent years have seen a disturbing uptick in violence linked to false blasphemy allegations. The lynching of a Sri Lankan garment factory employee in Sialkot, the burning to death of a man in Swat, and the shooting of a doctor by a police officer in Mirpurkhas are just a few of the grisly examples cited by Dawn. The TLP’s role in inciting such acts has drawn widespread condemnation, yet the group has often operated with impunity—thanks in part to the state’s inconsistent policies and the willingness of some officials to appease rather than confront extremist elements.
The government’s latest response, however, suggests a potential shift. On October 16, Pakistan’s Federal Minister for Law and Human Rights, Azam Nazeer Tarar, announced new procedural safeguards aimed at preventing the misuse of blasphemy laws. These measures, according to Morning Star News, are intended to ensure fair investigations, judicial sensitivity, and timely justice in blasphemy-related cases. “The government is introducing procedural safeguards to prevent misuse of the laws and ensure timely justice by ensuring fair investigation and judicial sensitivity in blasphemy-related cases,” Tarar said. Rights groups have cautiously welcomed these changes, though many remain skeptical about their effective implementation.
Still, critics argue that banning the TLP and tweaking legal procedures are only partial solutions. As Dawn’s analysis makes clear, religious extremism in Pakistan is not merely a matter of outlawing a single party. The TLP, it argues, is “just a symptom of a menace that threatens our social fabric and the state’s unity.” The real challenge lies in addressing the root causes: widespread poverty (with over 40% of the population living below the poverty line), an education system that leaves 25 million children out of school, and the exploitation of religion for political gain. These conditions, the article notes, provide fertile ground for extremist recruitment and the spread of radical ideologies.
There is also the issue of legal and institutional complicity. The Election Commission’s decision to register the TLP as a political party—despite its violent record—was seen by many as a violation of the law. The party’s participation in elections allowed it to siphon votes from more moderate religious parties, further entrenching hardline positions in the political mainstream. Even now, the government’s latest ban on the TLP is pending approval from the Supreme Court, and there are concerns that, as in the past, the group could resurface under a different name or that the state might again succumb to pressure.
For Pakistan, the stakes could hardly be higher. The persistence of violent religious extremism not only threatens minorities and the rule of law but also undermines the country’s social cohesion and international reputation. While the current crackdown and proposed legal reforms mark a step in the right direction, experts and rights advocates insist that a more comprehensive approach is needed—one that tackles socioeconomic deprivation, reforms the education system, and enforces the law impartially against all extremist forces.
Whether this latest ban signals a genuine change in state policy or merely another cycle of repression and retreat remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the fight against religious extremism in Pakistan is far from over—and the path ahead will require more than just the banning of a single party.
