On December 23, 2025, the world found itself reflecting on a year of seismic shifts in South Asian geopolitics, as Pakistan’s renewed activism, a historic Saudi–Pakistan defense pact, and a narrowly averted nuclear crisis with India all reshaped the region’s security calculus. The intricate dance between Islamabad and New Delhi—long fraught with rivalry and mistrust—was thrown into sharper relief by a series of events that tested the limits of deterrence, diplomacy, and global intervention.
According to a detailed analysis published by Lt Gen PR Kumar (Retd), a former Director General of Military Operations in the Indian Army, Pakistan’s recent maneuvers on the international stage signal both resilience and fragility. As he put it, Pakistan’s ability to “keep ticking” is rooted in a confluence of historical design, institutional continuity, strategic geography, and external patronage. The military–bureaucratic nexus, he argued, ensures coherence, while external backers provide critical lifelines. But this very resilience, Kumar warned, is paradoxical: it enables survival but inhibits genuine reform.
Pakistan’s strategy in 2025 has been characterized by what Kumar dubbed a “geopolitical-diplomatic-economic blitzkrieg.” The country has engaged multiple poles of power to reduce dependency, framing deals around loans, investments, and defense memoranda of understanding (MOUs). Military leadership, notably through the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), has driven diplomacy, often sidelining civilian foreign policy apparatus. Meanwhile, a surge in infrastructure development—ports, corridors, and resource sites—has been marketed aggressively to foreign investors, creating both opportunities and risks, including the potential over-commercialization of national sovereignty.
This multifaceted approach is not without its perils. Pakistan continues to wrestle with deepening internal fault lines in regions like Baluchistan, Sindh, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, as well as a mounting debt burden that consumes over half of government revenues. Climate vulnerabilities, such as floods and droughts, threaten agricultural stability, while a volatile youth bulge and rising extremism complicate social cohesion. Civil–military imbalance remains a persistent obstacle to democratic reform.
Yet, as Kumar observed, there are glimmers of positive change: increasing public discourse on accountability, digital activism, and a cautious re-evaluation of military overreach following the political fallout with former Prime Minister Imran Khan. The second phase of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), if managed wisely, could catalyze industrial growth. But without deep governance reform, Pakistan risks remaining in a cycle of “survival without reform.”
India, meanwhile, finds itself at a crossroads. Described by Kumar as a civilizational and regional power—the world’s fastest-growing economy, a strong military force, and a nuclear weapons state—India has traditionally sought a stable, prosperous Pakistan to foster regional stability. But Pakistan’s renewed geopolitical activism complicates New Delhi’s ambitions. By diversifying its international partnerships and deepening transactional relationships, Pakistan is reshaping regional norms and accessing new finance, energy, and trade corridors—moves that dilute India’s preferred regional architecture and bargaining power.
Security dynamics have also shifted. The internationalization of Pakistan’s security architecture, particularly through multipolar platforms, influences crisis management on the India–Pakistan border. The Kashmir issue, cross-border terrorism, and conventional military calculus along the Line of Control have all taken on new dimensions. As Kumar put it, “A crowded diplomatic space may heighten rhetorical pressure and complicate negotiations with India on final solutions and confidence-building measures.”
India’s response, according to Kumar, must be multifaceted. He recommends preserving multi-domain deterrence and operational readiness, while avoiding reactionary escalation. Instead of tit-for-tat isolation, India should leverage calibrated diplomatic and economic statecraft, strengthen economic resilience, and deepen regional connectivity to undercut Islamabad’s appeal for quick transactional deals. Enhancing defense-industrial collaboration with trusted partners, expanding regional engagement through platforms like SAARC, and proactively managing diplomatic narratives are also critical.
One of the most dramatic moments of the year came in May 2025, when Operation Sindoor saw India launch strikes against terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in retaliation for the April 22 Pahalgam attack that killed 26 civilians. The operation signaled a recalibration of India’s use of multi-domain force and called out what Kumar described as “Pakistan’s nuclear bluff.” The escalation threatened to spiral into a broader conflict, with eight planes reportedly shot down during the hostilities.
It was at this juncture that former U.S. President Donald Trump claimed a pivotal role in de-escalating tensions. Speaking at Mar-a-Lago, Trump declared, “We stopped a potential nuclear war between Pakistan and India. And the head of Pakistan, a highly respected General, he’s a Field Marshal and also the Prime Minister of Pakistan, said President Trump saved 10 million lives, maybe more.” Trump asserted that, following four days of intense cross-border drone and missile strikes, he helped broker a “full and immediate” ceasefire after a “long night” of talks mediated by Washington. Since May 10, he has repeatedly claimed credit for helping settle the crisis—statements that have both reassured and rankled observers across the region.
While the U.S. role in averting catastrophe was widely acknowledged, the episode underscored the risks of a transactional and unpredictable regional order—one in which local actors increasingly hedge against overreliance on any single external patron. This point was driven home just months later on September 17, 2025, when Saudi Arabia and Pakistan announced a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement. According to analysis by Andrew Latham, Ph.D., the pact is an Article 5-style commitment: an attack on one is treated as an attack on both. Yet, its power lies in its ambiguity—no explicit nuclear provision is disclosed, but the very uncertainty serves as a deterrent. Officials on both sides have floated and then walked back suggestive statements, tightening adversaries’ risk calculus without breaching nonproliferation red lines.
The Saudi–Pakistan pact, Latham argued, is a local answer to local risks. Pakistan brings military capacity and a history of deploying troops to the Kingdom, while Saudi Arabia provides financial ballast that helps Islamabad weather economic storms. The agreement allows both capitals to diversify their security options without severing ties to Washington, marking the end of single-point security dependence in the Gulf and the rise of a more layered, regional deterrence architecture.
For India, this development is sobering. The presence of a committed financier in Riyadh complicates long-held assumptions about Pakistan’s economic fragility limiting the duration and scale of crises. Indian planners are now expected to tighten oil-supply hedges with the Gulf, deepen air and missile defense along the western arc, and press harder on deterrence stability—measures that have already taken on greater urgency.
As 2025 draws to a close, the region stands at a critical juncture. Pakistan’s resilience remains both its greatest strength and its Achilles’ heel, while India’s challenge is to maintain its strategic edge without succumbing to reactionary impulses. The emergence of new defense pacts and the growing complexity of regional alignments demand nuanced, forward-looking policies from all sides. In this high-stakes environment, ambiguity—when wielded with discipline—can be a stabilizing force, but only if matched by credible commitments to peace and reform.
