For decades, the world has lived under the shadow of nuclear weapons, with a delicate web of treaties and strategic doctrines keeping outright catastrophe at bay. But as the Middle East edges closer to a poly-nuclear reality and the last major arms control pact between the United States and Russia teeters on the brink of expiration, the global nuclear order faces its most profound test in a generation.
The Middle East, a region long plagued by cycles of conflict and foreign intervention, stands at a crossroads. According to a recent analysis published on November 11, 2025, the past 75 years have seen inconsistent foreign interventions and weak domestic institutions fueling instability, with power vacuums repeatedly filled by strongmen such as Egypt’s Nasser or Iran’s Ayatollahs. This has led to endless proxy wars, threatening not only regional security but also the world’s energy markets.
Western policymakers have long warned that the worst possible scenario would be a nuclear-armed Iran. Yet, the article challenges this consensus, arguing that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would almost certainly prompt Saudi Arabia and Turkey to follow suit—resulting in a poly-nuclear Middle East. Paradoxically, this scenario could bring greater stability. The logic, first articulated by neorealist scholar Kenneth Waltz, is that nuclear-armed rivals are compelled to act with extreme caution, as the risk of mutual destruction is simply too great.
Iran’s leadership, often caricatured in the West as ideologically driven, is in fact deeply pragmatic. The Washington Institute notes that Iran’s regime is guided by the doctrine of Maslahat, or expediency, which places national interest and regime survival above ideology. This is evident in several historical episodes: during the brutal Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Ayatollah Khomeini ultimately accepted a U.N. ceasefire to prevent economic collapse, famously describing the decision as “drinking from the poisoned chalice.” More recently, Iran agreed to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), curbing its nuclear program in exchange for economic relief after years of crippling sanctions. Even cooperation with the United States against ISIS in 2014 was rooted in survival, not ideology.
The argument goes further: since 1945, no two nuclear-armed nations have fought a full-scale war. The Cold War’s doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (M.A.D.) kept the United States and Soviet Union from direct conflict. India and Pakistan, after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1998, have not fought another full-scale war, despite recurring skirmishes. The same deterrence logic applies on the Korean Peninsula, where nuclear parity has prevented renewed war. As the article puts it, “History, therefore, shows a consistent pattern; ideological differences between rivals do not negate the logic of deterrence.”
Iran’s current reliance on proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias is a direct response to its lack of nuclear deterrence, the analysis notes. With a nuclear arsenal, Iran would have less incentive to use such groups, especially since it cannot predict or control their actions. Notably, Iran has refrained from providing chemical weapons to its proxies, aware that doing so would invite devastating retaliation from the U.S. or Israel.
Should Saudi Arabia and Turkey pursue nuclear arms in response, the article contends, their motivations would be defensive, aimed at maintaining a balance of power rather than seeking regional dominance. Both are described as “status quo” states, driven by regime survival and security. Iran itself is anchored by a complex political system, with power divided among the Supreme Leader, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and elected officials. This structure has proven resilient, weathering public protests in 1999, 2009, 2019, and 2022 without losing central control.
Ultimately, the article suggests that nuclear deterrence could remove external threats to Iran, forcing the regime to confront its internal contradictions and potentially weakening its grip on power. “Nuclear deterrence will remove external threats and force the country to confront its internal contradictions. Without the banner of resistance, the regime will lose its most powerful ideological weapon, thus weakening its grip on its population and prompting internal revolution,” the analysis concludes. The historical precedent of the Soviet Union’s collapse after achieving nuclear parity is cited as a possible analogy.
Yet, this vision of a nuclear Middle East is not without risks. “Yes, proliferation adds risk. But history suggests nuclear states act with extreme caution, precisely because the cost of error is extinction,” the article argues. The peace that would follow, it admits, would be an “ugly peace”—but peace nonetheless.
Meanwhile, the global nuclear order faces its own moment of peril. Just last week, Russia claimed to have successfully tested two nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable weapons: the Burevestnik cruise missile and the Poseidon underwater drone. The announcement, made only months before the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is set to expire in February 2026, has alarmed policymakers and media outlets across the West. According to the report, these new weapons are said to be difficult to detect and capable of evading missile defenses. However, there is no independent verification of the tests, and both systems have faced significant technical setbacks, being based on old Soviet designs that were never made operational.
Russia’s announcement has been widely interpreted as strategic signaling amid rising nuclear posturing. The U.S. response has only heightened tensions: President Trump instructed the State Department to restart U.S. nuclear testing “on an equal basis” with other countries, creating confusion. The Department of Energy later clarified that only “non-critical explosions” would be conducted, not actual nuclear detonations, and legislation has been introduced to prevent any president from unilaterally authorizing such tests. Nonetheless, the ambiguity has already had ripple effects. Russian President Putin has ordered officials to draft proposals for resuming Russian nuclear testing, citing uncertainty over U.S. intentions. This threatens to collapse a three-decade moratorium on nuclear tests—a move that, while offering little benefit to the U.S. (which already possesses the world’s largest archive of test data), could aid Russian and Chinese weapons development.
The most pressing concern, however, is the looming expiration of New START—the last binding agreement limiting deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. Russia suspended participation in the treaty in 2023 but continues to observe its limits, and has proposed a voluntary one-year extension. President Trump has expressed openness to the idea, but substantive progress remains elusive. Should New START lapse without even a symbolic extension, the world could see a new nuclear arms race, undermining the credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and reinforcing perceptions that nuclear states are backsliding on disarmament obligations.
Negotiating a new or more comprehensive treaty is seen as unrealistic in the current climate of geopolitical tension and weakened U.S. diplomatic capacity. The best available option, experts argue, is a one-year voluntary extension of New START’s central limits. While not a long-term solution, it would prevent immediate further deterioration of the global arms control framework and reduce the risk of dangerous miscalculations.
As the world stands at this precarious crossroads, the stakes could hardly be higher. The choices made in the coming months will shape not only the future of the Middle East, but the very foundation of global security itself.
