As the world grapples with renewed anxieties over nuclear weapons, South Asia finds itself at the center of a growing storm. Recent developments—ranging from North Korea’s missile launches to the United States’ contentious debate over nuclear testing—have reignited old fears and forced policymakers in India and Pakistan to confront some uncomfortable questions. In a region where both countries possess nuclear arsenals and a history of bitter rivalry, even the subtlest shift in military doctrine or testing posture can have far-reaching consequences.
On February 26, 2025, North Korean state media KCNA reported the test-launch of a strategic cruise missile, explicitly designed to demonstrate the country’s readiness and nuclear capabilities. According to Reuters, the move was intended as a show of force, sending a message not just to the United States and its allies, but to the wider international community that North Korea remains a nuclear power to be reckoned with. The timing couldn’t have been more fraught. Just days earlier, U.S. President Donald Trump had announced—via social media—his intention to resume American nuclear weapons testing, citing alleged clandestine tests by China, Russia, North Korea, and Pakistan. "I am saying that we're going to test nuclear weapons like other countries do, yes," Trump declared in an interview with CBS’s 60 Minutes. "Russia's testing, and China's testing, but they don't talk about it. I don't want to be the only country that doesn't test."
This pronouncement, made ahead of a high-profile summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, sent shockwaves through the global security establishment. According to Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, "A resumption of U.S. atomic tests would open the door for states with less nuclear testing experience to conduct full-scale tests that could help them perfect smaller, lighter warhead designs." Joseph Rodgers, a fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, echoed the sentiment: "It makes more sense for them to test than it does for the U.S. or Russia." These comments underscored the potential for a dangerous domino effect, with countries like India suddenly facing a strategic dilemma: Should they follow suit?
India’s nuclear journey has been marked by two pivotal moments: its first test, code-named ‘Smiling Buddha,’ in 1974, and the more definitive Pokhran-II series in 1998. Since then, India has refrained from further nuclear detonations, instead focusing on advancing its arsenal through subcritical and computer-simulated testing. Yet, as the international climate shifts, some in New Delhi are quietly debating whether it’s time for another full-scale test to secure India’s place in a rapidly evolving geopolitical order. The stakes are high. A new Indian test would almost certainly trigger immediate diplomatic fallout, including the likely suspension of the landmark 123 Agreement with the United States—a deal that, since 2008, has enabled civil nuclear trade and cooperation between the two countries. Per Article 14 of the agreement, any Indian nuclear test explosion gives the U.S. the right to terminate all nuclear cooperation, a move that would have significant implications for India’s energy sector and international standing.
What complicates matters further is the nuanced distinction between subcritical and full-scale nuclear tests. As U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright explained to Fox News, "These are not nuclear explosions. These are what we call sub-critical explosions." Subcritical tests, which involve compressing or shocking small amounts of fissile material without achieving a self-sustaining chain reaction, are generally undetectable by international monitoring systems like the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) International Monitoring System. Because no explosion occurs, these tests don’t violate most nuclear test bans or trigger the same level of diplomatic outrage. Still, the line between technical compliance and strategic signaling is thin, and the optics of any kind of nuclear testing—subcritical or otherwise—can be deeply destabilizing.
Nowhere is this instability more palpable than in South Asia. On December 8, 2025, Pakistan’s Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) issued a stark warning about India’s so-called ‘New Normal’ military doctrine. According to a CISS assessment reported by Kashmir Media Service, India’s approach—central to its defense policy since 2019—"normalises escalatory actions and unilateral military strikes under the guise of counterterrorism, risking serious escalation in any future crisis." Pakistani scholars argued that by leveraging its conventional military advantage and institutionalizing assured military retaliation, India raises the risk of miscalculation in a nuclearized region. "Institutionalising assured military retaliation in a nuclearised region is inherently destabilising," the CISS stated. They further warned that Western support for India’s military modernization, largely justified as a counterweight to China, is in fact bolstering capabilities that remain largely directed toward Pakistan.
During a high-level dialogue with Australian scholars and officials, CISS delegates maintained that Pakistan’s own doctrine of ‘Full Spectrum Deterrence’ continues to restrain India. They pointed to Pakistan’s preparedness to deliver a "Quid Pro Quo Plus" response to any Indian military action, referencing a confrontation in May 2025 as evidence of their resolve. Pakistani scholars also questioned India’s logic of blaming Pakistan for every violent incident, especially given the more than two dozen freedom movements simmering within India’s own borders. Using such claims as a pretext for military strikes, they argued, only undermines crisis stability and increases the risk of accidental escalation.
Australian experts at the dialogue sought to clarify their country’s position regarding alliances like AUKUS and the Quad. They emphasized that AUKUS remains a strictly trilateral partnership with no current plans for expansion, and that all activities adhere to nonproliferation standards aligned with IAEA safeguards. While policy debates occasionally mention possible future members such as Norway, South Korea, Canada, or India, these prospects remain remote, at least for now.
Against this backdrop, the broader picture is sobering. According to the Federation of Atomic Scientists’ 2025 Status of the World’s Nuclear Forces, there are currently nine countries with nuclear weapons, collectively possessing roughly 12,331 warheads—over 9,600 of which are in active military stockpiles. Russia and the United States account for nearly 90% of these, but the arsenals of China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and others are expected to grow in the coming decade. The specter of renewed nuclear testing—whether by the United States, India, or any other power—raises the risk of a new arms race, with unpredictable consequences for global and regional stability.
In South Asia, where memories of the 1998 tests and subsequent crises remain fresh, the stakes could hardly be higher. As both India and Pakistan weigh their next moves, the world watches anxiously, hoping that restraint and diplomacy will prevail over brinkmanship and escalation.
