In a case that has sent ripples through Norway’s intelligence and diplomatic communities, a 28-year-old former security guard at the US Embassy in Oslo was sentenced on October 15, 2025, to three years and seven months in prison for espionage. The Norwegian court found him guilty of spying for both Russia and Iran, concluding a trial that has raised pointed questions about the boundaries of espionage under Norwegian law and the vulnerabilities of diplomatic missions in a tense geopolitical climate.
According to Associated Press and Norwegian state broadcaster NRK, the man—whose name has not been made public—admitted to the facts laid out in the indictment but steadfastly denied any criminal wrongdoing. Prosecutors accused him of passing along a trove of sensitive information: floor plans of the embassy, personal details of diplomats and their families, security routines, and even a list of mail services used by Norwegian intelligence. These disclosures, made between March and November 2024, painted a picture of a trusted insider who crossed the line into clandestine activity.
The Oslo court, in its judgment made public on Thursday, did not mince words about the potential danger posed by the leaks. "The information was of a nature that could be used for direct actions and physical attacks against the concerned individuals," the court stated, as reported by Euractiv. The judges further noted, "The accused understood that disclosing this information could harm US security interests." This grave assessment formed the backbone of the conviction on five espionage-related charges, though the defendant was acquitted of gross corruption.
Yet the defendant’s defense team, led by attorney Inger Zadig of the Elden Law Firm, pushed back vigorously. In a statement on October 16, 2025, Zadig argued that the verdict "raises questions about what is considered espionage under Norwegian law." She insisted her client had "roughly the same level of access as a janitor at the embassy," and that "the information he shared was worthless and neither separately nor collectively capable of harming individuals or the security interests of any state." Zadig also asserted that the defendant had lied about having security clearance in communications with foreign agents, exaggerating his own importance and access.
Financial motives were also scrutinized during the trial. The court found that the defendant had received €10,000 from Russian intelligence and 0.17 bitcoin from Iranian intelligence in exchange for the information, as reported by Euractiv. Despite these payments, the defense maintained that the information provided was not classified and that the court had applied "an overly broad interpretation of what constitutes unlawful intelligence activity." The prosecution, for its part, had sought a much harsher sentence—six years and four months—highlighting the seriousness with which the Norwegian state views such offenses. Both defense and prosecution are now considering appeals, dissatisfied with the outcome for different reasons.
As for the defendant’s motives, they were rooted in geopolitics. NRK and other outlets reported that the man’s actions were driven by his opposition to US support for Israel, particularly in the context of the war in Gaza. During his trial, the defendant admitted to passing information but framed it as a protest against "the United States’ backing of Israel’s offensive in Gaza," denying that his actions amounted to aggravated espionage. This intersection of personal conviction and international conflict added a layer of complexity to an already fraught case.
The details of the leaks were extensive and far-reaching. According to Euractiv, the defendant provided Russian and Iranian authorities with names, addresses, phone numbers, and license plate numbers of embassy diplomats and employees, as well as their spouses and children. He also sent embassy floor plans, security routines, and information about the embassy’s activities—not just in Norway but also in Serbia and Turkey. Prosecutors argued that this information, in the wrong hands, could have enabled direct threats to the safety of diplomats and their families.
At the time of his arrest in November 2024, the man was pursuing a bachelor’s degree in security and preparedness at Norway’s Arctic University (UiT). This detail did not go unnoticed, as it marked the second major espionage-related case linked to UiT in recent years. As NRK noted, a prior case involved a guest researcher who posed as a Brazilian named José Assis Giammaria but was later revealed to be a Russian national, Mikhail Valeryevich Mikushin. He was arrested on espionage charges in 2022 and became part of a high-profile prisoner swap between the West and Russia.
The broader context of the case is one of heightened vigilance in Norway. The country shares a 198-kilometer border with Russia in the Arctic, and since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Norway has sharply restricted Russian nationals’ entry. In 2024, the Norwegian government even considered building a fence along all or part of its border with Russia, underscoring the climate of suspicion and security concern. Norwegian intelligence services, as Euractiv highlighted, have consistently identified Russia, Iran, and China as the main actors conducting intelligence operations within Norway’s borders.
The embassy spy case thus lands at the intersection of local vulnerability and global rivalry. The fact that the defendant was able to pass on such detailed information, even if his access was limited, has prompted soul-searching about embassy security and the potential for insider threats. The defense’s argument—that the information was neither classified nor dangerous—clashes with the prosecution’s warnings about the real-world risks posed by such leaks.
Meanwhile, the case has ignited a debate in Norway about the scope and definition of espionage. What constitutes actionable intelligence? Is intent enough, or must there be demonstrable harm? The court’s willingness to convict on the basis of the potential for harm, rather than proven damage, suggests a more expansive view—one that may shape future cases in this arena.
As both sides weigh possible appeals, the case stands as a stark reminder of the delicate balance between transparency, security, and justice in an era of shifting alliances and unresolved conflicts. The embassy guard’s conviction may not be the last word on espionage in Norway, but it has already left a mark on how the country perceives—and prosecutes—threats to its security and that of its allies.