On the night of December 12, 2025, the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Mairari in Borno State, Nigeria, became the focal point of a fierce and consequential battle between Nigerian security forces and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The attempted assault, orchestrated by ISWAP militants, was met with a robust and coordinated defense by the Nigerian Army, supported by a coalition of security forces. The events of that night and the weeks preceding them reveal the evolving nature of Nigeria’s fight against insurgency, highlighting both operational successes and critical vulnerabilities.
According to a statement by Lt.-Col. Sani Uba, Media Information Officer for Operation Hadin Kai (OPHK), the attack began late Friday and extended into the early hours of Saturday. ISWAP fighters attempted to breach the base using two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), a tactic designed to punch holes in defensive lines and sow chaos. However, as reported by the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN), both VBIEDs were promptly detected and neutralized by vigilant troops, preventing any penetration of the base. CCTV footage and field observations confirmed that several terrorists were killed, while others sustained serious injuries. Surviving ISWAP members evacuated their dead and wounded as they retreated from the failed assault.
In the aftermath, Nigerian forces, including troops from Sector 3, the Theatre Command Quick Reaction Force, the Nigeria Police Crack Team, and members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), conducted a thorough exploitation of the area. This operation led to the discovery of multiple terrorist casualties and the seizure of a trove of weapons and logistics abandoned in haste. Among the recovered items were five motorcycles, two android phones, AK-47 rifles, a belt containing 165 rounds of PKT ammunition, five AK-47 magazines loaded with 30 rounds each, and 59 rounds of 7.62mm special ammunition. Other items included blankets, a hand grenade, a combat boot, a flak jacket, plastic bottles containing engine oil, a stretcher, a wristwatch, a camel bag, spinners, and a motorcycle pump, as detailed by Zagazola Makama, a counter-insurgency publication.
Lt.-Col. Uba emphasized the significance of the operation: “The failed attack at Mairari underscores the operational readiness and professionalism of our men and women in uniform. Troops remain resolute in their commitment to decisively defeat all terrorist elements and restore lasting peace and stability across the North East.” He further noted that the successful recovery of terrorists’ equipment and logistics had degraded ISWAP’s operational capacity and denied them freedom of action in the area. Importantly, no casualties were recorded among the Nigerian troops, a testament to the effectiveness of their defensive preparations.
Yet, this recent victory comes in the shadow of a sobering loss. Just weeks earlier, in mid-November 2025, ISWAP insurgents captured and killed Brigadier General Musa Uba, commander of the 25 Task Force Brigade in Damboa, Borno State. Uba’s death, confirmed by ISWAP’s media outlet Amaq, sent shockwaves through the Nigerian military and underscored the persistent threat posed by the group. The general, alongside his troops and CJTF members, had been on a routine patrol in the ISWAP-dominated area of Damboa when they were ambushed around Wajiroko village. Two soldiers and two civilian task force members were killed in the initial firefight. General Uba managed to escape the immediate attack but became separated from his forces and found himself alone deep in hostile territory.
In a desperate bid for survival, Uba coordinated his rescue via WhatsApp on his personal phone, communicating with the rescue team and agreeing on extraction procedures. Despite the deployment of a helicopter to locate and rescue him, the effort was unsuccessful. Three days later, ISWAP announced that it had captured and killed the general. The episode raised urgent questions about operational coordination and the technological capabilities of both ISWAP and the Nigerian military. As reported by The Conversation, ISWAP’s ability to rapidly locate and capture Uba likely relied on their increasing use of technology, including drones for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and attacks—a trend that has been documented in the group’s recent operations.
The circumstances surrounding Uba’s death have prompted scrutiny of Nigeria’s military command and control structures. While the military leadership in Abuja initially denied reports of the general’s abduction, insisting he had led his troops back to base, ISWAP’s subsequent claims and the lack of immediate rescue highlighted deficiencies in battlefield communication. In modern warfare, it is standard for troops to carry Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, enabling real-time tracking and swift rescue operations. The absence of such technology, or its ineffective deployment, appears to have hampered efforts to save Uba, despite the relatively short distance—just 88 kilometers—between Maiduguri, the headquarters of Operation Hadin Kai, and Damboa.
These challenges persist despite significant financial investment in Nigeria’s security apparatus. In the 2025 budget, 6.57 trillion naira (approximately US$4.5 billion), representing about 12.45% of the total national budget, was allocated for security and defense. The question, as raised by security analysts, is whether these funds are being effectively utilized to equip the military with the technological tools necessary to confront an increasingly sophisticated insurgency. “With the gradual shift in terrorism and counter-terrorism towards a technology war, the Nigerian military authority must understand that investing in technological capabilities, including tracking technology, is not a luxury. It is a necessity,” argued a scholar researching terrorism and counter-terrorism in the Lake Chad region, as quoted by The Conversation.
Back in Mairari, the aftermath of the foiled attack has seen Nigerian troops step up aggressive patrols, aiming to prevent further terrorist activity and reassure local communities of their continued security presence. The recovery of weapons, communication devices, combat gear, and medical supplies from the battlefield paints a picture of an adversary that is both determined and resourceful, but also increasingly on the back foot. The operation’s success not only disrupted ISWAP’s immediate plans but also sent a message about the resilience and preparedness of Nigerian forces.
However, the events of the past month serve as a stark reminder that the fight against insurgency in Nigeria is far from over. The loss of Brigadier General Uba, a rare and deeply felt blow to the military’s leadership, underscores the high stakes and human cost of this ongoing conflict. At the same time, the successful defense of FOB Mairari offers a glimpse of hope—a demonstration that with vigilance, coordination, and the right resources, progress is possible in the struggle to restore peace and stability to Nigeria’s northeast.
The coming months will test whether these lessons are heeded and whether Nigeria’s security forces can continue to adapt to the evolving tactics of insurgent groups like ISWAP. For now, the people of Borno and the wider region watch and wait, hoping that the balance will continue to tip in favor of those working for peace.
