On December 17, 2025, Nepal’s Supreme Court issued a show-cause notice to the government, marking a dramatic new twist in the country’s ongoing political crisis. The court’s action came in response to a writ petition filed by eight former members of the dissolved House of Representatives (HoR), all from the Nepali Congress, who are seeking to overturn the dissolution of the legislature and invalidate the interim government led by Prime Minister Sushila Karki. This legal maneuver is the latest act in a saga that has seen Nepal rocked by a historic youth-led uprising, the resignation of a sitting prime minister, and a rapid shift in both domestic and regional power dynamics.
The roots of Nepal’s current turmoil stretch back to September 2025, when the country witnessed one of the deadliest and most transformative uprisings in its modern history. What began as an online campaign against corruption and nepotism—galvanized by the viral hashtag “#NepoBaby”—quickly escalated into a full-scale revolution. According to the Observer Research Foundation, the movement was uniquely youth-driven, with no party banners or ideological manifestos, and was fueled by frustration over governance failures, unemployment, and the glaring gap between the lavish lifestyles of the political elite and the daily struggles of ordinary Nepalis. The median age in Nepal is just 25, and this generation’s anger erupted onto the streets of Kathmandu and beyond.
On September 4, 2025, then-Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s government attempted to quell the unrest by banning 26 social media platforms, including Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, and Instagram. Far from pacifying the crowds, this move served as the immediate spark for violence. By September 8, police were using live ammunition against protestors, resulting in at least 19 deaths on the first day alone. The violence only intensified, with attacks on police stations and government buildings, and a mass jailbreak freeing around 14,000 inmates. By the end of two days, at least 76 people had lost their lives. The government was forced to deploy the army, but the tide had already turned.
In the midst of this chaos, Prime Minister Oli resigned, ceding to the overwhelming pressure from the streets. In a remarkable display of digital-era democracy, more than 10,000 users on a “Youth Against Corruption” forum selected Sushila Karki as the preferred successor. President Ram Chandra Poudel responded by appointing Karki as Nepal’s first female prime minister on September 12, 2025. Three days later, the President dissolved the 275-member House of Representatives and scheduled new elections for March 5, 2026—a move now at the center of legal and political contention.
At the time of its dissolution, the HoR was composed of 88 members from the Nepali Congress, 79 from Oli’s Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist–Leninist (CPN-UML), 32 from the CPN-Maoist Centre, and 21 from the Rashtriya Swotantra Party. The petitioners, led by Nepali Congress chief whip Shyam Ghimire, argue that as the largest party, the Nepali Congress had a clear constitutional claim to form the government under Article 76(3) of Nepal’s Constitution. Instead, they contend, the appointment of Karki and the subsequent dissolution of the House amounted to a constitutional bypass. Their writ explicitly describes the Karki-led interim government as “unconstitutional” and demands its annulment.
The Supreme Court’s constitutional bench, which includes Chief Justice Prakash Man Singh Raut and Justice Sapana Malla, heard the case and issued the show-cause notice on December 17. This judicial intervention signals the migration of Nepal’s political crisis from the streets to the courtrooms, with the fate of both the interim government and the dissolved House hanging in the balance. Notably, calls for restoration of the HoR are no longer limited to the Nepali Congress. The CPN-UML, whose leader was ousted as prime minister by the protests, has also joined the chorus, underscoring how even those sidelined by the uprising are now seeking to regain influence through legal and institutional means rather than mass mobilization.
While the legal battle unfolds in Kathmandu, the aftershocks of Nepal’s Gen Z uprising have reverberated far beyond its borders, forcing neighboring giants India and China to recalibrate their strategic, economic, and diplomatic approaches. As reported by the Observer Research Foundation, Nepal’s trade profile is highly asymmetric and import-dependent. In the fiscal year 2024–25, Nepal recorded massive trade deficits with both India (NPR 144.67 billion) and China (NPR 51.80 billion). India remains Nepal’s largest trade partner, accounting for 71.9 percent of exports and a significant share of imports. China, meanwhile, is the second-largest trading partner, with trade heavily skewed in its favor.
The September 2025 unrest sent shockwaves through these economic relationships. India’s exports to Nepal dropped by 16.6 percent that month as political turmoil disrupted road transport—the lifeline of cross-border trade. Essential commodities like petroleum, steel, pharmaceuticals, and machinery were hit hardest, and border towns saw long queues of stranded trucks. Traders on both sides reported significant losses. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs responded cautiously, expressing grief over the casualties and advising citizens to follow local guidelines, but refrained from direct commentary on Nepal’s internal affairs. Later, the ministry noted complaints from freight companies and transporters about disruptions and security concerns.
China’s reaction was even more measured. On September 10, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a brief statement reaffirming China–Nepal friendship, carefully avoiding mention of the violence or political upheaval. Analysts cited by ORF interpret this as a calculated display of diplomatic restraint, reflecting Beijing’s concerns over its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments in Nepal. The fall of the pro-China Oli government has left major projects, including the Grand Trans-Himalayan Railway, in limbo. For China, Nepal’s adherence to the “One China” policy is critical, given the presence of around 15,000 Tibetan refugees and the country’s proximity to Tibet. Interim Prime Minister Karki’s reaffirmation of this policy has helped ease some of Beijing’s anxieties, but uncertainty remains about future infrastructure cooperation.
Meanwhile, India has taken steps to shore up its relationship with Nepal in the wake of the upheaval. In November 2025, New Delhi amended the Treaty of Transit to expand rail-based freight movement and improve multimodal connectivity, aiming to facilitate Nepal’s trade with third countries. The revised treaty also emphasizes energy cooperation and digital finance—an effort to keep Nepal anchored to Indian-led regional frameworks as the political dust settles.
For Nepal, the challenge now is to manage the transition from youth-driven street power to stable governance. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine whether the current interim government survives or the dissolved House is restored, potentially setting the stage for yet another shift in the political order. As the country awaits the court’s verdict, many of the leaders who retreated from public view during the protests are re-emerging, seeking to reclaim influence through the very institutions that were bypassed in the heat of the uprising.
In the end, Nepal’s Gen Z revolution has not only redrawn the domestic political map but also exposed the fragility of its economic and diplomatic ties. The coming months will test whether the energy of the streets can be translated into constitutional order and whether Nepal can balance the competing interests of its powerful neighbors as it steps into a new era of governance.