Myanmar’s civil war, now stretching into its fifth year, has taken another dramatic turn as the military regime announced the recapture of Demoso, a strategic town in the country’s eastern Karenni (Kayah) State. The operation, which unfolded over 16 days and culminated on August 20, 2025, marks a significant—though fiercely contested—shift in control in a region that has become a flashpoint since the 2021 coup.
According to state media and reports from The Irrawaddy and the Associated Press, the military’s push to retake Demoso was part of the broader Operation Yan Naing Min, launched in May 2024. The campaign aims to reclaim territory lost to a determined resistance coalition: the Karenni Army (the armed wing of the Karenni National Progressive Party, or KNPP), the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), and the People’s Defense Force. These groups had seized Demoso during Operation 1111 in November 2023 and, buoyed by that success, briefly captured most of the Karenni capital, Loikaw, before being forced back by a regime counteroffensive.
Yet, even as the military trumpeted its victory, the reality on the ground remains murky. Resistance sources told The Irrawaddy that while the junta may control the town center, resistance fighters still hold strategic positions across Demoso Township. Colonel Phone Naing, adjutant-general of the Karenni Army, asserted that “resistance groups still control strategic positions in Demoso Township,” highlighting the fluid and fragmented nature of the conflict.
The battle for Demoso is just one chapter in a wider struggle engulfing Kayah State. The region, home to the Karenni ethnic minority, has witnessed some of the most intense and sustained fighting in Myanmar since the military seized power from the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021. Demoso itself, located roughly 110 kilometers (70 miles) east of the capital Naypyitaw, has been a focal point for both sides—its capture and recapture symbolizing the broader contest for control.
The military’s offensive has not been limited to Demoso. Regime troops are now battling to reclaim Nanmekhon town, just north of Demoso, and advancing south toward Hpruso Township. “We are struggling to defend the 4-Mile marker near Nanmekhon as regime troops advance in large numbers,” a resistance fighter reported to The Irrawaddy, underscoring the ongoing, high-stakes clashes that could reshape the region’s balance of power.
Further north, the regime scored another victory on July 6, 2025, when it recaptured Mobye in Pekon township, southern Shan State, after months of fighting. Mobye is a vital gateway linking the junta’s administrative capital Naypyitaw with Karenni State. The town had been seized by KNDF-led forces in January 2024, but relentless bombardment—including, according to resistance sources, the use of chemical weapons and drones—forced their withdrawal. KNDF Deputy Commander Maui explained the decision: “We withdrew troops from Mobye to prevent heavy losses after eight months of regime bombardment.”
Operation Yan Naing Min, the military’s current campaign, has so far reclaimed not only Demoso and Mobye but also Hsi Hseng, the eastern side of Pekon Lake, and the key roads linking Loikaw to Hsi Hseng and Mobye, as well as Pekon and Pinlaung. As of July 31, 2025, the junta had reasserted control over critical transport and supply routes, tightening its grip on contested areas but also exposing itself to renewed guerrilla resistance.
The cost of these operations has been steep, particularly for civilians. The state-run Myanma Alinn newspaper reported that during the 16-day operation to retake Demoso, six bodies and five weapons were seized, and that some members of the security forces were also killed. The newspaper published photos of soldiers posing in front of the hospital, fire department, and town hall—symbolic images meant to signal the restoration of order. Yet, beneath these official narratives, a much grimmer picture emerges.
The KNDF and other local resistance groups, while not immediately responding to media requests, have accused the military of grave abuses. In a statement posted on Facebook, the KNDF alleged that the junta carried out “unlawful arrests of civilians, deliberate shootings and killings without cause, and the use of civilians as human shields in attacking Demoso.” Such claims, if substantiated, point to potential violations of international humanitarian law and have fueled outrage among local and international observers.
The violence has not been confined to Demoso. On August 18, 2025, the provisional government formed by resistance groups in Kayah, including the KNDF, reported that at least 32 civilians were killed, five wounded, and several missing after the military bombed a hospital in the town of Mawchi, about 80 kilometers (50 miles) south of Demoso. Just days earlier, on August 14, an airstrike killed at least 21 people in Mogok, the heart of Myanmar’s gem mining industry. The military has not publicly acknowledged these strikes, typically maintaining that it only targets legitimate military objectives and accusing resistance forces of terrorism.
Kayah State’s suffering is emblematic of the broader humanitarian crisis gripping Myanmar. The region, the smallest of the country’s seven states, has been battered by displacement, civilian casualties, and the destruction of infrastructure. The provisional government and local NGOs have struggled to provide basic services amid ongoing hostilities, with hospitals, schools, and places of worship often caught in the crossfire.
Amid these battles, the military is preparing for elections it has promised to hold on December 28, 2025. Critics argue that the ongoing offensives are part of a broader strategy to consolidate control and suppress resistance ahead of the polls. The regime, for its part, insists that it is restoring stability and defeating what it labels as terrorist groups. “The army has not mentioned the strikes and usually says it only attacks legitimate targets of war, accusing the resistance forces of being terrorists,” reported the Associated Press, capturing the narrative tug-of-war that has come to define Myanmar’s information landscape.
The international community, meanwhile, has watched with alarm but limited leverage. Sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and appeals for dialogue have so far failed to stem the violence or produce a viable peace process. For ordinary people in Kayah and across Myanmar, the immediate reality is one of uncertainty, fear, and loss—caught between shifting frontlines and competing claims of legitimacy.
As the dust settles over Demoso, it is clear that control on the ground remains precarious and fiercely contested. The military’s recapture of the town may offer it a temporary strategic advantage, but the persistence of resistance forces and the ongoing humanitarian toll suggest that the war for Myanmar’s future is far from over.
