On December 18, 2025, the streets of Addis Ababa came alive with a spectacle not seen in years: a meskel flower carpet stretched before the airport, ceremonial guards snapped to attention, and traditional Ethiopian dancers swirled to the rhythms of welcome. The occasion? The arrival of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a two-day state visit, a diplomatic event that Ethiopian officials, led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, cast as the dawn of a "new chapter" in bilateral relations.
For Abiy’s administration, Modi’s visit was more than a diplomatic courtesy. It was a carefully staged performance designed to signal Ethiopia’s return to the global stage after years of international censure and domestic turmoil. The highlight of the visit was the conferral of Ethiopia’s Great Honour Nishan on Modi, an accolade reserved for those considered true friends of the nation. Ethiopia and India also upgraded their relationship to a strategic partnership, with new agreements on peacekeeping, technology, and debt—a moment awash in symbolism and political calculation.
But for many Ethiopians, both at home and abroad, the grand reception sparked tough questions. Why did India choose this moment for such a high-profile show of friendship? And does a single state visit, however lavish, really mark the end of Ethiopia’s diplomatic isolation?
According to Borkena, the answer lies in a mix of old ties and new realities. India and Ethiopia share a long history of educational exchange, trade, and a rhetoric of “Global South solidarity.” Modi’s speeches in Addis Ababa leaned heavily on this shared past, but the timing of his visit was no accident. As a member of the BRICS bloc and a key player in the Red Sea corridor, Ethiopia is increasingly important in the geopolitical rivalry between India, China, and the Gulf states. For New Delhi, this was about locking in its own interests—access to markets, investment opportunities, and influence—not about offering a moral endorsement of Abiy’s government.
The contrast with recent history is stark. Just months earlier, when Abiy Ahmed inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)—a project he hoped would become a symbol of continental pride—the guest list was notably thin. The event attracted mainly neighboring leaders from Djibouti, South Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya. The absence of heavyweight global figures was glaring, and the international validation Abiy craved was nowhere to be found. This, Borkena notes, has been a pattern: Abiy’s diplomatic overtures, such as his much-scrutinized 2025 trip to Europe, have often been met with skepticism and criticism rather than warmth.
Against this backdrop, Modi’s enthusiastic reception in Addis Ababa stands out as an exception—a rare moment when a major global leader stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Abiy on the red carpet. For Abiy, the optics are political gold. He can now point to images of himself and Modi smiling before their respective flags and claim, “A global power calls us partner. We are not isolated.”
But is this really a sign that Ethiopia’s diplomatic fortunes have turned? The reality, as Borkena and other observers stress, is more complicated. India’s calculus is clear-eyed and transactional. As the article puts it, “Modi’s acceptance of the invitation reflects India’s global strategy, not a moral judgement about Abiy’s governance. New Delhi does business with a wide range of regimes; it deals in interests, not in human rights scorecards.”
Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s domestic situation remains fraught. Entire regions—Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara—are still militarized, with recurring reports of atrocities, arbitrary detentions, and internet shutdowns. Political space is stifled, opposition figures and journalists face harassment or imprisonment, and relations with neighboring countries are fragile at best. In the words of Borkena, “You cannot bomb, jail, and silence your own citizens into submission—and then try to buy legitimacy with foreign ceremonies and medals.”
While Abiy Ahmed is eager to present Modi’s visit as proof that Ethiopia is respected and his diplomacy is working, analysts caution against mistaking photo opportunities for substantive change. Ethiopia’s need for new credit lines, investment, and diplomatic cover is enormous. Modi’s visit may offer a temporary boost in prestige, but it does not erase years of strained foreign relations or the complex realities on the ground.
India, for its part, is operating in a rapidly shifting global landscape. Its interest in Ethiopia reflects broader strategic competition with China and the Gulf, as well as the transactional, multipolar nature of today’s international order. This theme was echoed by Sardar Masood Khan, former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States and ex-Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Speaking to Kashmir Media Service on December 18, 2025, Khan dismissed the notion of a so-called “Core Five Alliance” involving the US, China, Russia, India, and Japan as “neither feasible nor a true alliance.”
“Alliance is a very big word. These countries do not share common strategic objectives, nor do they trust each other enough to form a unified front,” Khan said. He pointed out that India faces mounting strategic and diplomatic challenges in South Asia, with strained relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. In his view, India’s recent major military setback and its search for new technologies and partnerships are signs of its weakened position, not strength. Even attempts by the US to stabilize ties with India, including the December visit of Undersecretary of State Allison Hooker, have not reversed this trend.
Khan described the emerging global order as “transactional and interest-driven rather than alliance-based.” He argued that India’s growing isolation underscores the limited impact of such proposed alliances, and that its ambitions in Kashmir face heightened scrutiny amid regional and global realignments. “India’s military and strategic designs, including in Kashmir, are increasingly exposed as it struggles to secure partnerships in the Indo-Pacific,” Khan observed.
For Ethiopia, this new world order presents both risks and opportunities. As Western relationships cool, countries like India, the Gulf states, China, and Russia see openings. Ethiopia’s geography, population, and markets mean that big powers will keep knocking. But, as Borkena notes, this is a national asset—not a personal achievement of Abiy Ahmed. The real test will be whether Ethiopia can use this leverage wisely, to build internal stability and legitimacy, rather than simply chasing borrowed prestige from foreign dignitaries.
Ultimately, the lesson of Modi’s visit is clear: the smiles and ceremonies may make for compelling headlines, but Ethiopia’s true legitimacy—its future as a respected member of the international community—will depend on what happens within its borders. Ending internal wars, opening political space, and respecting fundamental rights are the only paths to genuine pride and respect. No amount of diplomatic theater can substitute for real change at home.
As the dust settles on the red carpet and the last notes of the welcome dance fade, Ethiopians are left with a familiar truth: their nation’s fate will be decided not by foreign visitors, but by the choices made in Addis Ababa itself.
