Russia and China’s deepening military cooperation has taken a dramatic turn, with newly leaked documents suggesting Moscow is actively helping Beijing prepare for a potential airborne invasion of Taiwan. According to an analysis released September 26, 2025, by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, and corroborated by other leading defense analysts, Russia has committed to supplying China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with advanced military equipment, technology, and crucially, specialized training in airborne assault tactics. The revelations, based on approximately 800 pages of contracts and internal correspondence obtained by the Black Moon hacktivist group, point to a covert deal that could accelerate China’s invasion readiness by a decade or more.
The documents—some of which have been independently verified, though not all—detail a sweeping agreement reached in April 2021. Under this deal, Russia agreed to sell China a full battalion’s worth of airborne weapons and vehicles, including 37 BMD-4M light amphibious assault vehicles, 11 Sprut-SDM1 self-propelled anti-tank guns, 11 BTR-MDM “Rakushka” armored personnel carriers, and several Rubin and KSHM-E command vehicles. All of these are to be modified with Chinese communication and command systems, ensuring interoperability with the PLA’s existing forces. The total contract is valued at over $210 million.
But hardware is only part of the story. The documents indicate that Russian instructors will train Chinese paratroopers at facilities in Kurgan and Penza, followed by collective battalion-level exercises on Chinese soil. The goal: to develop the tactics, command-and-control procedures, and operational know-how required for large-scale airborne operations—something China has long lacked, despite its rapidly modernizing military. As Oleksandr Danylyuk and Dr. Jack Watling, the RUSI analysts behind the report, put it, “The greatest value of the deal to the PLA is most likely in the training and the procedures for command and control of airborne forces, as Russia’s airborne forces have combat experience, while the PLA does not.”
According to Defence Blog, the transfer also includes the “Dalnolyot” long-range parachute systems, capable of dropping up to 190 kilograms from altitudes as high as 8,000 meters (about 26,250 feet). This technology would allow Chinese special forces to glide undetected for up to 80 kilometers (50 miles), potentially enabling them to infiltrate Taiwanese or even other regional territory in the early hours of a conflict. The documents reference a March 8, 2024, meeting in Moscow, where Russia agreed to provide China with data on the system’s performance in extreme cold, ranging from –40°C to –60°C, by the end of 2024.
While the leaked documents never mention Taiwan directly, their implications are clear. U.S. officials have previously warned that Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered the PLA to be ready to seize Taiwan by 2027. The PLA’s interest in airborne operations stems from the enormous risks associated with a direct amphibious assault on Taiwan. As RUSI’s commentary notes, “The beaches suitable for landing are limited, known, and dispersed. The runways and ports on the island could be invaluable for reinforcing the lodgement but denying these facilities would likely be a priority task for Taiwanese forces.”
China’s planners have studied the Allied D-Day landings in Normandy intensely. Lyle Goldstein, a Brown University expert on Chinese and Russian military strategy, told Defense Priorities, “They have studied D-Day backward, forward and upside down [and] realized that it would have failed without an airborne component.” For Beijing, the lesson is clear: small, well-equipped airborne units delivered by helicopter or aircraft are “absolutely essential” to any successful invasion of Taiwan. Goldstein added, “Russia will do more or less anything to keep China happy and cooperative,” especially as Moscow seeks support for its ongoing war in Ukraine.
The operational concept outlined in the documents is striking. Russian and Chinese planners envision a scenario in which armored vehicles and special forces are airdropped onto open ground—such as golf courses or fields—near key Taiwanese ports and airfields. These airborne troops would establish footholds, clear paths for follow-on forces, and potentially seize critical infrastructure before Taiwanese defenders can fully mobilize. As the RUSI analysis puts it, “The capacity to airdrop armored vehicles … would allow air assault troops to significantly increase their combat power.”
The contracts are not just about immediate battlefield advantage. They also allow for the transfer of technology and know-how to enable China to localize and scale up production of similar military equipment. A new maintenance and repair center for Russian equipment will be established in China, complete with technical documentation, further deepening the two countries’ military-industrial integration.
On the Russian side, the deal is being managed by Rosoboronexport, with participation from major defense firms such as Kurganmashzavod (armored vehicles), NPP Rubin (command vehicles), PJSC Il (transport aircraft), and KBP Instrument Design Bureau (weapons systems). China’s state-owned giants AVIC, CETC, and NORINCO are leading the project on their end. The collaboration reflects a pragmatic shift in Moscow’s attitude toward military exports to China, driven by a desire to fund its war in Ukraine and to position itself as a vital supplier in a future world divided into rival blocs.
For Beijing, the benefits are twofold: acquiring critical airborne capabilities and helping to sustain Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, which ties down NATO resources in Europe. The arrangement also gives China a chance to close a key operational gap—real-world combat experience and doctrine in airborne warfare—by learning directly from Russian veterans of the Ukraine conflict. “The Chinese school of airborne landing is very young,” Danylyuk observed, suggesting Moscow’s assistance could advance China’s airborne program by 10 to 15 years.
Yet, as history shows, airborne operations are fraught with peril. Russia’s own attempt to seize Hostomel Airport near Kyiv in 2022 ended in disaster, as Ukrainian defenders destroyed helicopters and repelled the assault. Western analysts caution that China would face similar challenges in suppressing Taiwan’s air defenses and landing sufficient troops and equipment to establish a sustainable beachhead.
Nevertheless, the scale and ambition of the Sino-Russian deal mark a significant escalation in regional military preparations. The PLA is not only buying hardware but also learning how to use it in concert with new tactics, command structures, and logistics. The agreement’s inclusion of training, technical transfer, and even the establishment of a repair center underscores the seriousness of Beijing’s intentions.
In the broader context, this partnership is emblematic of the shifting geopolitical landscape. As Moscow and Beijing draw closer—each for their own strategic reasons—their collaboration could reshape the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. While much remains uncertain, the evidence now emerging from these leaked documents sends a clear message: the era of limited, transactional defense ties between Russia and China is over. What comes next may well define the security environment of the coming decade.
