Latin America is no stranger to turbulence in its relationship with the United States, but the drama has reached a new crescendo in 2025. From the bustling corridors of Brasília to the oil-rich fields of Venezuela, the region is flexing its autonomy, challenging Washington’s long-standing grip—and the U.S. is responding in ways that harken back to the Cold War, with a modern twist.
Following the 2022 Los Angeles Summit, Latin American nations have started adopting what analysts call aggressive multi-polar strategies. According to recent reporting, this shift signals a clear move away from the U.S.’s traditional sphere of influence, as countries in the region seek greater independence both politically and economically. The old playbook—viewing Latin America through the lens of the Monroe Doctrine and employing zero-sum, “with us or against us” tactics—no longer seems to yield the results Washington expects.
This new era is marked by the creation of regional institutions free from U.S. oversight, like CELAC and ALBA, and a notable decrease in participation in U.S.-dominated forums such as the Organization of American States (OAS). At the same time, trade relationships with China are expanding rapidly, with new non-dollar payment systems and regional development banks cropping up across the continent. As reported by BNamericas, even Mexico is subtly distancing itself from Washington by embracing a non-interventionist doctrine, while Brazil aspires to regional leadership and closer ties with BRICS. Argentina and Colombia, meanwhile, are scrutinizing U.S. influence with a pragmatic eye.
Nowhere is the struggle for autonomy more pronounced than in Venezuela. The country, blessed (or cursed, depending on whom you ask) with vast oil reserves, has long been a vocal advocate for anti-U.S. sentiment and regional independence. Under the late Hugo Chávez’s nearly fourteen-year rule, Venezuela used its oil wealth to fund alternatives to U.S. influence and became a hub for left-wing movements across Latin America. Chávez’s so-called “Bolivarian Revolution” was, at its core, an anti-imperialist project aimed at exporting his ideological vision well beyond Venezuela’s borders. He even invited Russia and China into the Western Hemisphere, a move that made Caracas a systemic challenge to U.S. interests, according to regional analysts.
The U.S. response? A familiar mix of sanctions and pressure campaigns. In 2015, Washington imposed a fresh round of sanctions on Venezuela, and in the years since, it’s explored various regime change strategies—none of which have succeeded in bringing President Nicolás Maduro’s government to the negotiating table. In fact, these efforts have often backfired, strengthening anti-U.S. sentiment and reinforcing the resolve of Venezuela’s leadership. Intelligence reports from as far back as 2002, as noted by the CIA, observed that “conditions [were] ripening for a coup attempt.” But even today, the odds of a successful regime change remain slim: the opposition is fragmented, the military remains loyal to Maduro, and Cuban and Russian backing adds another layer of complexity.
U.S. intelligence agencies are all too aware of the risks. The specter of a Bay of Pigs-style fiasco or a Vietnam-like quagmire looms large, with intelligence blind spots and counterintelligence challenges—thanks in part to a robust Cuban intelligence presence—making covert action a risky proposition. As the Threat Assessment of the Directorate of National Intelligence notes, “the Maduro government’s security apparatus, external backing, fragmented opposition, and high repression…imply high risk and low odds for quick regime change.”
But the U.S. isn’t giving up on influence just yet. The ongoing war on drug cartels has provided a new pretext for engagement. The Trump administration—now in its second term—has given the CIA free rein to escalate the fight against Latin American drug cartels, designating many as foreign terrorist organizations and carrying out air strikes near Venezuelan waters that reportedly killed 11 drug traffickers. Some sources suggest that Washington may be eyeing a limited special operation for regime change under the guise of counter-narcotics efforts. The historical parallels are hard to ignore: in 1989’s Operation Just Cause, the U.S. justified the removal of Panama’s Noriega regime by citing the need to protect U.S. citizens and combat drug trafficking.
Yet, as history has shown, the risks are enormous. The U.S.’s Plan Colombia, launched under the Bush administration, blended counter-narcotics operations with broader political objectives, but the region’s dynamics have shifted since then. Today’s Latin America is more assertive, diversified, and less willing to tolerate heavy-handed U.S. intervention. The stakes are high, and any misstep could have consequences that reverberate far beyond the region.
Meanwhile, Brazil is navigating its own stormy waters with Washington. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in an article published in The New York Times on September 14, 2025, called for “open” and “frank” dialogue with President Donald Trump over newly imposed U.S. tariffs. Lula didn’t mince words, describing the 50% tariffs on Brazilian products—which took effect on August 1—as “wrong” and “illogical.” He pointed out that Brazil has been running trade deficits with the U.S. for years, questioning the rationale behind the measures.
The U.S. justified the tariffs by citing alleged political persecution in the trial against former President Jair Bolsonaro, who was recently sentenced by Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court to over 27 years in prison for his role in the tumultuous 2022 elections. Bolsonaro, who has always denied the accusations of attempting to prevent Lula from taking office, now finds himself at the center of a political maelstrom that has spilled across borders. According to BNamericas, one of Bolsonaro’s sons, federal deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, has been living in the U.S. and is reportedly working with the U.S. government to develop strategies opposing the current Brazilian administration.
Analysts warn that U.S.-Brazil relations are at risk of becoming even more tense. Creomar de Souza, CEO of the consultancy Dharma Political Risk and Strategy, told BNamericas, “There is a perception today, both among members of the Brazilian government and diplomats, that we may indeed see more aggressive rhetoric from the Trump administration against Brazil from now on. The question is whether this aggressive rhetoric will result in increased sanctions against Brazilian economic sectors or against individuals, especially representatives of the federal government.”
There’s also a sense that President Trump, who was re-elected in 2024 after his own controversial defeat in 2020 and the Capitol riots that followed, sees parallels between his legal troubles and those of Bolsonaro. This personal dimension could color U.S. policy toward Brazil, making the situation even more unpredictable. Business leaders from both countries are hoping to step in and foster dialogue, but the path forward is anything but clear.
All of this plays out against a backdrop of rising regional assertiveness and waning U.S. leverage. The Latin American pivot toward multi-polarity is as much about economics as it is about politics, with countries eager to diversify their partnerships and reduce reliance on Washington. The U.S. faces a stark choice: adapt to the new realities of the hemisphere, or risk being sidelined as Latin America charts its own course.
The coming months will test whether old habits die hard—or if a new era of diplomacy and mutual respect can emerge from the shadows of suspicion and rivalry.