The world’s appetite for critical minerals—those essential elements underpinning everything from electric vehicles to smartphones—has never been greater. Yet, as demand soars, the global supply chain is coming under increasing scrutiny, nowhere more so than in Kazakhstan and Russia. Recent developments in both countries highlight a new era of opportunity, risk, and geopolitical maneuvering that could shape the future of the world’s green transition.
On September 3, 2025, the leader of Kazakhstan’s Ak Zhol party, Azat Peruashev, reignited a simmering debate over how the country manages its rare earth metal exports. According to The Times of Central Asia, Peruashev formally called on the Minister of Industry and Construction, Ersaiyn Nagaspayev, to tighten oversight after raising concerns that state control over ore shipments is increasingly being handed off to private laboratories. "According to the law on precious metals and stones, the state authority is responsible for control over the import and export of ores and concentrates. But based on the official response from the Ministry of Industry, it appears that state control has effectively been delegated to laboratories hired by the subsoil users themselves. The government agency does not verify the accuracy of its data and limits itself to just receiving the documents," Peruashev stated, as reported by The Times of Central Asia.
The controversy isn’t new. Back in March, Peruashev submitted a formal parliamentary inquiry, citing allegations from a former Kazakhmys laboratory assistant. The complaint alleged that ore and concentrate exports were leaving Kazakhstan without proper chemical analysis, allowing exporters to underreport the presence of valuable rare earth and precious metals. Such practices, critics say, could artificially lower shipment valuations to the benefit of powerful business interests, while depriving the state of much-needed revenue—especially as global demand for rare earth elements continues to rise.
Kazakhmys, the major mining company at the center of the allegations, flatly denied any intentional wrongdoing. The company clarified that any rare metals recovered during processing were incidental and directed to the state enterprise Zhezkazganredmet. Kazakhmys also welcomed greater state scrutiny and dialogue, but Peruashev’s renewed demands suggest that concerns about oversight and transparency remain very much unresolved.
These debates are unfolding against the backdrop of a geological windfall. In April 2025, officials announced the discovery of a massive new rare earth deposit in Kazakhstan’s Karagandy region. Unofficially dubbed “Zhana Kazakhstan,” the deposit is estimated at 20 million metric tons of ore, with average concentrations of 700 grams per ton of neodymium, cerium, lanthanum, and yttrium. If those numbers hold up, Kazakhstan could soon rank among the world’s top three rare earth holders. The government has also identified 38 new mineral deposits—including 3.7 million tons of copper and nickel, and 19 tons of gold—as part of an ambitious exploration program aiming to expand mapped geological territory to 2.2 million square kilometers by 2026.
International interest in Kazakhstan’s mineral riches is surging. As highlighted in a June 2025 Atlantic Council opinion piece, Kazakhstan is increasingly seen as a linchpin in Western efforts to diversify rare earth supply chains away from China. In August, the state company Tau-Ken Samruk announced a partnership with U.S.-based Cove Capital to explore deposits in the Kostanai region, underlining the country’s growing importance as a strategic partner for nations eager to secure rare earth resources.
The numbers tell the story: Kazakhstan’s rare earth mineral exports have nearly quintupled since 2020, with another sharp rise in 2024. China, which dominates global rare earth processing, remains the main buyer. Domestically, the government is pushing to modernize the industry. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov chaired a high-level meeting in August to review development plans, including new investments in refining and research. Since 2018, investment in the sector has exceeded 67 billion tenge (about $125 million), and the modernization of Zhezkazganredmet is at the top of the agenda.
But with opportunity comes risk. A July 2025 investigation by Kursiv Media warned that Kazakhstan could repeat China’s mistakes if it fails to manage mining waste properly. The article highlighted risks of toxic runoff, soil degradation, and poorly regulated chemical processing—problems that could threaten both environmental sustainability and social stability in mining regions already under ecological stress.
Peruashev has framed the debate as a matter of national security and sovereignty. Rare earth elements are crucial not just for clean energy, but also for semiconductors and advanced weaponry—making their management a cornerstone of Kazakhstan’s strategic future. The government, for its part, insists that sovereign control over critical minerals will not be compromised, even as it welcomes foreign investment and scientific collaboration. Yet the latest parliamentary challenge underscores a delicate dilemma: too much state control could stifle investment, while too little could leave Kazakhstan vulnerable to dependency and revenue leakage.
The challenges facing Kazakhstan are mirrored—if not magnified—by those in Russia, where Norilsk Nickel (Nornickel), the world’s largest producer of nickel and palladium, is grappling with its own set of geopolitical headaches. Following Western sanctions imposed after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Nornickel has been largely cut off from traditional markets. According to Discovery Alert, Russian exports of platinum group metals (PGMs) to China surged to $1 billion in the first half of 2025, an 80% year-over-year increase. China’s demand for PGMs in catalytic converters and electronics has become a lifeline for Nornickel, but not without complications.
Nornickel’s credit risk analysis by martini.ai shows a stable B2 rating, but with rising short-term default probabilities due to macroeconomic and geopolitical factors. The company’s ability to secure reliable payments from Chinese partners—often reliant on Western banking infrastructure—has been strained by sanctions that limit access to global financial systems. In July 2025, Nornickel lowered its nickel output target to between 196,000 and 204,000 metric tons and cut its forecast for nickel surplus from 150,000 to 120,000 tons, citing scheduled maintenance and production adjustments. Meanwhile, palladium and platinum prices have soared by 38% and 59%, respectively, in 2025, as Chinese demand continues to outstrip global supply.
To adapt, Nornickel is pursuing joint ventures in China, such as its collaboration with Xiamen C&D to refine copper—a strategy intended to bypass Western financial bottlenecks. Yet, these partnerships carry their own uncertainties, from regulatory hurdles to reputational risks linked to China’s opaque business environment. Price volatility is another concern: about 25% of nickel producers are now operating at a loss, and closures of non-Indonesian operations could lead to short-term supply shortages and further market instability.
The lessons from Kazakhstan and Russia are clear: as the world races to secure the critical minerals that power modern technology, the supply chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Geopolitical shocks, regulatory gaps, and environmental missteps can all undermine even the best-laid plans. For investors and policymakers alike, resilience—through diversification, robust oversight, and adaptive strategies—is now the name of the game.
As new discoveries are made and alliances shift, the fate of the global critical minerals market will depend on how countries like Kazakhstan and Russia navigate this treacherous terrain. The stakes are high, but so too are the opportunities for those able to balance ambition with caution.