In a year already marked by dramatic geopolitical shifts, the Asia-Pacific region is facing new tremors as leaders from Japan and India adopt assertive—some say provocative—foreign policy stances, shaking up old alliances and redrawing the strategic map. Both countries, long seen as pillars of stability in an often-volatile region, now find themselves at the center of escalating tensions with global ramifications.
Since taking office earlier in 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has wasted little time in signaling a tougher approach to Chinese aggression, particularly over Taiwan. In early November, her remarks set off a diplomatic firestorm: “If battleships are used and a naval blockade involves the use of force [around Taiwan], I believe that would, by any measure, constitute a situation that could be deemed a threat to Japan’s survival.” According to reporting by Ben Solis, this was the first time a sitting Japanese prime minister so clearly outlined a scenario that could trigger deployment of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in direct conflict with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
China’s response was swift and furious. The Chinese foreign ministry demanded a retraction, and Beijing imposed a boycott on travel to Japan in December 2025. The rhetoric from Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials has been matched by military maneuvers: the PLA aircraft carrier Liaoning, escorted by three guided-missile destroyers, conducted takeoff and landing drills near Taiwanese and Japanese waters, with at least 140 aircraft takeoffs—without notifying Tokyo. The Japanese SDF scrambled jets in response, only to have Chinese J-15 fighter jets lock their radars onto the Japanese aircraft, a move widely interpreted as a signal of readiness to fire weapons.
For Japan, the stakes are not just rhetorical. Yonaguni Island, its southernmost territory, sits just over 60 miles from Taiwan’s coast and could, in the event of conflict, become a key battleground. In 2022, a PLA missile landed about 50 miles from Yonaguni during military drills, a stark reminder of the island’s vulnerability. Recognizing the threat, Japan has begun installing missile batteries, radar towers, ammunition storage, and other combat facilities along the Ryukyu island chain, which stretches from Yonaguni to the Japanese mainland. Japanese forces have also conducted military exercises in the waters around Taiwan.
“It should come as no surprise that sowing seeds of fear is the CCP’s weapon of choice,” a former Japanese military official told Ben Solis, highlighting the psychological dimension of China’s strategy. But what’s different this time, as Nikkei polling shows, is Japan’s willingness to push back. Fifty-five percent of Japanese respondents approved of Takaichi’s remarks, suggesting broad public support for her more muscular approach.
The United States, under President Donald Trump, has thrown its weight behind Tokyo. Following a late November call, Takaichi said Trump told her, “he and I are extremely good friends, and that I should call him anytime,” adding that Trump had reached out to her first. U.S. Ambassador to Japan George Glass publicly affirmed Washington’s support for Takaichi’s government “in the face of Chinese coercion.” The united front between Washington and Tokyo signals, as Solis puts it, that “the free world is done indulging Chinese aggression and is prepared to meet it with strength.”
Meanwhile, further west, a different but equally consequential realignment is underway. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India from December 5 to 6, 2025, was more than a diplomatic courtesy call. Prime Minister Narendra Modi rolled out the red carpet, sending a clear message to Washington: India has alternatives. Russia, isolated by Western sanctions since the Ukraine war began in 2022, has found a lifeline in New Delhi. India has leveraged Russia’s diplomatic isolation to secure discounted oil, weapons, and technology—benefits that, according to critics, have indirectly prolonged the Ukraine conflict.
India’s deepening relationship with Russia is reflected in the numbers. Bilateral trade soared to $68.7 billion in the 2024–25 fiscal year, with India importing $63.8 billion in oil, coal, fertilizers, and defense parts, while exporting just $4.9 billion to Russia. This massive trade imbalance underscores India’s strategic dependence on Russian energy and weaponry. Since 2022, India’s imports of Russian crude have jumped nearly 600%, making India Russia’s largest wartime energy customer and accounting for 38% of Moscow’s oil exports.
India’s military ties with Russia remain robust. New Delhi is planning an additional $1.2 billion purchase of S-400 missile rounds, and Russia has offered full Su-57 stealth fighter technology for licensed production in India. Joint projects between the two countries include the BrahMos missile, T-90 tanks, AK-203 rifles, and co-production of spare parts. India also supplies Russia with $60–95 million per month of restricted dual-use components critical for missile, UAV, communications, and artillery systems.
These arrangements have not gone unnoticed in Washington and Brussels. The U.S. and EU increasingly view India as a “Kremlin Enabler” and a destabilizing force in the global order. President Trump has called India a “Kremlin laundromat” and threatened 100% tariffs on Indian goods. The EU has criticized India’s participation in Russian military exercises, arguing that it obstructs deeper strategic cooperation with the West. U.S. officials have labeled India’s behavior as “destabilizing,” accusing it of enabling Russia’s military capacity even as New Delhi pursues U.S. military hardware, including a potential F-35 acquisition.
India’s ambiguous alignment is further complicated by its actions elsewhere. While maintaining close ties with Moscow, India sold $1.4 million in explosives to Ukraine, and continues to abstain from key United Nations resolutions critical of Russia. The recruitment of Indian nationals into Russian combat units, with reports of casualties and missing personnel, points to a deeper operational alignment with Moscow’s war effort.
For decades, India has walked a diplomatic tightrope, claiming non-alignment while engaging in what many see as double games with world powers. As nearly 68–70% of Indian military imports still originate from Russia, the challenge for Modi is how to maintain this delicate balance: continuing to buy Russian oil and arms while seeking a trade deal with Trump’s America. The risk, analysts warn, is that India’s strategy breeds mistrust on both sides and reinforces its image as an unreliable ally.
Back in Tokyo, Takaichi’s government faces its own balancing act. Critics argue that a military buildup could make a Chinese attack more likely, but Takaichi appears to have embraced the notion that “weakness is provocative.” With the U.S. standing firmly behind her, she is betting that a show of strength will deter, rather than invite, further aggression from Beijing.
In both Japan and India, the choices made this year are setting the stage for a new era in Asian geopolitics—one defined by hard choices, shifting alliances, and the ever-present shadow of great power rivalry. The world is watching, and the stakes couldn’t be higher.