The November 2025 parliamentary elections in Iraq marked a pivotal moment in the country’s ongoing experiment with democracy, but also exposed persistent challenges that continue to shape its political landscape. Despite record numbers of candidates and a notable increase in voter turnout, the outcomes highlighted the enduring dominance of established elites, the struggles of women and smaller parties to gain real influence, and the ongoing tension between electoral participation and genuine political change.
This sixth parliamentary election since the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein was the first to operate under the amended Election Law No. 9, which reintroduced the controversial modified Sainte-Laguë method for allocating seats. According to Al Jazeera English, this change was widely criticized for favoring larger, well-funded political blocs at the expense of independents and smaller parties, effectively recycling the same elite faces into positions of power. Legal expert Mohammed Jumaa argued that the law was “designed from the outset for the major blocs,” and its implementation meant “elections are more influenced by elite bargaining rather than the popular vote.”
The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced a 56.11% voter turnout, a significant jump from the 41% reported in the 2021 elections. On the surface, this suggested a renewed trust in Iraq’s political process. However, as The New Arab pointed out, these figures were shaped by eligibility requirements that excluded millions who did not update their voter registration or intentionally boycotted the process. Of the 32 million eligible voters, only 21.4 million updated their information and obtained a voter card—a decrease from 24 million in 2021. The decision to deny out-of-country voting further narrowed participation, raising questions about how representative the results truly were.
The main political blocs emerged largely unchanged from previous cycles, with Shia-led parties once again dominating the chamber. The Reconstruction & Development Coalition, led by Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, secured 46 seats and led the field with 1.3 million votes—370,000 more than its nearest rival. The Coordination Framework alliance of Shia groups declared itself the largest parliamentary bloc with 175 seats and is now tasked with nominating a prime minister. The process of government formation, as outlined by Al Jazeera English, involves a series of negotiations and votes to elect the speaker, president, and ultimately the prime minister, a process that traditionally extends far beyond the formal timelines due to intense bargaining among the main blocs.
Sunni and Kurdish parties saw mixed results. Despite expectations that Muqtada al-Sadr’s boycott would open opportunities for Sunni gains, Sunni representation actually dropped from 80 seats in the previous parliament to 73. The Takaddum Front, the leading Sunni party, decreased from 44 seats to 37, while the Sovereignty Coalition, led by Khamis al-Khanjar, suffered its biggest loss with only 9 seats. The Kurdish political landscape also shifted: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) consolidated its power, winning twice as many votes as its rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and securing five minority-quota seats across Iraq. The PUK, meanwhile, increased its seats only slightly, from 17 to 18, and lost ground in key areas.
One notable development was the record participation of women candidates. According to The New Arab, 2,248 women ran for office, accounting for 30% of all candidates—the highest share since Iraq began holding parliamentary polls. Ultimately, women won 84 seats, making up 25.5% of the legislature and exceeding the constitutionally mandated 25% quota by a single seat. However, the overall presence of women in parliament actually shrank compared to 2021, when women held 96 seats (29%). Of the 84 women elected in 2025, just 25 secured their positions through direct votes, while the remaining 59 entered via the quota system.
Despite these numbers, the gap between representation and real influence remains substantial. The New Arab reported that women lawmakers, including independents, often align with dominant political blocs that control funding and decision-making. Within these parties, women rarely occupy senior positions or have the opportunity to shape policy. This lack of influence has had tangible consequences: parliament failed to pass a draft law on combating domestic violence, and attempts to amend the Personal Status Law have proceeded in ways not beneficial to women. Social constraints, such as male guardianship over how women vote, persist, and female voter turnout lagged behind that of men—even though the most recent census in November 2024 indicated near parity in population.
The overall results of the election were announced by IHEC on November 17, 2025, and were followed by a three-day window for appeals. By November 20, IHEC reported receiving 400 appeals. Complaints ranged from those lacking evidence (71 yellow complaints, all rejected) to others requiring administrative investigation or with the potential to affect results. IHEC spokeswoman Jumana al-Ghalai emphasized the transparency of the process, stating that the high turnout and the full match between manual and electronic vote counts indicated “the stability of Iraq’s electoral system and citizen’s trust in political processes.” Still, critics argue that the numbers mask deeper issues of exclusion and manipulation.
Another factor shaping the election was the economic structure of Iraq’s public sector. The International Labour Organization estimates that nearly 38% of Iraq’s workforce is employed by the public sector, and political parties control ministries and the distribution of jobs and contracts. This means that salaries, promotions, and transfers may depend on party loyalty, turning the act of voting into what some describe as an “act of compliance” rather than a free expression of political will.
The amended election law’s use of the Sainte-Laguë method with a first divisor of 1.7 made it more difficult for smaller parties and independents to win seats. This, combined with the financial power of larger blocs, meant that the 2025 parliament was once again saturated with established elites. Many young Iraqis feel that, given such structural barriers, politics is not a viable pathway to influence or meaningful change.
In the midst of these challenges, there were some signs of progress. The Halabja governorate, for instance, was recognized as Iraq’s 19th governorate in April 2025, although it did not have a vote in this election due to its classification under the Sulaimani constituency. In future elections, Halabja will have its own independent constituency, potentially opening new avenues for representation.
As Iraq’s political factions now enter the next phase of government formation, the shape of the new administration will depend on whether the main Shia parties can unite behind a nominee for prime minister or if alliances with Sunni and Kurdish blocs will shift the balance of power. The Coordination Framework has shortlisted nine potential candidates, including the incumbent Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, but divisions remain among the leading Shia blocs.
For many Iraqis, the 2025 election was a reminder that while the mechanisms of democracy are in place, the promise of real change remains elusive. The dominance of established parties, the barriers faced by women and independents, and the lingering influence of patronage networks all point to a political system still in transition. Whether future reforms can bridge the gap between representation and genuine influence is a question that will define Iraq’s democratic journey in the years ahead.
