On December 14, 2025, Iraq’s Supreme Federal Court delivered a long-awaited decision: it officially ratified the final results of the country’s parliamentary elections, held just over a month earlier on November 11. The move, reported by the Associated Press and confirmed by statements from Iraq’s judiciary, marks a pivotal moment in Iraq’s ongoing experiment with parliamentary democracy, even as the path to a new government remains fraught with political complexity and uncertainty.
The ratification came after the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) concluded its review of an astonishing 853 complaints and appeals regarding the election’s conduct and results. According to the Associated Press, the court found that "the voting process met all constitutional and legal requirements and had no irregularities affecting its validity." The Federal Supreme Court, chaired by Judge Mundhir Ibrahim Hussein, held a closed session to review the findings and issued a ruling—No. (235 / Federal / 2025)—that is, in its words, "final and binding on all authorities" under the Iraqi Constitution and the Federal Supreme Court Law.
This sixth parliamentary election since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion saw Iraqis voting in both general and special rounds across the country’s 18 constituencies. The result? No single political bloc emerged with a clear path to power, setting the stage for a familiar post-election scramble to forge alliances, cut deals, and—eventually—name a new prime minister.
Caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition secured the largest number of seats, winning 46 out of the 329 in the new parliament. But as the Associated Press notes, this is far from enough to guarantee al-Sudani a second term. In Iraq’s fractious political landscape, the largest bloc rarely gets to simply impose its preferred candidate. The coalition led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took 29 seats, while the Sadiqoun Bloc—headed by Qais al-Khazali, a prominent militia leader—won 28. The Kurdistan Democratic Party, under Masoud Barzani, and the Taqaddum (Progress) party led by former parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, each secured 27 seats. That last result, in particular, sets up an intriguing contest for the powerful role of parliament speaker.
In terms of broader alliances, Shiite parties and lists captured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77, and Kurdish parties 56. Nine seats were reserved for minority groups, reflecting Iraq’s complex sectarian and ethnic tapestry. As has become tradition, the top government posts are divided along these lines: the prime minister is always Shiite, the president a Kurd, and the parliament speaker Sunni.
Al-Sudani, who came to power in 2022 with the support of the Iran-aligned Coordination Framework, now faces an uphill battle. It remains uncertain whether the coalition will rally behind him again or seek a new consensus candidate. What is clear, as reported by multiple outlets including Shafaq News and the Supreme Judicial Council, is that no single bloc can form a government alone. Political leaders have already launched negotiations to build a ruling coalition—a process that, in Iraq, is often protracted and unpredictable.
To guide this process, Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council has laid out a strict constitutional timetable. The clock started ticking on December 14, the day of the court’s ratification. Within 15 days—that is, by December 29—the new Council of Representatives must convene and elect a speaker and two deputies. The first session of parliament is expected to occur within this period, setting the stage for the next round of political maneuvering.
Once the speaker and deputies are in place, the parliament has 30 days to elect a president. If, for example, the first session is held on December 29, the deadline for choosing a president would be January 28, 2026. After the president is elected, he or she has 15 days to name a prime minister-designate, putting the next deadline at February 12, 2026, if the presidency is decided on time. The newly appointed prime minister will then have 30 days to form a government and present it to parliament for approval.
The judicial council’s statement, as reported by multiple sources, emphasized the binding nature of these deadlines: “The Federal Supreme Court ratified today, Sunday, the final results of the general elections for membership of the Council of Representatives.” The process, it said, “fulfilled its constitutional and legal requirements.”
Even as politicians jockey for position, the mechanics of parliament continue to evolve. On December 15, IHEC issued a document clarifying the procedures for filling parliamentary seats that become vacant—a common occurrence in Iraq’s tumultuous politics. According to Shafaq News, if a seat from an open list becomes vacant, it will automatically go to the losing candidate on the same list who received the highest number of votes in that district. For seats tied to a single party or political organization, the next highest vote-getter from that group steps in. Reserved seats for ethnic or sectarian components are filled by another candidate from the same group and district with the highest votes among those who did not win. If the seat was held by a woman, the replacement must also be a woman from the same open list, unless it’s a seat reserved under component quotas—in which case the rules are slightly different.
All these procedures are designed to ensure continuity and representation in parliament, even as the broader process of government formation unfolds. The November 11 vote, after all, was not just a contest for power, but a test of Iraq’s electoral institutions and their ability to manage disputes, certify results, and keep the political process moving forward.
Behind the scenes, the negotiations to form a new government are already underway. With so many factions and interests at play—Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish, and minority groups—consensus will not come easily. Iraq’s recent history is littered with examples of coalition talks dragging on for months, sometimes even resulting in political paralysis. Yet, as the Supreme Judicial Council’s deadlines remind everyone, the country’s constitution and laws offer a roadmap, however challenging, to the next chapter.
For ordinary Iraqis, the hope is that these steps will lead to a government capable of tackling the country’s pressing problems: economic stagnation, corruption, security challenges, and the ever-present question of foreign influence. Whether this fractured parliament can rise to the occasion remains to be seen, but for now, the process—at least on paper—is proceeding as the constitution intended.
With the election results now final and binding, Iraq’s leaders face the daunting task of turning numbers into governance. The coming weeks will test not only their political acumen, but also the resilience of the country’s still-young democratic institutions.
