On November 11, 2025, Iraqis once again took to the polls in droves, driven by a potent mix of hope, frustration, and deep-seated sectarian anxieties. The sixth parliamentary election since the fall of Saddam Hussein unfolded in a country still wrestling with the ghosts of its past and the turbulence of its present. According to Al-Ahram Weekly, the results echoed a familiar refrain: no single party managed to secure a majority in the 329-seat House of Representatives, setting the stage for another round of fraught coalition-building and political brinkmanship.
The numbers tell a story of division and complexity. Shia parties, long the dominant force in post-2003 Iraq, won 187 seats. Sunni factions secured 77, Kurdish groups took 56, and the remainder went to smaller minorities. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition emerged as the largest single Shia bloc with 46 seats, but even this was not enough to guarantee him a renewed grip on power. As TIME reported, Al-Sudani was propelled to electoral triumph by 12 million voters—a 56.11% turnout in a nation of 46 million—but the triumph was bittersweet. Despite his popularity and visible development projects, he failed to secure a majority even within the Shia camp, leaving his political fate hanging in the balance.
Al-Sudani, a political figure who rose through the ranks of the Islamic Da’wa Party and later became a governor and cabinet minister, has tried to carve out an image of strength and stability. His smiling visage adorned billboards across Baghdad, and he was a nightly fixture on television, inaugurating projects and promising a brighter future. Yet, as Al-Ahram Weekly noted, the Shia Coordination Framework (CF)—the coalition of powerful Shia parties—did not automatically endorse him. Instead, they set up a committee to interview candidates for the prime minister’s post and even downgraded the role, describing the next premier as merely the "executive director" of the cabinet. The CF’s criteria, widely seen as both unconstitutional and humiliating, have thrown the process into further uncertainty.
In response, Al-Sudani’s camp struck a defiant tone. A spokesman blasted the CF’s decisions as unconstitutional, accusing it of trying to "dwarf" the prime minister’s post. The bloc declared that Al-Sudani would stand for nomination regardless of the CF’s maneuvers, and warned that he would "resort to the people" if denied a second term. The intrigue within the Shia ranks is only one layer of Iraq’s post-election puzzle.
Sunni and Kurdish parties, who together control 125 seats, now face the daunting task of negotiating with a fractured but numerically dominant Shia majority. The Kurdish political landscape is itself deeply divided, with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) expected to compete for the presidency—a post reserved for Kurds under Iraq’s unwritten sectarian power-sharing system. The Sunnis, meanwhile, have formed a National Political Council in an attempt to unify their negotiating stance, but internal rifts remain.
According to Iraq’s Constitution, the newly elected MPs must convene within 15 days of vote ratification to elect a speaker, then choose a president within another 15 days, and finally agree on a prime minister within a month. But as history has shown, this process is rarely smooth. The need for cross-sectarian deal-making often leads to prolonged stalemates, leaving the government in limbo and the country adrift.
Beyond the political drama, Iraq faces a daunting array of policy challenges. The economy, battered by years of conflict and mismanagement, remains heavily dependent on oil revenues, which make up more than 90% of public income. With oil prices projected to decline drastically, Al-Ahram Weekly warns of looming budget cuts that could affect nearly 10 million government employees, pensioners, and social security beneficiaries. High unemployment, especially among youth, continues to fuel discontent, while endemic corruption erodes public trust and hampers reform.
Water scarcity and pollution have reached crisis levels, particularly in the south. Iraq’s reservoirs are near depletion, its marshes imperiled by both climate change and the oil industry, and farmers are abandoning their land for overcrowded cities. A recent agreement with Turkey promises more sustainable water releases, but it comes with strings attached—namely, cooperation with Turkish firms for oil sales. As TIME observed, Baghdad’s reconstruction efforts have too often enriched the well-connected while leaving many Iraqis in squalor, with limited access to electricity and basic services.
Sectarianism remains deeply embedded in Iraq’s political order. The unwritten system—crafted in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion—reserves the prime ministership for a Shia, the parliamentary speakership for a Sunni, and the presidency for a Kurd. This arrangement, intended to balance Iraq’s diverse communities, has instead entrenched divisions and fueled cycles of patronage and cronyism. As TIME reported, the 2025 elections saw the continued ascendancy of Iran-backed Shia militias in politics. Qais al-Khazali’s Asaib Ahl al-Haq’s Sadiqoun Bloc won 27 seats, the Badr Organization took 21, and Harkat Hoqouq, representing Kataib Hezbollah, secured six. These groups, once on the battlefield, now wield immense political power in parliament.
The return of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, accused of fueling sectarian strife and blamed for the fall of Mosul to ISIS, has further stoked fears of authoritarianism and renewed societal divisions. His State of Law Alliance captured 29 seats, marking a dramatic comeback for a polarizing figure.
Efforts by civil movements and secular reformists to break the sectarian mold were largely unsuccessful. Sajad Salim, an independent MP known for criticizing Shia militias, was initially barred from running (a decision later overturned), but still lost. Shurouq al-Abaychi’s secular coalition, the Alternative Alliance, was defeated, with accusations that established parties used their resources and influence to intimidate voters and manipulate results. Many Iraqis, especially those in the diaspora, were excluded from voting due to new rules requiring voter cards to be issued only in-country—a move seen by some as retaliation for the diaspora’s support of the 2019 Tishreen protests.
Foreign interference remains a constant backdrop. Iranian-backed militias hold significant sway in parliament, while the United States, under the watchful eye of Special Envoy Mark Savaya, has issued warnings about the need for Iraq to resolve the issue of "weapons outside state control" and protect the prestige of its institutions. As Savaya told a Kurdish news outlet, "There are big changes coming in Iraq... everyone will see actions instead of words." He added on social media, "Today, the world views Iraq as a country capable of playing a larger and more influential role in the region, provided that the issue of weapons outside state control is fully resolved and the prestige of official institutions is protected."
As Iraq’s political elite embark on the familiar, labyrinthine process of power-sharing negotiations, ordinary Iraqis are left waiting—again—for real change. The stakes are high: the next government will inherit an economy in peril, a society riven by sectarian and economic divides, and a state whose sovereignty is continually tested by foreign powers and armed groups. Whether this moment will yield a new beginning or simply perpetuate the cycle remains uncertain, but for now, Iraq stands at a crossroads, its future hanging in the balance.
