India’s nuclear energy landscape has undergone a seismic shift with the enactment of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Bill (SHANTI), 2025. Passed in December 2025 during a just-concluded session of the Indian parliament, this legislation signals a deliberate break from the country’s decades-old approach to nuclear governance—one that was defined by state monopoly, legal exceptionalism, and a risk-avoidance mindset. Instead, SHANTI seeks to balance ambition with realism, opening the door to private participation and global partnerships while retaining strong sovereign oversight and a robust safety regime.
For much of independent India’s history, nuclear regulation rested on a single premise: catastrophic risk had to be contained through state monopoly and centralized command. The Atomic Energy Act of 1962 embodied this philosophy, equating sovereignty with ownership and concentrating all operational, financial, and technological responsibility within a single public entity. This approach, as noted in the Statement of Objects and Reasons (SOR) for SHANTI, became a constraint on clean energy expansion, private participation, and timely capacity addition. According to EurAsian Times, the previous legal framework discouraged foreign companies and stifled innovation, resulting in delayed projects and technological stagnation.
The SHANTI Act’s most significant departure lies in how it redefines the relationship between the state, markets, and high-consequence technological risk. The Act enables participation by both public and private entities, shifting the locus of state authority from production to governance. As the SOR makes clear, the objective is to allow broader participation without compromising safety, security, or India’s self-reliance in the nuclear fuel cycle. The state remains central—not as the sole operator, but as the architect and guarantor of the system within which multiple operators function. This mirrors India’s regulatory evolution in other strategic sectors, where the state has moved from monopolist to system regulator without surrendering sovereign objectives.
One of the most consequential changes introduced by SHANTI is its treatment of nuclear liability. The earlier Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), 2010, relied on an expansive conception of supplier liability. This framework, while morally appealing, rendered nuclear risk uninsurable and projects unbankable, as it was nearly impossible for suppliers to calculate their liability in the event of a nuclear accident. As EurAsian Times reports, this discouraged American, French, and other Western companies from entering India’s nuclear market, even after landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreements were signed with the United States, France, Russia, and other countries.
SHANTI replaces this moralized framework with explicit risk allocation. Liability is now channeled, bounded, and supported by insurance mechanisms and sovereign backing. The Act recognizes that low-probability, high-impact nuclear accidents represent systemic risk, not firm-specific failure, and cannot be internalized by private balance sheets alone. This approach aligns India’s liability regime with international best practices, making the country a more attractive destination for global nuclear vendors and finance. According to EurAsian Times, this investor-friendly legal framework could reinforce strategic partnerships with supplier countries while maintaining sovereign control over sensitive fuel-cycle elements.
To further enhance regulatory clarity, SHANTI introduces a dedicated atomic disputes tribunal. This specialized body is intended to address disputes related to nuclear operations, contracts, and liabilities, offering a structured mechanism for resolution within the sector. The SOR’s emphasis on licensing, safety authorization, and dedicated dispute-resolution mechanisms reflects a calibrated approach: exceptional safety oversight and security protocols coexist with otherwise standard principles of procurement, financing, and participation. This tiered governance model distinguishes between the unique risks of nuclear power and the need for innovation and capital infusion.
The Act’s enactment comes at a critical juncture for India’s global nuclear ambitions. Since 2016, India’s application for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—the 48-member body that governs global nuclear trade worth about $40 billion annually—has remained pending. The NSG requires importing states to have International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and stringent security measures to prevent misuse or diversion of nuclear material. According to Ambassador Rafael Mariano Grossi, the head of the IAEA and former NSG chairman, India’s membership is ultimately a political decision and remains a work in progress as of late 2025.
The road to NSG membership has been anything but straightforward. While the United States initiated the process of ending India’s nuclear isolation by signing a civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 2008, and the NSG granted India a waiver to facilitate nuclear trade, China has consistently blocked India’s membership bid. China’s stance is that India’s entry should be conditional on simultaneous admission of Pakistan, a position rooted more in geopolitics than legal precedent. As EurAsian Times notes, France, Japan, Argentina, and Brazil all became NSG members without being signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), undermining the argument that NPT membership is a prerequisite.
Ambassador Grossi, in an interview with EurAsian Times, underscored India’s growing importance in the global nuclear industry. “India is important. No member in NSG is against India. India is far more advanced in nuclear energy than many NSG members. You just cannot ignore India. India is a key nuclear power that has focused on developing its nuclear energy for use in the agriculture sector, in the field of medicine, and in the development of its nuclear plants. It has an excellent reputation and an indisputable role, which will be even more important in the future. The globalisation of India’s nuclear programme is something to be welcomed.”
However, Grossi was also careful to point out that NSG membership is fundamentally a matter of consensus. “India’s membership quest is a work in progress... But then, ultimately, it (decision on India’s membership) is going to be a political decision. The NSG functions on the premise of compatibility and consensus through established guidelines.” He added, “So in India’s case, we are no longer very orthodox and legalistic.”
Despite not yet being an NSG member, India has already joined three other multilateral export control regimes—the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group—since 2016. These memberships have bolstered India’s credibility and demonstrated its responsible behavior in non-proliferation, but China remains unmoved. Because the NSG operates by consensus, a single holdout can block membership, and China has made clear that it will continue to do so until Pakistan’s aspirations are also addressed.
For India, SHANTI represents more than just a new law—it is a philosophical and practical shift in how the country manages high-consequence technological risk. The Act embodies a risk-management mindset, accepting that some risks cannot be eliminated, only structured and governed. It signals that exceptional risk requires differentiated oversight, not permanent exclusion from the institutional mainstream. As Aditya Sinha, writing for EurAsian Times, observes, SHANTI “reflects a maturing state. One that no longer treats risk as a moral failure or private participation as a loss of control. Instead, it recognises regulation as an exercise in institutional design under uncertainty.”
As India looks to scale up its nuclear capacity to meet rising energy and climate imperatives, the SHANTI Act provides a coherent, investor-friendly, and safety-conscious framework. Whether this will be enough to overcome geopolitical obstacles to NSG membership remains to be seen, but it undeniably marks a new chapter in India’s nuclear journey—one characterized by openness, pragmatism, and a willingness to embrace complexity.
