The global nuclear landscape is shifting rapidly, with South Asia and the world’s major powers recalibrating their deterrence strategies and capabilities in response to new threats and technological advancements. The past year has seen India assertively redraw the boundaries of conventional and nuclear deterrence, while debates rage in the United States over the future of arms control with Russia, especially as China’s nuclear arsenal continues its dramatic expansion.
Operation Sindoor, India’s bold response to a Pakistan-sponsored terrorist strike, sent shockwaves through the region and beyond. According to Lt Gen PR Kumar (Retd), writing for Indian Defence Review on October 17, 2025, India’s actions during and after the operation demonstrated a clear willingness to employ conventional military options, even in the face of nuclear threats from Pakistan. This marked a significant shift in India’s strategic signaling, with the country conveying to both Pakistan and the global community that nuclear threats would not inhibit its conventional military responses.
India’s nuclear doctrine, publicly adopted in 2003, remains anchored in a ‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy and the principle of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence.’ The doctrine promises massive retaliation if India is attacked with nuclear weapons—or other weapons of mass destruction. Operational control of India’s nuclear arsenal rests with the Nuclear Command Authority, led by the Prime Minister. Notably, India maintains bilateral agreements with Pakistan prohibiting attacks on each other’s nuclear installations and conducts annual exchanges of nuclear asset lists, signaling a commitment to transparency even amid high tensions.
Yet, as Lt Gen Kumar points out, Operation Sindoor signaled a new phase in India’s deterrence strategy. Rejecting what it calls “nuclear blackmail,” India made it clear that it would not allow Pakistan’s nuclear threats to limit its military options. “No nuclear blackmail will be tolerated,” Indian leaders declared, as cited by Indian Defence Review. The operation also closed the gap between state and non-state actors, holding Pakistan directly responsible for terrorist acts perpetrated by groups it supports. This shift, experts argue, raises the costs for Pakistan’s complicity in terrorism—but also increases the risk of escalation in South Asia.
India’s approach now emphasizes cumulative deterrence, combining punitive strikes, diplomatic isolation, and economic restrictions as part of a multi-domain strategy. The escalatory ladder, as described by Kumar, ranges from pre-kinetic operations in the political, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic spheres, to conventional military strikes, and, if necessary, nuclear response. However, India remains committed to its NFU policy, only contemplating nuclear use in retaliation for a nuclear (or possibly biological/chemical) attack.
To ensure credible deterrence, India is rapidly modernizing its nuclear capabilities. The commissioning of the second SSBN, INS Arighat, in August 2024, and the launch of the S4* SSBN in October 2024—with 75% indigenous content and equipped with K-4 missiles having a 3,500 km range—underscore this commitment. Two more advanced S5 SSBNs are under design, featuring K5 missiles and a 190 MW reactor. The successful test of the Agni-Prime ballistic missile from a rail-based launcher on September 26, 2025, with a 2,000 km range, further demonstrates India’s growing operational flexibility and survivability of its nuclear forces.
India’s modernization efforts extend beyond submarines and missiles. The country has procured 31 Predator drones from the United States, inaugurated a Very Low Frequency Naval Station at Damagundam, Telangana, to maintain communication with submerged SSBNs, and continues to improve its intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning systems. The 2025–26 Union Budget allocated Rs 37,482.93 crore to the Department of Atomic Energy, with an additional Rs 20,000 crore earmarked for a Nuclear Energy Mission focused on deploying at least five Small Modular Reactors by 2033. India aims to reach 100 GW of nuclear power capacity by 2047, with several new reactors and a prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam expected to reach first criticality by 2026.
While India’s nuclear modernization is largely driven by regional dynamics—especially the collusive relationship between China and Pakistan—the global nuclear order faces its own set of challenges. In an article published by Foreign Policy on October 16, 2025, Matthew Kroenig argues forcefully against extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, which is set to expire in February 2026. Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a one-year extension in September 2025, a suggestion U.S. President Donald Trump tentatively supported. But Kroenig contends that such an extension would be a mistake, given the rapidly evolving threat landscape.
New START, signed in 2010, limits the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads each. Over the decades, arms control agreements have played a key role in stabilizing the U.S.-Russia relationship and supporting U.S. nuclear modernization. However, Kroenig notes that New START is now “on life support,” with Russia having suspended participation in 2023 and the United States following suit on verification protocols, though both countries still comply with the treaty’s numerical limits.
The most pressing issue, according to Kroenig, is China’s unprecedented nuclear buildup. When New START was signed, China had only a few hundred nuclear weapons; now, projections suggest it could possess 1,500 by 2035. This means, for the first time, the United States must contend with two near-peer nuclear superpowers. “The United States’ current and planned nuclear forces will be insufficient to deal with this rapidly evolving threat,” Kroenig writes, citing a bipartisan commission’s unanimous conclusion in 2023.
He argues that the United States must urgently prepare to expand its nuclear arsenal, including uploading additional warheads onto strategic platforms, acquiring more nuclear-capable bombers and submarines, and developing new nonstrategic nuclear weapons for deployment in both Europe and Asia. “Extending New START by one year, therefore, would be a mistake. It would prohibit the United States from taking necessary steps to deter both China and Russia,” Kroenig warns, emphasizing that deterrence, not arms race avoidance, is the primary purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.
These developments reflect a broader trend: the return of nuclear competition as a central feature of international security. China’s rapid arsenal expansion, Russia’s assertive posture, and India’s recalibrated deterrence strategy are all symptoms of a world in which nuclear stability can no longer be taken for granted. As arms control agreements falter and modernization programs accelerate, the risks of miscalculation and escalation rise—especially in volatile regions like South Asia.
For policymakers and the public alike, these shifts serve as a stark reminder that the nuclear question remains as urgent and complex as ever. The coming years will test the ability of states to balance deterrence, diplomacy, and restraint in a world where old certainties are fading and new dangers are emerging.