On Monday, December 15, 2025, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma took to X with a pointed rebuttal, responding to Pakistan’s claims about China’s purported control over the Brahmaputra river’s flow into India. The dispute, which has rippled across diplomatic and social media channels, comes amid heightened water tensions in South Asia, where rivers are as much about geopolitics as they are about lifelines for millions.
The latest exchange began when Rana Ihsaan Afzal, special assistant to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, publicly questioned, “What if China stops the Brahmaputra Water to India?” This rhetorical jab was issued in the wake of India’s recent move to halt parts of the Indus waters to Pakistan—a significant escalation following the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam terror attack that left several Indian civilians dead. Pakistan’s line of questioning was clear: could China leverage its upstream position to squeeze India’s water supply, just as India had done to Pakistan?
Assam’s chief minister wasn’t having any of it. Sarma, who leads one of India’s most flood-prone states, responded with a blend of scientific detail and political resolve. “Brahmaputra is a river that grows in India—not shrinks,” he declared, swiftly dismantling the “scare narrative” he attributed to Pakistan. According to Sarma, “China contributes only ~30-35% of the Brahmaputra's total flow,” with the majority—65-70%—coming from the monsoon rains and tributaries within India’s own borders. “The Brahmaputra is not a river India depends on upstream—it is a rain-fed Indian river system, strengthened after entering Indian territory,” he asserted.
Sarma didn’t stop at percentages. He provided hydrological context, contrasting the river’s flow at the India-China border—about 2,000 to 3,000 cubic metres per second—with its massive surge in the Assam plains, where monsoon season sees it swell to between 15,000 and 20,000 cubic metres per second. “Any reduction in water flow from China may help India mitigate the annual floods in Assam,” Sarma added, turning the tables on Pakistan’s suggested threat and highlighting a recurring crisis that uproots hundreds of thousands in his state each year.
He also invoked history, reminding Pakistan of its long-standing advantages under the Indus Waters Treaty: “Pakistan, which has exploited 74 years of preferential water access under the Indus Waters Treaty, now panics as India rightfully reclaims its sovereign rights.” Sarma closed his post with a resolute message: “Brahmaputra is not controlled by a single source—it is powered by our geography, our monsoon, and our civilizational resilience.”
This war of words unfolded against a backdrop of veiled warnings from Beijing. Victor Zhikai Gao, a senior Chinese policy advisor, issued a cryptic statement: “Don’t do onto others what you don’t want done to you.” While he didn’t name India directly, the timing and context left little doubt. According to BBC, this was widely interpreted as a response to India’s suspension of parts of the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan, signaling that water, like trade or territory, is now firmly on Asia’s strategic chessboard.
What’s fueling these anxieties is China’s reported plan to construct the so-called “Great Bend Dam” on the Brahmaputra, just 30 kilometers from the Indian border. This proposed mega-dam would generate a staggering 60 gigawatts of power—three times the capacity of the famed Three Gorges Dam—and would be the world’s most powerful hydroelectric project. Its sheer scale and proximity to India have set off alarm bells in New Delhi. As reported by India Today, BJP MP Tapir Gao described the project as a “water bomb” that could be deployed against India and other downstream countries. Dr. Ranbir Singh, Chairman of the Brahmaputra Board, questioned the long-term consequences: “The Brahmaputra Basin is the only water-surplus river basin in India. With this dam in China, are we looking at a water-deficient Brahmaputra river basin?”
These developments come as India recalibrates its water diplomacy. For decades, New Delhi abided by the Indus Waters Treaty, even as cross-border attacks tested its patience. But after the Pahalgam massacre, India suspended its flow data sharing and restricted some water access to Pakistan—a rare move that marks a significant shift in strategy. China’s indirect response, through both words and infrastructural plans, is a reminder that water is now a key lever in regional power dynamics.
The tensions don’t end there. On Sunday, December 14, 2025, Sarma issued a stern warning to Bangladesh after Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, during a visit to China, called India’s Northeast “landlocked” and suggested Bangladesh was its “only guardian of the ocean.” Sarma responded on X: “Bangladesh has two of its own 'chicken necks'. Both are far more vulnerable,” referring to the 80-kilometer corridor from Dakshin Dinajpur to South West Garo Hills and the 28-kilometer stretch connecting Chittagong port to Dhaka. “If Bangladesh attacks our Chicken's Neck, we will attack both the Chicken Necks of Bangladesh,” Sarma warned, referencing India’s recent Operation Sindoor, which targeted terror infrastructure inside Pakistan. He didn’t mince words, stating, “Bangladesh has to be reborn 14 times before attacking India.”
These remarks were not made in a vacuum. Reports have surfaced of Chinese support to revive a World War II-era airbase in Lalmonirhat, Bangladesh, just 100 kilometers from the Siliguri Corridor—a strategic strip that connects India’s Northeast to the rest of the country. For India, the possibility of increased Chinese presence so close to this “chicken neck” only adds to the region’s strategic anxieties.
All of this is unfolding as India faces an unprecedented internal water crisis. The country, home to nearly 17% of the world’s population but just 4% of its freshwater resources, is staring at a future where water scarcity could trigger not just diplomatic disputes, but domestic upheaval. According to the Union Minister of Jal Shakti’s latest groundwater assessment, nearly 600 million Indians are already experiencing high to extreme water stress. Groundwater, the invisible lifeline for irrigation and drinking water, is being depleted faster than it can be replenished, with over 25% of assessment units categorized as overexploited, critical, or semi-critical.
India’s water diplomacy, therefore, is not just about fending off external threats or responding to neighboring countries’ provocations. It’s about ensuring that the taps don’t run dry at home, even as the rivers become bargaining chips in a high-stakes regional game. The Brahmaputra, with its mighty flow and geopolitical significance, stands at the heart of this challenge—one that will test India’s resolve, resilience, and readiness for years to come.
The story of the Brahmaputra is, at its core, a reminder that rivers don’t just cross borders—they shape destinies. As the debate rages on, the fate of millions depends not just on rainfall and melting glaciers, but on the delicate dance of diplomacy, strategy, and survival in South Asia’s water wars.
