In the high-stakes world of nuclear defense, the balance between deterrence and diplomacy is being tested like never before. Recent events in South Asia and the shifting global landscape are prompting policymakers, military strategists, and scholars to reassess the old playbook—and perhaps write a new one. The question on everyone’s mind: can the world rely on the threat of mutual destruction to keep the peace, or is it time to double down on dialogue and risk-reduction measures?
Just this past May, the world watched with bated breath as India and Pakistan—two nuclear-armed rivals—exchanged missile strikes for the first time since their nuclearization in 1998. According to South Asian Voices, the crisis escalated when India launched its dual-capable BrahMos missile during a tense standoff, prompting fears in Washington of a possible nuclear exchange. The United States quickly intervened, working behind the scenes to de-escalate the situation. In a region where the line between conventional and nuclear conflict is perilously thin, this episode was a stark reminder of how quickly things could spiral out of control.
But here’s the twist: despite the presence of highly destabilizing dual-use delivery systems—missiles that can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads—catastrophic escalation didn’t happen. This wasn’t the first time, either. Back in March 2022, an Indian BrahMos missile was accidentally launched into Pakistani territory, damaging civilian properties but miraculously causing no casualties. Pakistan’s military tracked the missile’s path, initiated tactical actions, and, ultimately, did not retaliate militarily. India responded by ordering an inquiry and terminating three Air Force officers, though it declined Pakistan’s request for a joint investigation.
These incidents might tempt some to believe that dual-use systems are less dangerous than theorists have long argued. After all, both sides have so far managed to avoid disaster. But experts caution against drawing the wrong conclusions. As South Asian Voices notes, "while dual-capable missiles do not inevitably lead to misperception and nuclear escalation, they do introduce ambiguity that could undermine crisis stability in future scenarios with higher intensity and more compressed decision timelines." In other words, the world has been lucky so far—but luck is not a strategy.
The theoretical risks are well documented. Dual-use missiles create uncertainty about their payload, which could lead an adversary to assume the worst—that a conventional strike is actually the opening salvo of a nuclear attack. This “use it or lose it” dilemma is compounded by the entanglement of conventional and nuclear forces, making it difficult for military planners to distinguish between the two in the heat of the moment. The psychological and emotional pressures of a crisis only add to the risk of miscalculation.
Pakistan’s response to the May 2025 crisis was instructive. Instead of escalating with its own long-range cruise missiles, it opted for conventionally-armed, short-range Fatah-I and Fatah-II ballistic missiles. According to analysts, this was likely seen as sufficient for proportional retaliation without crossing the nuclear threshold. Yet, as South Asian Voices points out, the intervention of the United States may have been a deciding factor in Pakistan’s restraint—raising questions about what might happen if international mediation isn’t available in a future crisis.
At the heart of these dilemmas is the enduring debate between deterrence and diplomacy. The logic of deterrence—especially the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)—has kept the peace between nuclear powers for decades. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union amassed vast arsenals, each knowing that a nuclear strike would guarantee their own destruction. This uneasy balance prevented direct conflict, and the concept of deterrence remains central to national security thinking to this day, as The Diplomatic Insight observes.
But the world has changed. New nuclear states like North Korea and Pakistan have emerged, and nonstate actors—terrorist groups unconstrained by rational calculations—pose new challenges. The rise of cyberwarfare adds another layer of danger: a well-timed cyberattack could cripple early warning systems, potentially triggering a catastrophic mistake. Critics argue that deterrence is an illusion, fueling arms races and global tensions rather than ensuring real security.
Diplomacy, on the other hand, offers a different path. Treaties like the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in effect since 1970, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) have slowed the spread of nuclear weapons and promoted disarmament. The New START treaty between the U.S. and Russia, initiated in 2010 and extended in 2021, limits deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, enhancing transparency and predictability. Even so, there have been setbacks—such as the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019.
In South Asia, recent developments suggest a hybrid approach may be emerging. Pakistan has established an Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC) to separate the operational employment of land-based conventional missiles from nuclear delivery systems. A former senior official explained that "the formation of ARFC has separated the operational employment of land based conventional missiles from the land based nuclear delivery systems of the National Command Authority (NCA)." If India were to follow suit, it could further reduce the risk of misperception and inadvertent escalation.
Communication, too, has played a crucial role. During the May 2025 crisis, India and Pakistan maintained a hotline between their Directors-General of Military Operations, even as tensions ran high. The use of such backchannels—and the potential for a similar hotline between foreign secretaries—could provide vital avenues for de-escalation in future crises. As South Asian Voices suggests, upgrading existing pre-launch notification agreements to include cruise and hypersonic missiles, not just ballistic ones, would be a concrete step toward reducing ambiguity.
Technology, of course, is a double-edged sword. Advances in missile defense systems, artificial intelligence, and machine learning could alter the calculus of nuclear strategy in unpredictable ways. Reliable missile defense might undermine deterrence, while AI could both assist in arms control and raise fears of accidental escalation if decision-making becomes automated. As The Diplomatic Insight notes, "AI would facilitate the management of intricate arms control agreements, identify potential security threats, and allow for improved decision-making under crisis situations." But it also brings new risks if not carefully managed.
Ultimately, the future of nuclear defense may hinge on a delicate balance of deterrence and diplomacy. Strategic stability depends not only on the threat of retaliation, but also on arms control, transparency, and crisis management. As the world becomes more complex and the pace of technological change accelerates, international cooperation and clear communication will be more important than ever.
For India and Pakistan—and indeed, for all nuclear-armed states—the lessons of recent crises are clear. While catastrophic escalation has so far been avoided, the risks remain very real. Institutionalizing risk reduction measures, disentangling nuclear and conventional forces, and strengthening diplomatic frameworks are not just wise—they are essential steps in safeguarding a precarious peace.