India’s strategic forces are on the brink of a significant leap forward, with the navy chief Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi confirming on December 2, 2025, that the country’s third locally-built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, Aridaman, is in the final stages of trials and will soon be commissioned. This development, reported by The National Bulletin, marks a major milestone in India’s ongoing efforts to enhance its maritime nuclear deterrent and solidify its status as one of the select nations capable of deploying strategic weapons by land, air, and sea.
Admiral Tripathi, speaking during his annual media conference on the eve of Navy Day, stated, “Aridaman is in the final stages of trials and it will be commissioned soon.” The commissioning is expected to occur early next year, with a fourth SSBN, S-4, planned to follow in 2027. The Arihant-class submarines, to which Aridaman belongs, are designed as undetectable platforms for launching nuclear missiles, reinforcing India’s nuclear triad.
According to Hindustan Times, India’s nuclear triad was first completed in 2018 when the INS Arihant, the nation’s first indigenous SSBN, finished its maiden deterrence patrol. Prime Minister Narendra Modi then declared the achievement as a major victory for national security. The INS Arihant, commissioned in 2016, is equipped with 12 B-05 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) capable of delivering nuclear warheads up to 750 kilometers. Its successor, INS Arighaat, was commissioned in August 2024 and is based at Visakhapatnam, further strengthening India’s sea-based deterrence posture.
What sets the new Aridaman and the forthcoming S-4 apart is their enhanced capability. These submarines will be equipped with K-4 SLBMs, which boast a range of up to 3,500 kilometers. This extended reach means Indian submarines could, in theory, strike targets deep within adversary territory, a crucial factor in maintaining credible second-strike capability. As Admiral Tripathi emphasized, “The platforms will be in a position to fire nuclear missiles even in the event of a signal failure at New Delhi.”
India’s arsenal, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) yearbook published in June 2025, now stands at an estimated 180 nuclear warheads, up from 172 the previous year. Pakistan, by contrast, is estimated to have 170 nuclear weapons, and China’s arsenal has grown to 600 warheads from 500 a year earlier. These numbers, while indicative of India’s progress, also highlight the enduring regional competition and the shadow cast by China’s formidable capabilities.
India’s nuclear doctrine, promulgated in 2003, remains anchored in a “no first use” policy. Weapons are to be used only in response to a nuclear attack on Indian territory or forces, with retaliation aimed at causing “unacceptable damage.” This policy, while reassuring in its restraint, is designed to deter adversaries by maintaining a credible and survivable second-strike force—hence the emphasis on nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines that can remain hidden and operational for extended periods.
Alongside these strategic developments, India is also pursuing a 70,000-crore Project 75I to build six next-generation conventional submarines. The project, a collaboration between Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) in Mumbai and Germany’s thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (tkMS), is at an advanced stage of negotiations. These submarines will feature air-independent propulsion (AIP), significantly enhancing their underwater endurance and stealth, with the first delivery expected seven years after contract signing and subsequent deliveries at a rate of one per year. As part of the deal, tkMS will transfer design and technology to India, supporting the nation’s drive for self-sufficiency in defense production. The minimum indigenous content in the first submarine is set at 45 percent, rising to 60 percent by the sixth vessel.
But India’s maritime assertiveness has not gone unnoticed by its neighbors. In May 2025, during Operation Sindoor, the Indian Navy’s aggressive maneuvers in the northern Arabian Sea had a tangible impact on Pakistan’s economy and maritime activity. Admiral Tripathi noted, “Many of the major global shipping companies started avoiding going to Pakistani ports. Also, there was an increase in the insurance premiums if you were heading to Pakistani ports and that led to minimising the number of merchant ships willing to take the risk.” The operation effectively confined the Pakistan Navy to its own shores, with the Vikrant carrier battle group playing a pivotal role in keeping Pakistani forces near the Makran coast. “We continue to maintain a high tempo of operations, including in the northern Arabian Sea, and robust maritime domain awareness so that we can swiftly respond to any eventuality,” Tripathi added.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s nuclear program remains mired in controversy and concern. As detailed in The Economic Times, the legacy of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called “father of the bomb,” has exposed deep vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s nuclear security. Former CIA officer James Lawler revealed that American intelligence provided President General Pervez Musharraf with “absolutely incontrovertible evidence” that Khan was exporting nuclear secrets to Libya and possibly other states. Despite this, Khan was merely placed under a carefully staged house arrest, with no formal trial or international interrogation. The episode, sanitized for domestic audiences, underscored the Pakistani military’s reluctance to hold its own accountable.
The proliferation network orchestrated by Khan operated for years, trafficking nuclear centrifuge technology, blueprints, and components across continents. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s powerful espionage agency, has also been implicated in illicit activities, including drug trafficking to finance militant groups. This operational culture of corruption and black-market dealings raises uncomfortable questions about the true extent of state complicity in nuclear proliferation.
The downstream consequences are stark. Designs originating from Khan’s network are believed to have reached Iran, whose early centrifuge models bore unmistakable similarities to those first developed by Khan. As Iran advances its enrichment capabilities, the specter of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East looms large. Lawler warned that a nuclear Iran could spark a “nuclear pandemic” in the region—a threat whose roots lie in Pakistan’s earlier negligence.
Perhaps most worrying is the risk of nuclear technology falling into the hands of non-state actors. Pakistan’s internal instability, the rise of groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the ideological infiltration of segments of the military compound these fears. As the article in The Economic Times put it, “A nuclear state where militants once attacked an airbase housing strategic aircraft is not a state capable of ensuring nuclear security.” The risk, though unthinkable to some, remains all too real in South Asia’s volatile security landscape.
India, by contrast, continues to modernize its naval and air capabilities. The navy operates two aircraft carriers—INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya—and is set to receive its first Rafale Marine fighter jets in 2029 as part of a 63,000-crore deal with France. The order, placed in April 2025, includes 26 jets and provisions for local manufacturing and technology transfer, further deepening India’s defense-industrial base and integrating indigenous weapons systems.
As India forges ahead with its ambitious submarine and naval aviation programs, the region’s nuclear balance remains precarious. The dangers of proliferation, state negligence, and the specter of non-state actors acquiring nuclear technology cast a long shadow over South Asia and beyond. For now, India’s steady progress stands in marked contrast to Pakistan’s troubled legacy—a difference that may well shape the security of the region for years to come.
