On October 12, 2025, the Middle East and the broader global security landscape found themselves at a crossroads as Iran’s claim of deploying hypersonic weapons in its conflict with Israel sent shockwaves across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The announcement, reported by multiple outlets, forced Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, among others, to urgently reassess their defense strategies in the face of rapidly evolving missile threats. The psychological and political reverberations of hypersonic weapons—capable of traveling at speeds and maneuvering in ways that challenge existing missile defenses—have not only unsettled the Gulf but also reignited debates about a new global arms race.
According to reporting by the Eurasian Times and other sources, this latest escalation comes amid a flurry of technological advances and shifting alliances. The United States, recognizing the mounting anxieties among its Gulf partners, has seized the moment to push for a comprehensive regional air and missile defense system. In May 2024, Washington convened U.S.–GCC Defense Working Groups in Riyadh to discuss the integration of sensors, interceptors, and command systems—a vision of a defense network that transcends national boundaries. The benefits of such collaboration were made starkly clear during the Iran-Israel conflict, where real-time data sharing and a common operating picture became indispensable against unpredictable missile threats.
Yet, the proposal is not without its hurdles. As reported by the Eurasian Times, GCC states remain wary of sovereignty concerns, data security, and the political risks of openly coordinating defense efforts. There’s a palpable tension: while the logic of collective security is compelling, the realities of regional rivalries and domestic sensitivities make implementation tricky. Nevertheless, the U.S. has pressed ahead, conducting a series of “Sands” exercises—Red Sands, Blue Sands, and Yellow Sands—with GCC partners. These drills, while not specific to hypersonic threats, have focused on countering unmanned aerial systems and enhancing radar sharing and missile interception, underscoring the urgency of building a cohesive defense network capable of handling threats that move faster and strike harder than ever before.
As the hypersonic era dawns, the GCC states are taking divergent paths shaped by their unique positions and alliances. Saudi Arabia has moved decisively, transitioning from purchasing Chinese missile systems to developing its own domestic missile production capabilities. This shift, highlighted in Eurasian Times analysis, signals Riyadh’s commitment to long-term deterrence and its exploration of hypersonic strike concepts. The UAE, for its part, has become adept at integrating next-generation systems—often American—into its arsenal, despite the regulatory and political challenges that come with such partnerships. Qatar, meanwhile, has focused on maintaining credible layered defenses and the ability to rapidly integrate into coalition operations. Its successful defense of Al Udeid Air Base against an Iranian missile strike was a vivid demonstration of its capabilities and its diplomatic balancing act.
But the hypersonic arms race is not just a regional affair. The shadow of great power competition looms large. Both China and Russia have been aggressively marketing and testing their own hypersonic weapons, offering potential partnerships to Gulf states eager to keep pace. However, as the Eurasian Times and other analysts have pointed out, acquiring such technology is fraught with technical, political, and legal barriers. Export-control frameworks like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) restrict the transfer of sensitive missile technologies, while the technical challenges of developing hypersonic weapons—requiring specialized materials, guidance systems, and testing infrastructure—are formidable.
The allure of hypersonic technology for the GCC is clear: the ability to deter adversaries by threatening high-value, well-defended targets and complicating Iranian strategic calculations. Yet, the arguments against such a pursuit are equally compelling. The costs are enormous, the military advantage over advanced conventional strikes is ambiguous, and the risk of escalation is ever-present. Perhaps most critically, the pursuit of non-aligned hypersonic programs could strain vital IAMD partnerships with the United States, which remains the cornerstone of daily security for many Gulf states. As the Eurasian Times put it, "the U.S. is cautious about Gulf states exploring non-aligned hypersonic programs, emphasizing the importance of maintaining alignment with American defense strategies."
Meanwhile, the specter of a new global nuclear arms race is growing. On October 12, 2025, Dr. Ben Zala, a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Monash University, discussed the shifting nuclear landscape on ABC. The end of the Cold War had brought significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the former USSR and the United States, but with key treaties expiring or already expired, the world is once again facing the possibility of renewed nuclear competition. Dr. Zala noted, "some treaties that enabled these reductions are finished or about to expire, raising concerns about renewed nuclear arms competition." Recent images of Russian soldiers loading Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile launchers during tactical nuclear drills have only heightened these anxieties.
Russia, for its part, is not standing still. On October 10, 2025, President Vladimir Putin announced at a press conference in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, that Russia is testing a new weapon system, with tests "proceeding successfully." While Putin did not specify the nature of the weapon, speculation by military analysts such as Igor Korotchenko, cited by TASS, suggests it may involve a breakthrough in solid-propellant missile technology—specifically, variable-thrust capabilities. This would represent a significant leap, allowing missiles to perform mid-course corrections, speed changes, and evasive maneuvers, making them far more difficult to intercept by advanced anti-missile systems like THAAD or Aegis.
As military analyst Vijainder K Thakur explained, "if Russia has indeed achieved variable-thrust solid propulsion, it would mark a significant milestone in missile technology—one that blurs the long-standing performance gap between solid- and liquid-fueled systems." Such advances would enhance the flexibility, survivability, and unpredictability of Russia’s strategic arsenal, further complicating the calculus of missile defense and deterrence for both regional and global actors.
Putin’s remarks were also made in the context of his proposal to extend the New START arms-control treaty, which limits American and Russian strategic offensive weapons and is set to expire on February 5, 2026. He expressed optimism that the treaty would be extended, "as long as there is goodwill" on Washington’s part, but he was quick to assert that Russia feels secure regardless, given the "novelty" of its nuclear deterrent and its continuous improvement.
For the GCC, the choices made now—whether to prioritize defensive measures and alliances or to pursue offensive hypersonic systems—will shape the region’s security landscape for years to come. The calculus is complex: deterrence, alliance politics, technological ambition, and the ever-present risk of escalation all weigh heavily. As hypersonic and nuclear technologies continue to evolve, the Gulf’s response will not only determine its own security, but could also influence the trajectory of global arms control and the future of warfare itself.
In a world where missile speeds are rising and arms control regimes are fraying, the decisions unfolding today in the Gulf and beyond may well set the tone for a new era of strategic competition—one where the balance between offense and defense grows ever more precarious.