On October 24, 2025, a former CIA officer’s revelations sent ripples through the corridors of international diplomacy and intelligence. John Kiriakou, who spent 15 years at the CIA as an analyst and in counterterrorism operations, disclosed that the United States deliberately refrained from targeting Abdul Qadeer Khan, the architect of Pakistan’s atomic bomb and a notorious proliferator of nuclear technology, after direct intervention by the Saudi government. According to Kiriakou, this decision was not only a major policy blunder but also emblematic of the complex, and sometimes contradictory, alliances that shape U.S. foreign policy.
Kiriakou’s account, reported by multiple outlets including ANI and The Economic Times, paints a vivid picture of covert diplomacy and unspoken bargains. “A colleague of mine was dealing with A Q Khan,” Kiriakou said. “If we had taken the Israeli approach, we would have just killed him. He was easy enough to find. We knew where he lived. We knew how he spent his day. But he also had the support of the Saudi government. And the Saudis came to us and said, ‘Please leave him alone. Please. We like A Q Khan. We’re working with A.Q. Khan. We’re close to the Pakistanis…They named Faisalabad after King Faisal. Just leave him alone.’”
At the time, the U.S. intelligence community had detailed information on Khan’s daily routines and whereabouts. Yet, despite the opportunity to neutralize a man widely regarded as the world’s most infamous nuclear smuggler—one who supplied technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya—the Americans were told to stand down. The reason? Pressure from Riyadh, which considered Khan both an ally and a strategic asset due to its close ties with Pakistan.
Kiriakou was unequivocal in his assessment of this episode, calling it “a mistake that the US government made, not confronting A Q Khan head-on.” He described the diplomatic pressure as a “major US policy failure,” a view echoed by several CIA and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials who later confirmed that the White House had issued explicit instructions not to target Khan. “And it had to be because the Saudis were demanding it, insisting on it,” Kiriakou added.
The roots of this unusual alliance run deep. Khan, born in Bhopal in 1936, moved with his family to Pakistan in 1952 after the partition of India. He died in Islamabad in 2021 at the age of 85, having left an indelible mark on the world as the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb—making his country the world’s first “Islamic nuclear power.” His legacy, however, is not just national pride; it is the proliferation of nuclear secrets to some of the world’s most volatile regimes.
Why would Saudi Arabia go to such lengths to shield Khan? Kiriakou speculated that the answer might lie in Riyadh’s own nuclear ambitions. “We often wondered if it was because the Saudis were also building a nuclear capability. I think that’s something we should probably be thinking about,” he said. The implications are profound, raising questions about the extent of nuclear collaboration between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and the potential for a new nuclear player in the Middle East.
Recent developments have only added fuel to this speculation. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a “Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement,” pledging that any attack on either nation would be treated as an attack on both. Kiriakou suggested that Riyadh might now be “calling in its investment,” referencing the extensive role Pakistani personnel play in Saudi Arabia’s military. “Almost the entire Saudi military is Pakistani. No Saudi is going to join the military unless they’re going to make him a general. There are no privates or corporals who are Saudi. They’re all Pakistani. It’s the Pakistanis that protect Saudi Arabia on the ground,” he explained.
Despite the formal defense pact, Kiriakou was dismissive about the prospect of a Saudi “nuclear umbrella.” “I don’t think it is realistic,” he said, though he acknowledged the “strategic depth” of the partnership between Islamabad and Riyadh. The relationship, it seems, is less about nuclear guarantees and more about mutual leverage and shared interests.
Kiriakou’s revelations also shed light on U.S.-Pakistan relations during the presidency of Pervez Musharraf. According to ANI, the U.S. provided millions of dollars in military and economic aid to Pakistan, effectively “purchasing” Musharraf’s cooperation. “When I was stationed in Pakistan in 2002, I was told unofficially that the Pentagon controlled the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, that Musharraf had turned control over to the United States because he was afraid of exactly what you just described (nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands),” Kiriakou recounted.
This arrangement allowed the U.S. to operate with remarkable freedom in Pakistan, with Musharraf maintaining the support of his military by pretending to cooperate on counterterrorism while allowing certain activities against India to continue. “He had to keep the military happy. And the military didn’t care about Al-Qaeda. They cared about India. And so in order to keep the military happy and keep some of the extremists happy, he had to allow them to continue this dual life of pretending to cooperate with the Americans on counterterrorism while committing terror against India,” Kiriakou explained.
The former CIA officer also reflected on India’s response to the 2001 Parliament attack and 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, noting that the U.S. intelligence community expected India to retaliate. “At the CIA we called the Indian policy strategic patience. The Indian government would have been perfectly within its rights to respond by striking Pakistan and they didn’t. And I remember at the White House people were saying, wow, the Indians are really exhibiting a very mature foreign policy here. We expected the Indians to, to strike back and they didn’t. And that kept the world from what might have been a nuclear exchange. Right? But India’s gotten to the point where they can’t risk strategic patience being misunderstood as weakness. And so they had to respond,” he said.
In the broader context of U.S. foreign policy, Kiriakou offered a candid critique. “We like to try to convince the world that we are a shining beacon of hope for democracy, human rights, and equality. And it’s just simply not true,” he said. “Our foreign relations are based on our national needs at any given moment. We don’t do things because they’re the right thing to do. We do them because they happen to be good for us that day, which is why we get into bed with so many dictators around the world.”
This latest revelation about Abdul Qadeer Khan, Saudi Arabia, and U.S. policy choices shines a harsh light on the compromises and calculations that define global security. It’s a reminder that, behind every headline, there are often unseen hands and unspoken bargains shaping the fate of nations.