In a revelation that’s sent ripples through the international security community, former CIA operations officer James Lawler has shared dramatic new details about the United States’ covert efforts to dismantle the global nuclear trafficking network led by Pakistan’s top scientist, AQ Khan. Lawler’s account, given in interviews published by ANI and The Economic Times, sheds light on the high-stakes confrontation that unfolded at the highest levels of Pakistan’s government and the daring intelligence operations that ultimately brought down a sprawling web of nuclear proliferation.
According to Lawler, the turning point in the saga came when US intelligence presented what he called “absolutely incontrovertible evidence” to then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. The evidence showed that Khan, long hailed as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, was secretly selling the country’s most sensitive nuclear technology to foreign states—including Libya, and possibly others.
Lawler recounted that CIA Director George Tenet personally delivered the news to Musharraf. The reaction was explosive. As Lawler told ANI, “Musharraf responded furiously, declaring, ‘I'm going to kill that son of a bitch.’” But, rather than opting for violence, Musharraf ultimately decided to place Khan under years-long house arrest—a move that became central to shutting down the proliferation network and signaling to the world that Pakistan was taking the threat seriously.
Lawler, who led the CIA’s counter-proliferation operations in Europe starting in the mid-1990s, described the painstaking work of infiltrating Khan’s network. His team, numbering “no more than 10 people” at CIA headquarters, set up front companies that posed as legitimate suppliers of nuclear components. Through carefully orchestrated sting operations, they lured would-be traffickers into their web. “The people came,” Lawler explained, enabling the CIA to map the network from the inside out.
“If you want to defeat proliferation and proliferators, you need to become a proliferator,” Lawler said, reflecting on the unconventional tactics that proved so effective. He even gave Khan a grim nickname: “the ‘Merchant of Death,’” a moniker that underscored the scientist’s transformation from procuring technology for Pakistan to actively exporting nuclear know-how to the highest bidder.
The operation’s most decisive breakthrough came with the interception of the BBC China, a freighter bound for Libya and loaded with containers packed with nuclear components. When the cargo was seized, it provided irrefutable evidence that forced Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to admit to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Lawler recalled the stunned silence of Libyan officials when confronted with the evidence, after which they acknowledged, “By Allah, you’re right. We did have a nuclear program.”
The CIA’s approach was a blend of intelligence gathering and technical sabotage. Lawler described how the agency, working with US national laboratories, developed scientific techniques to “harm” proliferators’ capabilities—disrupting centrifuge programs and undermining the technical foundations of would-be nuclear states. “The risk of not acting would be the risk,” Lawler emphasized, highlighting the stakes involved in letting such a network operate unchecked.
As the operation unfolded, Lawler’s focus shifted from Iran—his initial area of concern—to the Khan network, while other parts of the US intelligence community grappled with the more opaque nuclear ambitions of North Korea. Lawler noted that designs originating from the European enrichment consortium Urenco formed the basis of early centrifuge models that were later proliferated to several countries via Khan’s network.
Reflecting on the broader implications, Lawler warned of the dangers posed by a potential Iranian nuclear weapon. “My biggest concern is the nuclear pandemic this would set off in the Middle East,” he said, predicting a domino effect in which other states would seek their own nuclear arsenals, dramatically raising the risk of accidental or intentional nuclear use.
Lawler’s career at the CIA, which spanned from 1980 to 2005, was marked by a dogged pursuit of nuclear traffickers. His nickname, “Mad Dog,” originated not from his aggressive tactics in the field, but from a dog bite incident in France early in his career. “Stopping countries from getting nuclear weapons, nobody should really argue with that,” he reflected in his interview with The Economic Times, expressing pride in the mission he helped shape. These days, Lawler writes spy novels, but his sense of purpose remains undimmed.
Beyond the technical and operational details, Lawler also touched on the geopolitical ramifications of the Khan affair. He urged the United States to strengthen its relationship with India, noting the two countries’ shared democratic values and compatible interests. “I think sometimes American foreign policy is a big puzzle. What I am hopeful for is that the United States needs a much stronger relationship with India,” he said. Lawler questioned why the world’s two largest democracies had never become true strategic partners, suggesting that past frictions—such as reciprocal tariffs and disputes over Russian oil imports—should not define the long-term partnership. “You’re a democracy. We’re a democracy… I think we could be much stronger working together than standoffish,” Lawler observed.
The revelations about Khan’s activities and the CIA’s response underscore the complexity and urgency of the fight against nuclear proliferation. The operation’s success depended not only on technical know-how and daring tradecraft, but also on the willingness of political leaders to act decisively when presented with uncomfortable truths. Musharraf’s reaction—initial fury, followed by a calculated decision to contain Khan—illustrates the difficult choices faced by leaders caught between national pride and international responsibility.
As Lawler’s story makes clear, the threat of nuclear proliferation remains as real today as it was during the heyday of the Khan network. The lessons learned from this episode—about the importance of vigilance, innovation, and international cooperation—continue to resonate in a world where the shadow of the atomic bomb still looms large.
James Lawler’s account offers a rare glimpse into the clandestine world of nuclear counter-proliferation. It’s a story of high drama and quiet heroism, of risks taken in the name of global security, and of the ongoing struggle to prevent the world’s most dangerous weapons from falling into the wrong hands.