EU Ramps Up Satellite Defenses Amid Russian Jamming

Europe’s skies and digital infrastructure have come under increasing threat from a surge in GPS jamming and spoofing attacks, with Russia at the center of mounting allegations. Over the past year, these electronic assaults have escalated from isolated incidents to a persistent, destabilizing force, disrupting flights, undermining navigation systems, and triggering a sweeping response from European policymakers and industry leaders.

The gravity of the situation became impossible to ignore on August 31, 2025, when the plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen encountered GPS jamming while flying to Bulgaria. According to Reuters, the EU suspects Russian involvement in this high-profile incident, which underscored just how vulnerable even the bloc’s most critical operations have become. This was not an isolated event: between 2024 and 2025, similar attacks—including a 63-hour-long GPS signal disruption affecting 1,600 aircraft—have been traced to sources such as mobile jammers in Kaliningrad and vessels operating in international waters. Polish researchers documented 29 hours of GNSS interference near Kaliningrad in October 2024 alone, with signals powerful enough to disrupt flight navigation, as reported by Spire.

These disruptions have forced airlines to reroute flights, resulting in higher fuel costs and delays, while also exposing critical gaps in Europe’s navigation satellite system resilience. The Baltic Sea region, a key artery for air and maritime traffic, has become a testing ground for these increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare tactics. As incidents multiplied, European policymakers recognized the urgent need to shore up defenses and reduce dependency on vulnerable navigation infrastructure.

In response, the European Union has launched a series of ambitious initiatives aimed at fortifying its space and navigation capabilities. On September 1, 2025, EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius announced plans to deploy additional satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO), designed to enhance the continent’s resilience against jamming attacks. Kubilius emphasized the necessity for improved detection capabilities and a more robust satellite network, stating, “We need to ensure that our navigation and communication systems remain secure and operational, even in the face of deliberate interference.”

This new LEO satellite deployment will integrate with the existing Galileo global navigation system, providing redundant signals that are much harder to jam. Industry experts cited by DW highlight that LEO constellations offer lower latency and stronger signals, making them particularly effective at countering electronic warfare strategies. The EU’s €10.6 billion IRIS² project, for instance, aims to provide encrypted internet connectivity as an alternative to non-European systems like Starlink, further supporting the bloc’s quest for strategic autonomy in space.

Beyond satellite launches, the EU has taken concrete steps to secure its navigation signals. In July 2025, the Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) was rolled out, providing cryptographic authentication to GNSS signals and making them far more resistant to spoofing. This technical leap was hailed as a critical milestone by the EU Space Programme Agency, with real-time signal monitoring upgrades at the Galileo Reference Centre expected to generate new revenue streams for cybersecurity firms specializing in GNSS authentication.

To further bolster defenses, thirteen EU member states have called for resilient Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) systems, including a revival of terrestrial alternatives like eLORAN. This diversified approach aims to ensure that essential services—ranging from aviation to emergency response—remain operational even if satellite signals are compromised.

These policy shifts are driving a wave of innovation and investment across the European tech and defense sectors. Anti-jamming and spoofing solutions are in high demand, with companies like infiniDome recently securing a major EU defense contract for its technology. Their partnership with German firm Cavemus to protect drones exemplifies the dual-use potential of these systems, appealing to both defense and commercial markets. Meanwhile, industry giants such as Raytheon, BAE Systems, and Thales Group are developing AI-enabled adaptive jamming systems that use machine learning to detect and neutralize interference in real time—a capability that could prove decisive in future conflicts.

The EU’s €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative is fueling further investments in Galileo’s resilience, with a 35% local sourcing cap for non-EU components driving consolidation among European defense firms. According to Defense News, Germany’s anti-jam systems market alone is projected to grow from $1.2 billion in 2024 to $2.5 billion by 2033. Startups leveraging quantum timing and low-Earth-orbit navigation are attracting capital through the European Space Agency’s FutureNAV program, signaling a fertile environment for emerging technologies.

Policy-driven procurement is also reshaping the defense landscape. The European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) aims to source 60% of defense equipment from local suppliers by 2035, creating a robust pipeline of contracts for firms that align with this vision. The result is a surge in research and development partnerships, with the next 12 to 24 months expected to see consolidation among market leaders and a proliferation of resilient navigation technologies.

However, this rapid modernization is not without risks. The EU’s emphasis on local sourcing could exclude non-European firms from lucrative contracts, potentially limiting competition and innovation. The ever-evolving nature of Russian spoofing techniques may also outpace current countermeasures, posing a persistent challenge for both policymakers and industry. Moreover, integrating AI into anti-jamming systems raises thorny ethical and regulatory questions, especially in civilian contexts where unintended consequences could have far-reaching impacts.

Geopolitically, the EU’s assertive stance on space security may further strain already tense relations with Russia, which continues to deny involvement in GPS jamming incidents. Yet, as SpaceWar notes, these investments position Europe as a leader in space resilience, setting new standards for allied nations and influencing the global approach to satellite security.

For aerospace and defense firms, the current environment presents both opportunities and challenges. Companies like Kratos Defense are already developing GNSS-based systems tailored to contested environments, aligning closely with EU procurement needs. The race to deliver robust, tamper-resistant navigation capabilities is on, with billions of euros at stake and the security of Europe’s infrastructure hanging in the balance.

As electronic warfare becomes a defining feature of modern conflict, Europe’s response—combining technological innovation, strategic investment, and policy reform—offers a blueprint for safeguarding critical systems in an increasingly contested domain. The coming years will reveal whether these measures can keep pace with the rapidly evolving threat landscape, but one thing is certain: the era of taking satellite navigation for granted is over.