In the waning days of July 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen found herself in an unusual diplomatic setting: the windswept greens of Donald Trump’s Turnberry golf course in Scotland. There, after waiting out the former U.S. president’s day on the links and enduring a public tirade against wind turbines, von der Leyen struck a handshake deal that would define the next chapter in transatlantic trade. The United States agreed to impose 15 percent tariffs on most European Union exports—well above the pre-Trump average of 1.47 percent, but a far cry from the 30 percent Trump had threatened just weeks before.
The announcement, made official on July 27 at Turnberry, was met with a mix of relief and consternation across Europe. According to The Guardian, the immediate benefit was clear: a full-blown trade war, with the specter of tit-for-tat tariffs spiraling out of control, had been avoided. The Council of the European Union, representing the bloc’s member governments, had made it a top priority to steer clear of Trump’s 30 percent tariff threat and pursue a negotiated solution. In that narrow sense, the deal worked—at least for now.
But the terms struck many as lopsided. As Politico noted, the EU is the world’s largest trading bloc, theoretically capable of flexing its collective muscle against global powers. Yet the 15 percent tariff still represented a steep climbdown from the status quo, and the agreement remained little more than a handshake, with no binding document in place. Even before the ink could dry, Trump threatened further tariffs in response to EU technology regulations, and opposition mounted in the European Parliament, particularly from the center-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) caucus. As of late September, it was unclear whether von der Leyen had the votes needed to ratify the deal.
Why did the EU accept such terms? Part of the answer lies in the geopolitical context. Von der Leyen, according to Politico, was concerned that a hardline stance from the Trump administration might lead to U.S. military disengagement from Europe at a time when Russia’s war against Ukraine had left the continent feeling vulnerable. The EU was also grappling with uncertainty from two of its top three trading partners: the United States and China. This turbulence posed an unprecedented challenge to the bloc’s economic security, raising existential questions about its global standing and resilience.
For everyday Europeans, the stakes are clear. According to the Eurobarometer Spring 2025 survey, 37 percent of respondents said the EU should focus on defense and security to reinforce its position in the world, while 32 percent prioritized competitiveness, economy, and industry. International trade ranked ninth, with only 16 percent citing it as a top priority—a figure that predated the U.S.-EU trade announcement. Notably, 77 percent of Europeans agreed that the EU should be given more tools to confront global challenges, a sentiment that ran high even in countries with Euroskeptic governments, such as Hungary (82 percent) and Slovakia (71 percent). An overwhelming 90 percent wanted the EU’s member states to act more unified on the global stage.
Despite the turbulent environment, optimism about the EU’s future remains robust. Two-thirds (66 percent) of Europeans said they felt positive about the bloc’s prospects, with no country dipping below 51 percent. This widespread optimism, coupled with the desire for more unity and strength, suggests that bold efforts to shore up the EU’s economic security would likely find broad public support.
The EU’s challenges are not limited to Washington. In July, Chinese President Xi Jinping rebuffed von der Leyen’s warnings that China risked losing access to the EU’s single market unless it opened its own economy to European firms. Xi refused to guarantee a supply of rare earths—critical for batteries and green technologies—to the EU, leaving the bloc exposed. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have supplied Russian firms with drone parts, deepening Beijing’s support for Moscow in the Ukraine conflict. In response, the EU has proposed targeting Chinese entities in its latest Russia sanctions package, a move that Beijing has met with tighter export controls on rare earths. Unlike its dealings with Trump, the EU has not capitulated to Chinese demands, but its threats have so far fallen on deaf ears.
Amid these external pressures, the EU has pursued strategies to bolster its economic security. First, it has sought to conclude free-trade agreements with other countries and blocs. The rest of the world, it seems, has not followed Trump’s protectionist lead; free trade remains the guiding principle for most major economies. The EU and India hope to finalize a trade deal by the end of 2025, and a new agreement with Indonesia has already been reached. The European Commission has also approved a free-trade deal with the Latin American bloc Mercosur, though it still faces ratification hurdles from at least 15 of the 27 EU member states and a majority in the European Parliament. This deal, however, faces an unusual coalition of opposition: environmentalists and farmers, united by concerns over sustainability and market impacts.
Second, the EU is looking inward. While the single market formally eliminates tariffs between member states, a 2024 IMF report found that intra-EU trade barriers—stemming from divergent regulations, protected sectors, and infrastructure bottlenecks—could be equivalent to a tariff rate as high as 44 percent. The IMF recommended harmonizing regulations, liberalizing protected sectors, improving cross-border infrastructure, and pursuing further intra-EU trade liberalization. For many Europeans, the economic benefits of the EU have always been its biggest selling point. The bloc’s handling of crises—from Brexit to COVID-19 to the war in Ukraine—has reinforced its role as an external protector. Yet, the current turbulence with Trump and China tests the very foundations of that security.
Critics of the Turnberry deal argue that the EU “capitulated” to Trump. But as Le Monde points out, the immediate benefit was the avoidance of a trade war, which would have hurt both sides. Tariffs, after all, are paid by consumers and businesses in the country imposing them, driving up costs and fueling inflation. For example, the U.S. currently imposes 50 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum—measures that protect American producers but raise costs for industries like automotive and construction. Retaliatory tariffs by the EU would have had a similar effect, harming European economic activity. The aerospace sector, crucial for France, is notably exempt from any new tariff increases. Compared to other trading partners, the EU has fared reasonably well: the tariffs imposed on other countries such as South Korea, Japan, Switzerland, China, South Africa, India, Canada, and Brazil are either identical or higher than those on the EU.
As the world’s largest trading bloc, the EU finds itself at a crossroads. Whether it can navigate the twin challenges posed by Washington and Beijing—while deepening its own internal market and forging new trade alliances—will determine if it emerges as a true global power or remains, as some critics say, little more than a talking shop. The coming months will reveal whether von der Leyen’s gamble at Turnberry was a moment of necessary pragmatism or a costly concession.