In a momentous event for Ethiopia and the African continent, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is set to be officially inaugurated on September 9, 2025. Perched on the Blue Nile, the dam stands as Africa’s largest hydroelectric project—a mile-long, 475-foot-high monument to national ambition, regional controversy, and the enduring tug-of-war over the Nile’s precious waters. The dam, whose construction began in April 2011, has been hailed by the Ethiopian government as a transformative force, expected to generate more than 6,000 megawatts of electricity and potentially double the country’s power generation capacity, according to reporting from The Conversation and CBS News.
The GERD’s journey from blueprint to reality has been anything but smooth. The $5 billion project was largely bankrolled by Ethiopians both at home and abroad, with the government issuing bonds and rallying diaspora communities for support. This approach, as noted by The Conversation, was a matter of pride for Ethiopia, which eschewed foreign financial institutions and international donors. As Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declared in a social media post on September 2, 2025, "Seeing the dam completed is a historic milestone in Ethiopia. For me personally, it was my final prayer and it was my ultimate wish."
But if the mood in Addis Ababa is jubilant, the same cannot be said for Ethiopia’s neighbors downstream. Egypt and Sudan, both heavily reliant on the Nile’s flow, have long harbored deep anxieties about how the dam will affect their water security. The Nile is the lifeblood of Egypt, providing more than 90% of the country’s fresh water. Most Egyptians live along its banks, and the prospect of any reduction in water flow is viewed as nothing short of existential. In August 2025, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi issued a stark warning: "Anyone who imagines that Egypt will turn a blind eye to an existential threat to its water security is mistaken. We will continue to monitor the situation and take all measures provided for under international law to safeguard our people's existential resources."
The Blue Nile, which originates in Ethiopia, supplies over 80% of the combined Nile river system’s water, making the GERD’s management a source of intense regional scrutiny. Egypt and Sudan initially opposed the dam’s construction outright, later shifting their stance to advocate for a protracted filling period—between 12 and 21 years—to protect their own water supplies. Ethiopia, citing domestic and political imperatives, favored a much shorter timeline. As of the eve of the dam’s inauguration, no legally binding agreement had been reached on how its reservoir will be filled and operated, despite years of negotiations involving the African Union, the United States, and even appeals to the United Nations Security Council, as detailed by The Conversation and CBS News.
The deep-rooted dispute is further complicated by colonial-era treaties. The 1959 Nile Waters Treaty, signed between Egypt and Sudan, allocated 66% of the Nile’s average annual flow to Egypt and 22% to Sudan, leaving upstream countries like Ethiopia with no formal share. Ethiopia’s highlands, however, contribute more than 86% of the water that eventually flows into the Nile, a fact that has long fueled Addis Ababa’s argument that the colonial agreements are outdated and inequitable. As John Mukum Mbaku, a scholar on Nile governance, explained to The Conversation, "The terms of these treaties are only possible if the nine upstream riparian states don’t access or utilise any water from the Nile and its tributaries. Most importantly, they make the water rights of the other Nile countries dependent on Egypt and Sudan’s goodwill."
International law, meanwhile, offers its own set of guiding principles—namely, equitable and reasonable use, the obligation not to cause significant harm, and the duty to cooperate. Legal experts have noted that the 1959 treaty’s disregard for the rights of upstream states stands in stark contrast to these norms. The lack of a comprehensive, inclusive agreement has left the region in a precarious position, with trust in short supply and national interests at odds.
Sudan’s position has been further complicated by a devastating civil war that has raged since 2023. The Sudanese government has voiced concerns that the GERD could disrupt the operations of its own dams, making it harder to manage Khartoum’s development plans. Yet, as The Conversation points out, the dam could actually help with flood control in Sudan and drought protection in Egypt—if the three countries can find a way to work together.
For Ethiopia, the GERD is not just about electricity—it’s a symbol of national unity and a springboard for development. Only 54% of Ethiopia’s roughly 120 million people currently have access to reliable power, according to CBS News. The dam promises to change that, fueling rural industrialization, reducing deforestation by replacing firewood with electric power, and cutting air pollution from burning wood and dung. Improved electricity access could also boost education by providing lighting for students and cooling for classrooms, as well as expanding internet connectivity in rural areas. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been emphatic about the dam’s potential to generate $1 billion in annual revenue, which he says will help finance further infrastructure projects.
Ethiopia’s government has also sought to position the GERD as a catalyst for regional cooperation. In remarks on July 3, 2025, Abiy stated, "To our neighbours downstream—Egypt and Sudan—our message is clear: The Renaissance Dam is not a threat, but a shared opportunity. It is a symbol of regional cooperation and mutual benefit. The energy and development it will generate stand to uplift not just Ethiopia, but the entire region." The hope, at least in Addis Ababa, is that the dam’s benefits will be felt beyond Ethiopia’s borders, through power purchase agreements and shared prosperity.
Yet, skepticism persists. In a joint statement issued the week before the inauguration, Egypt and Sudan argued that the GERD "breached international law and would cause grave consequences to the two downstream countries." Both governments have now elevated water security to the level of national security, warning of potential responses should their water supplies be threatened.
The United States has attempted to play the role of mediator, with the Biden administration reaffirming its recognition of Egypt’s water needs, Sudan’s operational concerns, and Ethiopia’s development goals. Assistant Secretary of State Molly Phee told reporters in 2024, "We are committed to helping all these parties discuss how agreements related to water management, use, and access can contribute to security and stability." Nevertheless, the impasse remains.
Adding to the drama, former U.S. President Donald Trump claimed in July 2025 that the GERD was "stupidly" funded "with United States money, largely," an assertion Ethiopia’s government has flatly denied. The project’s coordination body insists the dam was built "without any foreign aid."
As Ethiopia prepares to host the Second Africa Climate Summit on the same week as the GERD’s inauguration, the spotlight will be firmly on Addis Ababa. African leaders are expected to attend the celebrations, underscoring the dam’s symbolic importance for the continent’s development aspirations. Yet, as the turbines begin to turn, the question remains: can the promise of shared prosperity overcome the legacy of mistrust and competition that has long defined the Nile basin?
The GERD’s completion marks a watershed moment for Ethiopia and Africa. Whether it becomes a source of unity or division will depend on how the region’s leaders choose to navigate the river’s turbulent waters in the years ahead.