Consumer Energy Solutions (CES), a prominent energy-efficiency contractor based in south Wales, collapsed into administration on January 9, 2026, marking a dramatic end to a decade-long operation and putting nearly 300 jobs at risk. The company’s sudden downfall has sent shockwaves through the UK’s retrofit supply chain, reigniting debate about the effectiveness and oversight of government-backed energy-efficiency schemes—and leaving both workers and households in limbo.
CES, which employed 295 staff across Swansea, Bangor, and Treorchy, was a key subsidiary of City Energy Group. The company’s closure followed a turbulent period in which its parent group warned staff of potential redundancies just days before Christmas. According to BBC News and ITV, the abrupt announcement left employees in turmoil, with many learning of their fate via a company Teams call. The roles lost span sales advisors, project planners, and heating and insulation departments, with administrators now tasked with supporting those affected, including through Job Centre Wales and Careers Wales.
The immediate cause of CES’s collapse was closely tied to the winding down of the UK government’s Energy Company Obligation (ECO) scheme—specifically the fourth phase, ECO4, which is set to end on March 31, 2026. As the government’s flagship program for improving home energy efficiency, ECO requires energy suppliers to fund upgrades for low-income and vulnerable households, with private contractors like CES delivering the work. While the scheme is often marketed as “free” to households, the costs are ultimately borne by consumers through their energy bills.
Joint administrators Jimmy Saunders and Michael Lennon from KR8 Advisory took charge on January 9. In a statement, Saunders pointed to the government’s decision not to extend ECO4 beyond March 2026 as a factor that “compounded” CES’s troubles. The company’s business model, heavily reliant on ECO4-funded projects, took a direct hit as the scheme’s conclusion loomed. “The conclusion of the ECO4 scheme created significant headwinds for the CES arm of our business which generated significant revenues for this specific subsidiary. Despite exhaustive efforts to secure a solvent path forward, regrettably it was not viable to continue trading,” a City Energy Group spokesperson told BBC News.
For affected customers, CES made it clear it would no longer complete work, carry out remedial repairs, or handle complaints. Instead, those with completed installations were advised to contact insurance-backed guarantee providers for guidance—a process consumer groups warn can be confusing and slow, especially for vulnerable households. Administrators are expected to reach out to creditors and employees with details on redundancy payouts and next steps, but the way forward remains uncertain. Without a swift buyer for any parts of the business, more projects could stall and redundancy payments may drag on.
CES’s collapse also lays bare the complex structure of City Energy Group and its financial underpinnings. Public filings show that City Energy Network Limited, a key company within the group, reported multi-million-pound pre-tax profits and paid dividends to shareholders in the years leading up to 2024. In March 2024, the group became majority-owned by Cairngorm Capital, a private equity investor known for specializing in UK mid-market businesses. Cairngorm Capital described City Energy as a “vertically integrated” energy services group, combining marketing, surveying, installation, and compliance under one umbrella. While such integration can boost efficiency and profits, critics argue it may also obscure accountability—especially when subsidiaries like CES fail while others remain operational.
The ECO scheme itself has come under increasing scrutiny. Oversight is split between Ofgem, which regulates energy suppliers’ obligations, and quality assurance bodies such as TrustMark. Installers must meet technical standards like PAS 2030 and PAS 2035, and are expected to operate within robust consumer protection frameworks. Yet, systemic problems persist. TrustMark has publicly acknowledged these issues, stating it engaged with the City Energy Group situation in line with its role, though it is not a financial regulator.
In 2025, the National Audit Office (NAO) delivered a damning report on ECO oversight, highlighting poor installation quality, fragmented accountability, and delays in identifying non-compliance. The NAO concluded that government and regulators had not acted quickly enough to protect households from widespread failings. Parliamentary committees echoed these concerns, documenting systemic failures and suspected fraud elsewhere in the ECO system, though they stopped short of alleging political corruption tied to specific companies or councils.
Local authorities play a role in ECO through the Local Authority Flexible Eligibility (LA Flex) mechanism, confirming whether households meet eligibility criteria but not appointing installers. There is no evidence that Welsh local authorities improperly approved City Energy companies as installers under ECO, nor that they directed work to CES or other group entities. Still, questions linger about the scale and verification of eligibility declarations, councils’ awareness of national compliance concerns, and whether normal procurement safeguards were applied when councils procured retrofit work separately. These are governance questions being asked nationally, not specific allegations of wrongdoing in Wales.
The collapse of CES comes amid a shifting policy landscape. In August 2025, the government floated the idea of extending ECO4 by six to nine months to provide stability for the supply chain and continued support for households, but no decision had been released by January 2026. Meanwhile, the Department of Energy Security and Net Zero declared that the ECO and GBIS schemes were “not delivering value for money,” announcing an additional £1.5 billion investment into the Warm Homes Plan, bringing total public investment to nearly £15 billion—a record sum aimed at upgrading homes and tackling fuel poverty.
For the hundreds of workers left jobless and the households left wondering about the fate of their energy upgrades, the end of CES is more than just another company collapse. It is a stark reminder of how dependent the UK’s retrofit sector remains on government policy, and how quickly fortunes can change when that policy shifts. As the government pledges reforms and the industry braces for the end of ECO4, the lessons of CES’s downfall will hang over any future attempts to deliver energy efficiency at scale.
In the months ahead, all eyes will be on whether promised reforms can deliver the accountability, transparency, and consumer protection that so many believe are lacking. For now, the story of CES stands as a cautionary tale about the perils—and the promise—of public-private partnerships in the fight against fuel poverty.
