On December 18, 2025, the usually formal air of Cuba’s National Assembly of People’s Power was charged with a palpable sense of urgency. Army General Raúl Castro Ruz, the legendary leader of the Cuban Revolution, made a rare appearance at the fifth regular session of the Assembly’s 10th Legislature. The session was not just ceremonial—behind the grand speeches and parliamentary procedures, the country’s mounting economic crisis was front and center, demanding solutions that could no longer be postponed.
President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, who also serves as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, did not mince words. According to reports from Granma, he described the national economy as suffering from "an accumulation of distortions, adversities, difficulties, and mistakes of our own, exacerbated by an extremely aggressive external blockade." It was a sobering assessment, but Díaz-Canel insisted that “there is no room for resigned management of the crisis,” urging the Assembly and the nation to respond “with a sense of urgency, serenity, realism, and commitment.”
The economic pain is not theoretical for Cubans. According to Al Jazeera, the island is currently beset by food shortages, blackouts, and severe inflation. These hardships are more than statistics—they are daily realities that have pushed a growing number of Cubans to leave the island, marking the largest exodus in decades. The government, notably, is no longer trying to prevent this migration, a striking shift from past policies.
So what’s driving this wave of departures? The causes are manifold, but the economic crisis is at the heart of it. Blackouts have become routine, especially in western Cuba, where, as Al Jazeera noted, the government has been scrambling to update the aging energy grid. Grocery stores are often bare, and the value of the Cuban peso has plummeted, making basic necessities unaffordable for many families. Severe inflation eats away at wages, and the sense of uncertainty has become a constant companion for millions.
During the National Assembly session, the government made it clear that it would not simply accept the status quo. The Prime Minister presented a Government Program designed to correct economic distortions and revive the economy. Parliament debated the plan, and President Díaz-Canel was adamant: “It cannot continue to be a reference document: it must become the mandatory roadmap for all agencies, companies, and territories.” For every complex challenge, he called for “greater creativity, greater discipline, greater control, and a relentless fight against the burdens that hold us back: bureaucracy, indolence, and corruption.”
The Party’s Central Committee, Díaz-Canel reminded deputies, has already established a new working method: macroeconomic stabilization, correction of distortions, and a boost to production. But these aren’t just slogans, he insisted—they must be “a system of concrete decisions, with deadlines and responsible parties.”
Macroeconomic stability, he argued, is not an abstract goal: “It is not a technocratic luxury; it is a condition for wages to be worthwhile, for the market to function, not for its own sake, but to guarantee a sustainable social policy.” The Economic Plan for 2026, presented and approved during the session, is intended as a plan of “offensive and readjustment,” not mere technical adjustment. It is, as Díaz-Canel put it, “a revolutionary necessity to perfect socialism under construction, to make it more prosperous, sustainable, and fair.”
Yet, the government’s ability to chart a new course remains sharply constrained by external pressures—most notably, the ongoing U.S. economic embargo, which Díaz-Canel described as “relentless economic aggression.” The embargo, now in place for more than six decades, has been repeatedly condemned by international bodies, but it continues to shape nearly every aspect of Cuban life. In the regional context, Díaz-Canel also pointed to U.S. hostility toward Venezuela, framing it as part of a broader doctrine of “arbitrary will and domination through threats, coercion, and even direct aggression.”
Despite these headwinds, the Assembly session was notable for a string of legislative achievements. Lawmakers approved both the Economic Plan and the State Budget Law for 2026. Perhaps most significantly, they passed the General Law on Science, Technology, and Innovation. This new law, as detailed by Granma, introduces modern concepts aimed at boosting innovation in the Cuban economy. It encourages the creation and growth of Technology-Based Companies (TBCs), High-Tech Companies (HTCs), science and technology parks, interface companies, and foundations. To support this, a Science and Innovation Financial Fund will be established, funded by a 10% contribution from the profits tax of TBCs, parks, and other dynamic structures.
The law also makes local governments, with support from universities and the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (CITMA), responsible for promoting territorial innovation systems and consolidating scientific hubs. The hope is that by decentralizing innovation and tying it to local needs, Cuba can foster the kind of creativity and problem-solving needed to weather the current storm.
The legislative agenda has been brisk since the 2019 Constitution came into force. According to Minister of Justice Rosabel Gamón Verde, since then, 58 laws and 130 decree-laws have been approved, totaling 188 higher-level legal norms. This year alone, laws were passed on topics ranging from the General Regime of Misdemeanors and Administrative Sanctions to the Cuban Sports System, the Code on Children, Adolescents, and Youth, the Civil Registry, Constitutional Reform, and the Exceptional Reduction of the Current Term of Office of Delegates to Municipal Assemblies of People’s Power.
Institutional changes were also on the docket. During the session, deputies elected José Luis Toledo Santander as secretary of the National Assembly and the Council of State, following Homero Acosta Álvarez’s resignation. Litza Elena González Desdín, president of the University Student Federation, was elected as a member of the Council of State, while Oscar Manuel Silvera Martínez, the former Minister of Justice, was named president of the People’s Supreme Court. President Díaz-Canel’s proposal to appoint Rosabel Gamón Verde as Minister of Justice received the Assembly’s approval. To round out the session, eight new deputies took office, expanding popular representation in the nation’s highest organ of state power.
All these moves, both legislative and institutional, are happening against a backdrop of real and growing hardship. The exodus of Cubans—many of them young and educated—poses a profound challenge for the country’s future. The government’s decision not to prevent this migration may reflect a recognition of the depth of the crisis, or perhaps a pragmatic acceptance that, for now, there are few immediate solutions. As Al Jazeera’s reporting makes clear, the causes of the exodus, the destinations of migrants, and the government’s shifting stance are all part of a complex, evolving story.
For now, Cuba’s leaders are betting that a mix of economic reforms, innovation incentives, and legislative renewal can help chart a path out of crisis. Whether these efforts will be enough to stem the tide of departures and restore hope remains to be seen. But one thing is certain: the days of resigned crisis management are over, and the stakes for Cuba’s future have rarely been higher.
