The global race to secure critical minerals has reached a fever pitch in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the world’s largest reserves of cobalt and significant copper deposits are drawing intense competition among U.S., Chinese, and Indian investors. As of early February 2026, the geopolitical spotlight has fixed firmly on the Central African nation, with its mineral wealth now seen as vital to the future of electric vehicles, advanced manufacturing, and defense systems.
According to Reuters, the DRC accounts for more than 70% of global cobalt supplies and produced some 3.3 million metric tons of copper in 2024. These figures underscore why Congo’s mineral sector has become a strategic battleground for superpowers seeking to secure supply chains and reduce reliance on rivals—especially China, which has dominated the sector for over a decade by routing most output to its own refineries.
At the heart of the current scramble is Chemaf SA, a copper and cobalt producer controlled by the Virji family. Chemaf’s flagship Mutoshi project boasts significant cobalt reserves, making the company a prized asset despite its hefty liabilities—about $900 million in debt, much of it owed to commodities trader Trafigura Group. Chemaf is about 94.7% owned by Chemaf Resources Ltd., with the DRC government holding a roughly 5% minority stake.
Virtus Minerals Inc., a Delaware-registered firm led by veterans of the U.S. military and intelligence community, has agreed to acquire Chemaf and assume its liabilities. Managing Director Phil Braun told Bloomberg that Virtus plans to deploy approximately $750 million in debt and equity to expand production, aiming to secure a reliable supply of cobalt for U.S.-aligned industries. The deal, if finalized, would mark a major shift in mineral flows and potentially reduce China’s stranglehold over the sector.
Chemaf’s sale has attracted at least six international bidders, reflecting the asset’s growing strategic importance. Among the contenders are U.S.-based United Critical Minerals LLC, a subsidiary of India’s Jindal Steel & Power Ltd., Lloyds Metals and Energy Ltd., Global Critical Resources Corp. (controlled by Austrian entrepreneur Cevdet Caner), Buenassa Sarl, and DRC’s own state-owned miner Gécamines. This diverse field of suitors highlights the global stakes involved, as well as the rising interest from India in securing battery metals for its burgeoning technology sector.
The heightened competition follows the collapse of a planned 2024 sale to a subsidiary of China’s Norinco Group, after Congolese authorities declined to approve the transaction amid increasing geopolitical scrutiny. According to Bloomberg, U.S. officials reportedly urged President Félix Tshisekedi to block the Chinese deal, underscoring Washington’s strategic concerns about mineral control. Chemaf formally launched the sale process that year due to funding pressures stalling progress on two core assets: the Phase 2 expansion of the Etoile mine and the greenfield Mutoshi project.
Chemaf Chairman Shiraz Virji voiced optimism about the new direction, saying, “I am pleased to have found a new owner that can invest in completing the development of Etoile Phase 2 and Mutoshi, which will be to the benefit of the DRC for decades to come.” This sentiment reflects the hope that new investment will not only boost production but also benefit the Congolese economy and local communities.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government is employing a broader strategy to compete with China for African copper, cobalt, and other critical minerals. Rather than placing American operators directly in high-risk environments, Washington is leaning on offtake deals and state-backed funding to redirect African mineral output into U.S.-aligned value chains. As Reuters reports, these arrangements—such as those with commodities trader Mercuria and Congolese state miner Gécamines—allow the U.S. to secure a share of mine output in exchange for financing or other support, without assuming the political and operational risks of direct mining.
“We’re already seeing U.S. engagement reshape mineral flows out of Africa,” said Thomas Scurfield, a senior analyst with the nonprofit NRGI, ahead of the Indaba mining event in South Africa. “The U.S. is putting money behind its rhetoric, but it remains to be seen whether it can compete with China’s scale and speed.”
Gécamines, for its part, is preparing to ship around 100,000 tons of its Tenke Fungurume copper allocation to U.S. buyers this year, following a 2023 renegotiation with China’s CMOC that granted it broader marketing rights. This move positions Gécamines as a key player in the shifting landscape, not only as a leading zinc exporter but also as a principal buyer of germanium and gallium concentrates. The company recently recorded its first export of locally processed germanium, signaling a step forward in developing value-added mineral processing within the DRC.
Yet, the contrast between U.S. and Chinese approaches remains stark. As Vincent Rouget, an analyst at Control Risks, observed, “This is the U.S. deploying financial firepower rather than industrial presence.” While Washington relies on trading channels and incentives to steer Congolese copper toward American buyers, Chinese firms continue to control many of Congo’s largest assets—including Tenke Fungurume and Kamoa-Kakula—and have been quick to advance projects even on contested ground.
London-based KoBold Metals, which holds more than 3,000 square kilometers in the DRC’s lithium and copper belt, has adopted a more cautious approach. The company refuses to proceed with projects entangled in ownership disputes, a stance that contrasts with Chinese operators who often move forward despite legal ambiguity. At Manono, one of the world’s largest undeveloped lithium deposits, KoBold has said it will not advance production until ownership issues are resolved, while Chinese company Zijin is already building infrastructure on the northern block. If KoBold secures the southern block cleanly, production could begin within three years from early 2026.
The competition isn’t limited to cobalt and copper. London-based Pensana, for instance, abandoned plans to build a rare earth refinery in Britain, opting instead to shift the project to the United States due to stronger incentives and price guarantees. This decision reflects a broader trend: Western governments are ramping up efforts to attract critical mineral processing and manufacturing, aiming to create resilient supply chains that are less vulnerable to geopolitical shocks.
Recent diplomatic developments may further tip the scales. A peace agreement brokered by the United States between Congo and Rwanda, signed in 2025, is expected to improve investment conditions and ease conflict risks in the mining corridor. Analysts say this could give U.S.-aligned bidders a leg up, especially as Washington expands its engagement in Central Africa and seeks to build a minerals bloc with like-minded partners.
Still, the outcome of these efforts remains uncertain. As Scurfield noted, “The U.S. is putting money behind its rhetoric, but it remains to be seen whether it can compete with China’s scale and speed.” For now, the race for Congo’s minerals is wide open, with global powers vying for a stake in the resources that will shape the next era of technology and industry.
As the world watches, the fate of Congo’s mineral wealth—and the communities that depend on it—will hinge on the outcome of these high-stakes negotiations and the evolving balance of power between East and West. The coming months promise to be decisive for the future of critical minerals, not just in Africa, but across the globe.