On December 15, 2025, China released a sweeping White Paper entitled "China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation in the New Era," setting out an ambitious vision for global security governance at a time when the world’s stability seems more precarious than ever. More than a mere policy statement, this document signals Beijing’s intent to shape the rules for the next generation of warfare and diplomacy—particularly in the fast-evolving domains of artificial intelligence, cyberspace, and outer space. The White Paper’s timing is no accident, coming just as the Trump administration unveils its own National Security Strategy (NSS), which pivots toward economic rebalancing with China and a renewed focus on U.S. military strength.
According to the White Paper, China reaffirms its "No First Use" nuclear doctrine and a strictly defensive military posture—a stance that stands in stark contrast to the first-strike policies of other nuclear-armed nations. Beijing’s arsenal, the document asserts, remains at a "minimum level" for self-defense. China also highlights its moratorium on nuclear testing, in place since 1996, and its active engagement in P5 nuclear dialogues, including recent trust-building efforts such as the creation of glossaries to clarify nuclear terminology among the major powers. These moves, as reported by the Arms Control Association and other observers, are not trivial gestures. In a year marked by Russia’s suspension of the New START Treaty and ballooning U.S. nuclear modernization programs, China’s restraint positions it as a responsible steward on the global stage, implicitly shaming Washington and Moscow for their expansive arsenals and first-strike doctrines.
Yet the real significance of China’s White Paper lies in its focus on the future. The document elevates artificial intelligence, cyberspace, and outer space as the new frontiers of global governance, declaring them "new territories of global governance" and "new frontiers for human development." China proposes a pivotal role for the United Nations in these domains, urging universal participation to forge consensus-based standards—particularly those that amplify the voices of developing nations. This is a classic example of Beijing’s diplomatic playbook: wrapping a bid for greater influence in the language of equity and multilateralism. By championing the UN, where China’s Security Council veto and alliances with the Global South give it significant clout, Beijing seeks to preempt Western-led initiatives like the U.S.-driven Artemis Accords for space or the Wassenaar Arrangement for export controls.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s NSS, released in December 2025, offers a contrasting vision. While it focuses on economic security and rebalancing ties with China, its treatment of arms control is sparse, prioritizing deterrence and burden-sharing among allies. The NSS emphasizes missile defenses and Indo-Pacific alliances to counter Chinese aggression, particularly in the South China Sea, and commits to new defense initiatives such as the "Golden Dome" missile shield. This approach, as highlighted in the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2025 report, risks ceding leadership in emerging domains to Beijing, especially if the United States retreats from global forums like the UN.
China’s ambitions in artificial intelligence are particularly noteworthy. In October 2025, Beijing amended its Cybersecurity Law to address AI risks and mandated incident reporting for critical infrastructure. This regulatory move coincided with the January 2025 debut of DeepSeek-R1, a Chinese AI model that has propelled the country to the forefront of global AI development. The White Paper’s call for UN-led norms is not just defensive—it is a strategic bid to shape the rules of the road in ways that could constrain U.S. dominance in generative AI, all while advancing China’s "civil-military fusion" strategy. The NSS, for its part, frames AI as a pillar of U.S. economic and military power, directing billions toward domestic infrastructure and innovation, even as it relaxes some safety barriers to keep pace with China’s rapid advances.
Cyberspace is another contested domain. China, having hosted the UN’s Open-Ended Working Group on ICT security throughout 2025, positions itself as a champion of equitable digital governance, seeking to dilute Western influence in international cyber norms. The U.S., facing persistent threats from ransomware and election interference, is previewing a tougher cyber strategy that emphasizes "costs and consequences" for adversaries like China. This divergence—Beijing’s consensus-driven approach versus Washington’s preference for deterrence and unilateral action—underscores the deepening divide over how the digital world should be governed.
Outer space, too, is a flashpoint. China’s rapid progress in space-based military technologies has drawn warnings from U.S. Space Force leaders about a narrowing technological gap. The White Paper advocates new treaties to prevent the weaponization of space, echoing China’s broader no-first-use ethos. Yet, as critics point out, Beijing’s calls for restraint often sidestep its own hypersonic missile tests and anti-satellite maneuvers. The NSS, meanwhile, doubles down on missile defenses and regional alliances to deter Chinese moves in the Indo-Pacific, while also signaling a willingness to engage in joint governance talks if Beijing’s rhetoric on stability proves genuine.
Against this backdrop, the global arms control community is also in the spotlight. The Arms Control Association has opened voting for its 2025 Arms Control Person(s) of the Year, recognizing individuals and institutions that have advanced effective solutions or raised awareness about the dangers of mass casualty weapons. Among the nominees: Kathryn Bigelow and Noah Oppenheim for their Netflix film "A House of Dynamite," which offers a sobering look at the paradoxes of nuclear deterrence; the UN Delegation of Mexico and five co-sponsoring states for advancing a landmark resolution on the risks of integrating AI into nuclear command systems (approved 115-8, with the U.S. and Russia voting no); and the Nevada State Legislature, which unanimously reaffirmed support for the U.S. nuclear test ban moratorium.
Other nominees include Catholic Cardinals and Bishops from Japan, South Korea, and the United States, who made a peace pilgrimage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings, and 24 Japanese high school students who presented 110,000 signatures for world peace to the UN in Geneva. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine also earned recognition for a June 2025 report that found Cold War-era scenarios of tens of thousands of multi-megaton warheads are outdated and that current military strategies involve a mix of urban and military targets.
As global leaders and activists grapple with these complex challenges, the tension between technological innovation and arms control is sharper than ever. China’s White Paper, with its vision for UN-led governance in emerging domains, is both a blueprint for the future and a challenge to the existing order. The Trump administration’s NSS, with its emphasis on deterrence and economic rebalancing, offers a different path—one that risks sidelining global institutions in favor of bilateral deals and regional alliances.
In the end, the question facing the United States and its allies is whether to engage with China’s emerging governance architecture or risk watching from the sidelines as Beijing shapes the rules for the next era of global security. The anniversaries of 2025 serve as a stark reminder: peace and stability must be engineered, not inherited, and the choices made today will echo for decades to come.
