As Chinese warships and fighter jets circled Taiwan in massive drills last December, a different kind of battle was unfolding on millions of smartphone screens across the island. A 51-second video, first posted on Douyin—China’s version of TikTok—featured Cheng Li-wun, leader of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT), sharply criticizing President Lai Ching-te. "Lai is dragging all 23 million of us in Taiwan into a dead end, a road to death," Cheng declared, accusing the president of inviting Chinese aggression with his pro-independence stance. The clip, produced by a Chinese Communist Party-run media outlet, didn’t stay on Douyin for long. In a matter of hours, it had spread to Facebook, YouTube, and other platforms favored by Taiwanese users, blurring the line between local debate and foreign influence.
This episode, reported and analyzed by Reuters on April 17, 2026, is emblematic of a broader, intensifying campaign of information warfare waged by Beijing against Taiwan. According to data from the Taipei-based Information Environment Research Center (IORG), Chinese state media have ramped up efforts to amplify voices critical of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its president, Lai Ching-te. The strategy is as sophisticated as it is relentless: Beijing imports public statements from prominent Taiwanese opposition figures and influencers, repackages them into a torrent of anti-DPP messaging, and then disseminates them on both Chinese and international social media platforms.
It’s not just about numbers, though the scale is staggering. In the last quarter of 2025 alone, 1,076 official Communist Party media accounts posted some 560,000 videos on Douyin. Of these, about 18,000 discussed Taiwan directly. IORG’s analysis, which used facial-recognition technology to identify key figures, found that 57 Taiwanese personalities appeared in 2,730 clips—most notably Cheng Li-wun, who featured in 460 videos across 68 Douyin accounts, generating over five million interactions. Many of these videos, after their initial run on Chinese platforms, were repackaged and pushed onto Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube—platforms that are blocked in China but widely used in Taiwan.
What’s the goal behind this digital deluge? According to five Taiwanese security officials and IORG data cited by Reuters, Beijing aims to discredit the DPP government, which it accuses of seeking independence, and to convince Taiwanese citizens that resistance is futile. The timing is hardly coincidental: the DPP is currently seeking $40 billion in additional defense spending, a move the Chinese campaign appears designed to undermine by portraying Chinese military power as overwhelming and Taiwanese defense efforts as pointless.
Cheng Li-wun, whose criticisms of the DPP are a fixture in Chinese state media videos, met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on April 10, 2026. During their meeting, Xi emphasized the need to “consolidate political mutual trust” and “join hands to create a bright future of the motherland’s reunification,” according to a video provided by CTI and cited by Reuters. The KMT, in a statement to Reuters, described Cheng’s visit as fulfilling a campaign pledge and continuing a longstanding tradition of dialogue between the KMT and the Communist Party, adding, “Even if mainland state media tend to incorporate more Taiwanese voices, this is based on the diversity of public opinion that already exists in Taiwan.”
It’s not just politicians whose voices are being amplified. Chinese state media have also featured Taiwanese influencers such as Holger Chen Chih-han, a bodybuilder popular with younger audiences, and several retired senior military officials known for their criticism of the DPP and Taiwan’s defenses. In one widely shared video, former Army Colonel Lai Yueh-chien claimed that Chinese drones had “entered” Taiwan undetected during the December military drills and suggested China might conduct a decapitation strike against “pro-independence leaders” in their sleep. Taiwan’s defense ministry swiftly denied the drone claim, but not before the video made its rounds on Facebook and YouTube.
The psychological impact of this barrage is difficult to measure, but the intent is clear. “They want you to doubt the military and doubt Taiwan, to make you feel that no one will come to help you if war breaks out,” one Taiwanese security official told Reuters. Bonnie Glaser, head of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund, put it bluntly: “The strategy really is to lower morale, instill a sense of psychological despair, convince people they have no future in being autonomous and their best option is to join up with China.”
Yet, despite the intensity of Beijing’s information warfare, there is little evidence it has shifted public opinion in Taiwan in a meaningful way. According to a long-running survey by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, support for maintaining the status quo indefinitely rose eight points to 33.5% since 2020, while support for moving toward independence declined nearly four points to 21.9%. The share of people favoring unification with China, either immediately or eventually, has remained relatively stable at around 7%. Importantly, there has been no discernible shift in attitudes toward independence or unification since 2024—the period when Chinese information warfare intensified, according to IORG’s research.
Still, Taiwan’s government is taking no chances. The defense ministry told Reuters it is countering the uptick in “cognitive warfare” by bolstering the armed forces’ media literacy skills and psychological resilience. President Lai’s office underscored its position that cross-strait peace must be “built on strength, not on concessions to authoritarian pressure.” To further inoculate the public, the government distributed a civil-defense handbook warning that any claims of Taiwan’s surrender amid heightened tensions should be considered false—a tacit acknowledgment of the information battle raging alongside the military standoff.
The scale of the problem is daunting. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau reported that, in 2025 alone, it had identified over 45,000 sets of inauthentic social media accounts and 2.3 million pieces of disinformation related to China-Taiwan issues. Many of these efforts, officials say, are designed to exacerbate divisions within Taiwan, weaken the public’s will to resist, and win support for China’s position.
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office and defense ministry did not respond to Reuters requests for comment on the information warfare campaign. Likewise, Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, and Douyin declined to answer questions about their role in the spread of Chinese state-backed content.
For now, the battle for hearts and minds continues, with both sides adapting their tactics in a contest that plays out as much on social media feeds as it does in the strait’s choppy waters. As Beijing’s digital offensive intensifies, Taiwan’s leaders and civil society are betting that resilience, transparency, and vigilance will be their best defense.