On December 24, 2025, the diplomatic landscape in East Asia was shaken by a pointed rebuke from Beijing, as Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian condemned recent remarks from a senior Japanese official advocating for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. The statement, delivered during a regular news briefing and reported by both Xinhua and Chinese Foreign Ministry channels, underscored intensifying anxieties over Japan’s evolving defense posture and its implications for regional stability.
According to Lin Jian, the controversial remarks were not an isolated slip but rather a symptom of a broader, long-standing agenda among Japan’s right-wing political circles. The official in question, described as being close to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, reportedly asserted that Japan should possess nuclear weapons—a stance that immediately drew the ire of China’s leadership. Lin did not mince words, calling out Prime Minister Takaichi and her allies for a “consistent erroneous stance” and accusing them of harboring ambitions to remilitarize Japan.
“It sends an extremely dangerous signal,” Lin warned, referencing not only the nuclear weapons comments but also a recent string of provocative statements by Takaichi herself, including contentious remarks on Taiwan. For China, these developments are more than rhetorical flourishes—they are seen as deliberate attempts to test the boundaries of the international community and, as Lin put it, “challenge the post-war international order.”
To understand the gravity of China’s reaction, it helps to look at the broader context of Japan’s military and security policies in recent years. Both Xinhua and the Chinese Foreign Ministry outlined a series of steps taken by Tokyo that have raised eyebrows across Asia. These include the removal of Japan’s self-imposed ban on exercising the right to collective self-defense, the development of intermediate-range offensive weapons, increased military deployments, and a restructuring of command systems. The scope and area of Self-Defense Forces activities have also been expanded, marking a significant shift from the defensive posture Japan maintained for decades after World War II.
Lin Jian argued that these moves constitute “a severe violation of provisions in instruments with legal effect under international law, including the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, and of Japan’s own Constitution.” Both the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation were key documents in establishing the postwar order in East Asia, explicitly limiting Japan’s ability to remilitarize. Japan’s pacifist constitution, particularly Article 9, famously renounces war and prohibits the maintenance of armed forces with war potential—though in practice, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have long operated in a gray area.
Since taking office just two months ago, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has moved quickly to accelerate Japan’s military buildup. According to Lin, Takaichi’s government has already hit its defense-spending target of two percent of GDP—a goal originally slated for two years from now. This rapid increase in defense spending is coupled with further relaxation of arms export restrictions and a push to revise three key security and defense documents, including the National Security Strategy. Takaichi’s administration has also discussed revising Japan’s three non-nuclear principles—policies that have long prohibited the nation from possessing, producing, or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory. Additionally, Lin noted that there have been suggestions of introducing nuclear-powered submarines, signaling a willingness to consider even more assertive military capabilities.
For many in China and beyond, these policy shifts are deeply troubling. Lin Jian contended that the remarks on nuclear weapons and the broader trajectory of Japanese defense policy represent “yet another attempt by the Japanese side to intentionally test the bottom line of the international community.” He insisted that such actions threaten not only regional peace and stability but also the interests of the Japanese people themselves.
“These moves challenge the post-war international order, threaten regional peace and stability, and do not serve the interests of the Japanese people,” Lin said, echoing sentiments that have been voiced by a number of China’s diplomatic partners. He went on to emphasize that China, together with “all other peace-loving countries,” would respond collectively to these developments to “firmly prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism.”
Japan’s recent actions must be viewed against the backdrop of a region already fraught with tension. The rapid modernization of China’s own military, North Korea’s persistent nuclear ambitions, and the evolving security commitments of the United States all contribute to a complex strategic environment. Japan’s moves to bolster its own capabilities—whether through increased spending, expanded operational scope, or reconsidering its nuclear policy—are seen by some as prudent measures in an uncertain world. However, for others, including many in China, these steps evoke memories of Japan’s militaristic past and raise fears of a destabilizing arms race in Northeast Asia.
It’s worth noting that Japan’s security policy has undergone significant changes over the past decade, driven in part by shifting regional threats and domestic political dynamics. The reinterpretation of collective self-defense, a more assertive stance on arms exports, and the development of new military technologies have all been justified by Japanese leaders as necessary adaptations to a changing world. Yet, these moves have consistently drawn criticism from neighboring countries, particularly China and South Korea, who remain wary of any sign that Japan might be moving away from its postwar pacifism.
The controversy over nuclear weapons is especially sensitive. Japan is the only country to have suffered atomic bombings, and its three non-nuclear principles have long been a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Any suggestion that Japan might reconsider these principles is bound to provoke strong reactions both domestically and internationally. According to Xinhua, the recent remarks by the senior Japanese official—and the government’s apparent willingness to at least discuss the issue—have “sent a dangerous signal” that cannot be ignored.
While the Japanese government has yet to officially endorse nuclear armament, the fact that such ideas are being floated by individuals close to the prime minister is enough to set off alarm bells in Beijing and other capitals. For China, the risk is not merely hypothetical; it is a matter of historical memory and present-day security calculus.
As the year draws to a close, the diplomatic fallout from these remarks is likely to reverberate well into 2026. Regional powers will be watching closely to see whether Japan continues down its current path or takes steps to reassure its neighbors. In the meantime, the message from Beijing is crystal clear: any perceived move toward remilitarization or nuclear armament by Japan will be met with firm opposition from China and its allies.
For now, the world waits to see how Tokyo will respond to the mounting criticism—and whether the international community can prevent a return to the dangerous rivalries of the past.
