On December 1, 2025, the Indo-Pacific region found itself at the crossroads of shifting alliances, economic calculations, and hard-nosed national interests, as two major developments signaled the evolving landscape of influence and technology in Southeast Asia. Britain, according to a new paper from the Council on Geostrategy, is recalibrating its strategy to expand its long-term influence in the region, while Vietnam, a country long adept at balancing between global powers, has taken a decisive turn by awarding significant 5G contracts to Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE.
The Council on Geostrategy’s latest primer, authored by former Royal Marine Brigadier Rory Copinger-Symes CBE, lays out a vision for Britain’s future in the Indo-Pacific that goes far beyond the occasional show of military might. The report, published just after the Carrier Strike Group 2025 deployment and the release of the Strategic Defence Review, argues that the UK’s influence should be rooted in its alliances, elite training capabilities, and regulatory expertise. As Copinger-Symes puts it, “Britain’s Indo-Pacific strategy cannot rely on episodic deployments alone. It should be underpinned by a wider ecosystem of influence that only the UK can uniquely offer.”
Central to this vision is the AUKUS partnership, which the paper frames as the linchpin of the UK’s long-term contribution to regional deterrence. The prospect of British submarine rotations under AUKUS, set to begin in 2027, stands as a concrete example of the UK’s sustained engagement. The report underscores that Britain’s value lies not in matching the overwhelming scale of the United States or Chinese fleets, but in being a “trusted partner” to the US, Australia, and Japan—nations that increasingly look to London for specialist training, regulatory guidance, and diplomatic support.
But the report doesn’t stop at military alliances. It points to Britain’s potential for strengthening practical partnerships through a blend of military engagement and smart diplomacy. It highlights the UK’s participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, as well as deeper maritime security cooperation with India under the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, as ways to build influence among countries seeking strategic space between Washington and Beijing. The proposed Indo-Pacific Open General Export Licence, for example, is presented as a tool to align the export of strategic goods with the goal of supporting partners like Malaysia and the Philippines in developing their own capabilities.
Yet, the report is candid about the gap between British rhetoric and available resources. It calls for clearer articulation of long-term defense commitments and a focus on alliance cohesion and reliable engagement, rather than simply trying to keep up with the hardware race. “In light of shifting global dynamics, particularly the PRC’s rise as a central strategic competitor, Britain should navigate its Indo-Pacific defence strategy with careful consideration,” Copinger-Symes advises. The paper concludes that consistent, dependable engagement—backed by elite training and regulatory know-how—will matter more to regional partners than the sheer number of ships Britain can deploy at any given time.
Meanwhile, across the South China Sea, Vietnam is making headlines of its own, but for reasons that have left Western capitals uneasy. As reported by Reuters, Vietnam has awarded new 5G contracts to Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE, signaling a notable shift in a region where telecom infrastructure has become deeply entwined with geopolitical rivalry. Procurement records show that in April 2025, a consortium including Huawei secured a $23 million 5G equipment contract—just weeks after the White House slapped tariffs on Vietnamese exports. ZTE, for its part, picked up at least two antenna contracts worth over $20 million, with the first appearing in September.
This move marks a significant change for Vietnam, which has long balanced its economic engagement with China against its growing ties to the United States and Europe. For years, the country kept Chinese technology at arm’s length, shaped by a complex history of cultural exchange and conflict—not least the 1979 border war. But as the need for rapid economic modernization grows, Vietnam’s calculus is shifting. The country has become a vital manufacturing hub for global giants like Apple, Samsung, and Nike, and the need to expand digital infrastructure quickly and affordably has made Chinese-made systems increasingly attractive.
Patrick Donegan, founder of telecom and IT security research firm HardenStance, told Reuters that Western efforts to curb investment in Huawei’s networking equipment have been “largely successful in the other Five Eyes countries — the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand — some parts of the EU and one or two other countries. Elsewhere in the world, Huawei continues to enjoy good market share.” Vietnam, he points out, sits squarely in that “elsewhere,” guided by its own pragmatic interests rather than the dictates of any one superpower.
Vietnam’s warming ties with China are not limited to telecoms. Earlier this year, the National Assembly approved an $8.3 billion railway project, with part of the funding expected to come from Chinese loans. And at the country’s 80th National Day parade, a visiting Chinese military contingent was met with cheers from the crowd—an unmistakable sign of shifting public sentiment.
Still, the embrace of Chinese technology is not without its risks. Donegan notes, “Huawei equipment could most certainly be used to enable surveillance by the Chinese state. However, China’s state-sponsored hackers are having tremendous success without even needing that kind of help.” He points to the “Salt Typhoon” intrusions into major US and international telecom operators last year, where Chinese groups exploited system vulnerabilities to gain access—reminding everyone that the threat landscape is broad and complex.
The United States has not been silent on these developments. As Reuters reports, US representatives have warned that Vietnam’s expanding use of Chinese suppliers could complicate future access to advanced US technologies. Some officials have floated the idea of isolating parts of the network that rely on Chinese equipment to limit exposure, but these suggestions only underscore the tough choices facing countries like Vietnam.
For Vietnam, the dilemma is clear. Avoiding Chinese technology does not guarantee security, and exclusive reliance on Western suppliers does not ensure affordability or a timely rollout. The country’s long-standing wariness of Chinese influence is now being weighed against the demands of modernization and economic growth. The result is a landscape where Western hopes for coordinated resistance to Beijing’s growing influence may be overtaken by domestic needs and pragmatic decisions.
In the end, both Britain and Vietnam are navigating a region in flux, where alliances, technology, and national interests are constantly being renegotiated. Britain is betting on the strength of its partnerships and expertise to build lasting influence, while Vietnam is making calculated choices to fuel its rapid modernization—even if that means drawing closer to Beijing. The Indo-Pacific, it seems, remains a place where no strategy is set in stone, and where every nation must find its own way through a maze of shifting power and opportunity.
