Brazil’s political climate has rarely been as turbulent as it is today, with the nation’s three branches of government locked in a high-stakes struggle for authority and legitimacy. Just as the country’s judiciary was lauded for jailing those responsible for the attempted coup d’état of late 2022 and early 2023—a move many saw as a reaffirmation of democratic institutions—new legislative maneuvers and international developments have cast fresh uncertainty over the future of Brazil’s democracy.
On December 10, 2025, Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies approved a controversial law reducing the sentences of those convicted for the attempted coup. Among those affected is former president Jair Bolsonaro, whose sentence was trimmed from 27 years and three months to 22 years and 11 months. Even more striking, Bolsonaro would only serve three years and three months in prison before transitioning to a semi-open regime, spending nights behind bars but enjoying relative freedom during the day. According to Havana Times, legal experts believe his sentence could be shortened even further if the law, which unifies the crimes of attempted coup and violent abolition of the rule of law, passes the Senate.
This legislative move comes on the heels of a series of confrontations between Brazil’s executive, legislative, and judicial branches. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who took office in January 2023, has found himself repeatedly at odds with a right-leaning Congress. In July 2025, Congress approved a new environmental licensing law designed to expedite project approvals and ease licensing requirements. Lula vetoed 63 provisions, but Congress swiftly overturned 56 of those vetoes. The Brazilian Association of Members of the Public Prosecutor’s Office for the Environment issued a technical note warning that the law violates at least nine articles of the Constitution and represents the most severe setback for environmental protection since 1988. As Havana Times reports, prosecutors argue the law dismantles environmental governance and creates legal uncertainty, likely prompting a Supreme Court challenge.
Meanwhile, the Senate escalated its own standoff with the judiciary by approving a constitutional amendment on December 9, 2025, that would restrict the demarcation of indigenous lands to those occupied by Indigenous peoples as of October 5, 1988—the day the current Constitution was enacted. The Supreme Court had already ruled such a “temporal framework” unconstitutional in 2023 and began reviewing the matter again on December 10, 2025, in response to the renewed legislative push. Lawsuits from Indigenous groups and left-wing parties have challenged the amendment, arguing that it undermines ancestral rights.
Sociologist Elimar do Nascimento, a professor at the University of Brasília, told IPS that this institutional crisis has roots in the misgovernance of Bolsonaro’s administration, which ceded significant power to the so-called “centrão”—a bloc of legislators with little ideological loyalty but strong economic and political interests. The centrão now holds sway over nearly half of the annual budget for government investments, a shift that has limited the executive’s capacity and, according to Lula, “kidnapped the budget.” On December 4, Lula complained that parliamentary amendments allow legislators to channel resources to their preferred communities, often with little accountability, fostering an environment ripe for corruption.
Justice Flávio Dino, appointed to the Supreme Court by Lula in 2024, has launched investigations into dozens of legislators over suspected misuse of public funds—a move that has only intensified the animosity between Congress and the judiciary. As Nascimento put it, “I recently heard the expression ‘political entrepreneur’ used to define legislators,” suggesting that personal gain, rather than public service, is now the primary motive for many in Congress.
The judiciary, for its part, has not been immune to controversy. The dean of the Supreme Court, Justice Gilmar Mendes, recently tried to restrict the power to request the removal of Supreme Court justices, confining it exclusively to the Attorney General. This decision, made unilaterally, provoked widespread protests and led to proposals in the Senate to curb the Court’s authority. Suggestions include expanding the Court from 11 to 13 justices—with appointments by both chambers of Congress—imposing a 10-year term limit (instead of lifetime appointments), and changing the nomination process. Traditionally, the president nominates justices, subject to Senate approval, though no nominee has ever been rejected.
Despite these tensions, many justify the Supreme Court’s activist stance, arguing it was the only effective bulwark against far-right coup attempts during Bolsonaro’s presidency. Ultraright groups, however, view the Court as their nemesis, blaming it for the imprisonment of Bolsonaro and several generals following trials that began in September 2025.
International dynamics have added another layer of complexity. On December 12, 2025, the U.S. removed Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, his wife, and her Lex Institute from its sanctions list. The Trump administration had imposed these sanctions in July 2025, accusing de Moraes of authorizing arbitrary pretrial detentions and suppressing freedom of expression during the Bolsonaro trials. The reversal followed a weekend phone call between President Donald Trump and President Lula. A senior Trump official told the Associated Press that the passage of an amnesty bill by Brazil’s lower house signaled improving conditions in Brazil and contributed to the decision to lift sanctions.
De Moraes hailed the move as a “victory of Brazil’s judiciary,” stating at a São Paulo event, “Brazil’s judiciary did not bow to threats, coercion and it will never do so. It carried on with unbiasedness, seriousness and courage. It is a victory for national sovereignty.”
Brazil’s government celebrated the lifting of sanctions as a “big defeat” for Bolsonaro’s family. Gleisi Hoffmann, Minister for Institutional Relations, credited Lula for the diplomatic breakthrough, saying, “It was Lula who put this repeal (of the sanctions) on Donald Trump’s desk, in a dignifying and sovereign dialogue.” Eduardo Bolsonaro, the former president’s son, expressed regret over the U.S. reversal and vowed to continue fighting for his father’s cause.
These developments come at a time when Brazil’s political tectonics are shifting rapidly. Nascimento predicts that the current aggressive conflicts between branches may subside if the right wins the general elections in October 2026. With Congress already dominated by right-wing forces and Lula’s approval ratings sagging, the stage is set for a possible realignment. Bolsonaro’s imprisonment and ineligibility have opened the door for other far-right candidates, such as São Paulo governor Tarcísio Freitas, who may attract broader support without Bolsonaro’s polarizing baggage.
As Brazil’s political branches continue to jostle for power, the country faces a pivotal moment. Whether these clashes will ultimately strengthen its democracy or erode its foundations remains to be seen. For now, the nation’s future hangs in the balance, shaped by a complex interplay of legal maneuvers, legislative battles, and international diplomacy.