Bolivia stands at a crossroads after a historic first-round presidential election on August 17, 2025, which saw the leftist Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, the nation’s dominant political force for nearly two decades, soundly defeated. The reverberations of this political earthquake are already being felt across the country’s judicial system, energy sector, and international relationships, particularly with neighboring Argentina and Brazil.
MAS’s candidate, Eduardo del Castillo, managed only about 3% of the vote, a stunning collapse for a party that had shaped Bolivia’s political and economic landscape since Evo Morales first rose to power. Instead, the electorate’s support splintered between two main challengers: former president Jorge Quiroga, who secured 27%, and centrist senator Rodrigo Paz, who led the field with 32%. With neither candidate reaching the 50% threshold, a runoff is scheduled for October 19, promising a dramatic showdown and the potential for a major policy realignment.
The election’s outcome is more than a political shift; it’s a pivot point for Bolivia’s embattled natural gas sector. According to Rystad Energy, gas production in Bolivia has been declining steadily since 2014, threatening to turn the once energy-rich nation into a net importer within the next decade. The numbers tell a stark story: in 2014, natural gas exports accounted for 46.5% of Bolivia’s total exports, translating to $6.01 billion out of $12.90 billion. A decade later, by 2024, that share had plummeted to just 18.1%, or $1.61 billion out of $8.92 billion.
Both Quiroga and Paz have made revitalizing the gas sector a centerpiece of their campaigns, but their approaches diverge. Quiroga proposes direct subsidies to gas producers to spur output and advocates investing in renewable energy. By boosting renewables, he argues, Bolivia can reduce its reliance on natural gas for domestic electricity generation—which currently consumes between 40% and 50% of all domestic gas—freeing up more for export. “Investment in renewable energy is a strategy to reduce the country’s internal gas consumption, thereby freeing up more gas for export and generating additional revenue,” he has said, according to Oilprice.com.
Paz, on the other hand, envisions a mix of legal and fiscal incentives to attract private investment, paired with a reduction in subsidies. Both candidates agree that the domestic market for gas is currently distorted by low prices—Bolivia sells gas to Brazil at $6 to $7 per MMBtu, while domestic consumers pay only $1.0 to $1.4 per MMBtu. Addressing this disparity, they contend, will be crucial to making the sector more attractive to investors and to boosting state revenues.
There’s urgency to their plans. Argentina, once a major importer of Bolivian gas, has dramatically reduced its purchases since 2024 thanks to its own production boom at the Vaca Muerta field. That leaves Brazil as Bolivia’s primary export market, and even there, competition is heating up. Brazilian operators like Transportadora Brasileira Gasoduto Bolivia-Brasil (TBG) and Nova Transportadora do Sudeste (NTS) are investing in pipeline upgrades to increase capacity for pre-salt gas from Brazil’s offshore fields, potentially squeezing Bolivia’s market share further.
Both Quiroga and Paz have signaled a willingness to reverse the nationalization policies that have kept Bolivia’s energy sector under tight state control since 2006, when Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) took over the reserves and commercialization of gas. Their hope is that by improving the legal framework and providing a more stable business environment, they can attract foreign investment to develop new reserves and arrest the production decline. But as Rystad Energy notes, "new upstream investments will take time to materialize, especially if they are located far from existing infrastructure." The challenge is immense, and success is far from guaranteed.
Meanwhile, the political landscape is shifting in other dramatic ways. On August 27, just days after MAS’s electoral defeat, a Bolivian court granted house arrest to Luis Fernando Camacho, the influential right-wing governor of Santa Cruz, who had been jailed since 2022 without conviction. Camacho was arrested on terrorism charges related to his role in the 2019 political crisis, which saw then-President Evo Morales resign amid allegations of electoral fraud, plunging the nation into chaos that left at least 36 dead and 800 injured.
Camacho’s release—ordered after Bolivia’s Supreme Court of Justice reminded lower courts that pretrial detention cannot exceed six months—has been interpreted by many as a sign of changing times. Human rights groups had long criticized his imprisonment as politically motivated, and Camacho’s legal team expressed optimism after the court’s decision, stating, “There is hope. Bolivia is regaining the independence of its justice system and democratic values.” According to Reuters, Camacho is expected to return to Santa Cruz, the country’s wealthiest region, where he was elected governor in 2021 following a failed presidential bid.
His case is not unique. The release could pave the way for other high-profile figures whom Bolivia’s right-wing opposition considers political prisoners, including former interim president Jeanine Anez and Marco Pumari, the former head of the Civic Committee of Potosi. Courts are reviewing several cases against Pumari, and last week lifted his preventative detention in one matter related to the 2019 crisis. “Bolivia is regaining the independence of its justice system and democratic values,” Camacho’s team reiterated on X.
The outgoing MAS government, for its part, is not going quietly. President Luis Arce, in a post on X, lamented the slow pace of justice for those responsible for the violence in 2019, calling on the judiciary “to let its work be guided by truth and objectivity.” The wounds of that tumultuous period remain raw, and the next administration—whether led by Quiroga or Paz—will face the delicate task of balancing justice, reconciliation, and the rule of law.
As Bolivia prepares for the October runoff, the stakes could hardly be higher. The country’s economic future hinges on reviving its gas industry, which in turn depends on attracting foreign investment, modernizing infrastructure, and navigating shifting regional energy markets. At the same time, the nation is grappling with the legacy of political polarization, contested justice, and demands for democratic renewal.
For now, Bolivians are watching closely, with a sense of both hope and trepidation. The choices made in the coming months will shape not just the nation’s energy policy, but its very identity and place in the region.