Belgium’s decision to formally intervene in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) genocide case against Israel has added a new layer of international scrutiny and debate to one of the world’s most contentious legal battles. The move, announced by the ICJ on December 23, 2025, marks Belgium as the latest European country to join South Africa’s high-profile proceedings, which accuse Israel of committing genocide during its military operations in Gaza following the Hamas-led attack of October 7, 2023.
According to RFI and Al-Mayadeen, Belgium filed a declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute, a provision allowing states to participate in proceedings when the interpretation of a treaty—here, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide—is at issue. This legal step does not mean Belgium fully supports South Africa’s accusations, nor that it defends Israel; rather, Belgium’s stated aim is to clarify its interpretation of international law in the context of the case. As the Belgian government put it, the intervention is about “clarifying its interpretation of international law in the context of the case.”
Still, the symbolism of Belgium’s intervention is hard to ignore. The country joins a growing list of states—among them Spain, Ireland, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey—that have chosen to weigh in on the case. For Israel, the decision stings. Idit Rosenzweig-Abu, Israel’s ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg, expressed her disappointment in no uncertain terms: “We were hoping that Belgium doesn’t consider itself in the same group as Ireland and Spain. Therefore, this submission is disappointing.” She told Radio Judaica in Brussels, “I didn’t expect that the government of Mr. De Wever would automatically adopt decisions that were made by the previous government.”
The political context in Belgium is complex. The previous government, led by Alexander De Croo and dominated by left-leaning parties, had already announced its intention to join the ICJ case in March 2024. But the decision to follow through came under the current center-right administration of Prime Minister Bart De Wever, a move that surprised some observers, including Israel’s ambassador. The continuity between governments, despite their political differences, underscores Belgium’s commitment to international legal norms—at least in the eyes of its current leadership.
Belgium’s legal arguments delve into the heart of what constitutes genocide. In its filing, Belgium emphasized that the existence of an armed conflict does not preclude the possibility of genocidal intent. Citing a previous ICJ order in the Gambia v. Myanmar case, Belgium argued that “the pursuit of military objectives does not eliminate a genocidal intent.” In other words, war operations can coincide with a genocidal intent if those operations are disproportionate to the stated military goals. Belgium further contends that compliance with international humanitarian law is not a defense against the crime of genocide. As the country’s submission puts it, breaches such as the killing of vulnerable populations and attacks that fail to distinguish civilians from combatants can serve as evidence of genocidal intent. However, the absence of such breaches does not necessarily mean genocidal intent is lacking.
These arguments have raised eyebrows among legal experts. Gerard Filitti, senior counsel at the Lawfare Project, warned in JNS that Belgium’s position could have far-reaching consequences: “They risk setting a precedent that collapses the line between genocide and war, and destabilizes the legal framework governing armed conflict.” Geoffrey Corn, chair of criminal law at Texas Tech University School of Law, echoed these concerns, noting that the more states that intervene, the stronger the political statement becomes. “It’s discouraging, because I think that the claim is not particularly meritorious,” Corn told JNS. He pointed out that the standard for proving genocidal intent is deliberately high, and that civilian casualties, tragic as they are, do not by themselves prove such intent.
From the outset, Israel has rejected the genocide accusation as baseless, insisting it makes every effort to avoid harming civilians and blaming Hamas for the high civilian death toll. Israel argues that Hamas fighters operate from densely populated areas and use civilians as human shields, a claim repeated in its written observations to the court. Furthermore, Israel accuses South Africa of acting as an emissary for Hamas. The United States, Israel’s closest ally, has also dismissed South Africa’s case as unfounded and has taken steps such as cutting aid to South Africa and sanctioning members of the International Criminal Court, which has issued arrest warrants against both Israeli and Hamas leaders.
The legal proceedings at the ICJ are ongoing, and a final decision could take years. In the meantime, the court has issued several provisional orders—on January 26, March 28, and May 24, 2024—requiring Israel to take all necessary measures to prevent genocide and to ensure the “unhindered” flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza. These orders are legally binding, but as RFI notes, the ICJ has no concrete means to enforce them. On September 16, 2025, a UN independent commission reported that Israel had committed the crime of genocide in Gaza, recording over 60,199 Palestinian deaths since October 7, 2023, with 46 percent of the victims being women and children. While the commission’s findings are not legally binding, the evidence it gathered may be considered by the court.
Belgium’s intervention is not occurring in a vacuum. The country recognized the State of Palestine in September 2025, though it said formal recognition would wait until Hamas is excluded from Palestinian leadership. This move aligns Belgium with nearly 80 percent of UN member states, including France, that now recognize Palestinian statehood. South Africa, for its part, has long championed the Palestinian cause, drawing parallels between the plight of Palestinians and its own history under apartheid—a comparison Israel vehemently rejects.
Ultimately, the outcome of the ICJ case could set a precedent affecting how international law distinguishes between acts of war and acts of genocide, particularly in the context of urban warfare and civilian casualties. As Geoffrey Corn observed, “If the court essentially dilutes that intent burden, it’s not going to bode well for those states in the future.” For now, the world watches as the legal and political ramifications of Belgium’s intervention continue to unfold.
With both sides digging in and international opinions deeply divided, the ICJ’s eventual ruling is likely to reverberate far beyond the walls of The Hague.
