For more than a year, the relationship between Bangladesh and India has been under mounting strain, but in recent weeks, the tension has escalated into a full-blown crisis. The trouble began brewing in the aftermath of the July 2024 mass uprising in Bangladesh, which saw the ousting of long-time Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Since then, an interim government has taken charge, and the country has been navigating one of its most fragile political phases in decades, according to multiple sources including Prothom Alo and Mathrubhumi.
The roots of the current turmoil trace back to the dramatic events of July 2024, when Hasina, after 15 years at the helm, was forced from office and fled to India. The interim government swiftly banned the Awami League—Hasina’s party—from all political activities, as confirmed by ANI. The party’s deregistration by the Election Commission and the ongoing trials of its leaders at the International Crimes Tribunal have only deepened the divide. In May 2025, a gazette notification from Bangladesh’s Ministry of Home Affairs formalized the ban, invoking the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance.
As Bangladesh prepares for national elections in February 2026, the stakes could hardly be higher. The Awami League, which has won nine national elections by popular mandate, is now barred from participating. In a pointed statement, Hasina declared, “An election without the Awami League is not an election but a coronation. Yunus governs without a single vote from the Bangladeshi people, and now he seeks to ban the party that has been elected nine times by popular mandate.” She further warned, “Historically, when Bangladeshis cannot vote for their preferred party, they do not vote at all. So millions will be effectively disenfranchised if this ban on the Awami League is maintained.”
This political exclusion has fueled widespread unrest. On December 11, 2025, Bangladesh announced the schedule for its parliamentary election and a referendum, triggering a new wave of protests and diplomatic skirmishes. Over the last ten days, the crisis has deepened, with both countries summoning each other’s diplomats and trading accusations. Hindutva groups in India, including the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), have staged protests targeting Bangladeshi missions in Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Agartala, leading to clashes with law enforcement, as reported by Prothom Alo.
Security concerns have prompted both nations to suspend visa services in multiple locations—Dhaka halted services in at least four Indian cities, including Delhi, while India reciprocated by suspending visas in four locations including Dhaka. The diplomatic tit-for-tat reflects just how precarious the so-called “golden chapter” of bilateral relations has become.
The situation took a darker turn with a series of violent incidents that have reverberated across both countries. On December 18, 2025, the brutal killing of garment worker Dipu Chandra Das in Bhaluka, Mymensingh—he was beaten to death after being accused of blasphemy—sparked outrage in India. The incident was seized upon by Indian media and Hindutva groups as evidence of minority persecution in Bangladesh, reviving painful memories of 1971 and intensifying calls for New Delhi to act, according to Mathrubhumi.
That outrage quickly spilled onto the streets, with protests erupting outside Bangladesh’s High Commission in New Delhi and other consulates. On the night of December 20, a group of 20 to 25 people staged an unexpected protest opposite Bangladesh House in Delhi’s heavily secured Chanakyapuri district. The ability of protestors to bypass security and stage a demonstration in such a sensitive area left many in Bangladesh stunned. The following day, Indian foreign ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal dismissed reports about the protest as “misleading” but simultaneously demanded justice for Dipu’s killing and raised concerns about the safety of minorities in Bangladesh. According to diplomatic sources cited by Prothom Alo, Jaiswal’s remarks were seen as tacit endorsement of the protesters’ position.
The diplomatic back-and-forth has been relentless. On December 14, India’s High Commissioner Pranay Verma was summoned in Dhaka, where Bangladeshi officials demanded an end to Sheikh Hasina’s anti-government activities being conducted from India and called for the arrest and repatriation of suspects in the attempted murder of youth leader Sharif Osman Bin Hadi. Just days later, India summoned Bangladesh’s High Commissioner M Riaz Hamidullah to its Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi, further escalating the standoff.
Meanwhile, India’s parliament has been closely monitoring developments. On December 18, the parliamentary standing committee on external affairs presented a report in the Lok Sabha, describing the current state of Bangladesh–India relations as the most significant strategic challenge since 1971. The Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) echoed these concerns in a 53-page report, warning that further deterioration in ties could “fuel violence, destabilize the two countries’ shared border and hinder economic development.” The ICG urged both sides to avoid exploiting anti-India or anti-Bangladesh sentiment for electoral gain and to focus on rebuilding relations based on mutual interdependence.
As the crisis deepens, some in India have called for strong measures, even as the government has so far avoided escalatory language. Despite public outrage and pressure, there is no evidence of Indian military mobilisation or plans for intervention. India’s Ministry of External Affairs has instead emphasized cooperation on trade, water sharing, and security, reiterating support for a “democratic, stable, peaceful, and inclusive Bangladesh.” Mathrubhumi notes that India’s post-1971 record has been one of restraint, preferring diplomacy and border management over direct intervention—even in the face of refugee flows and cross-border crime.
The regional picture is further complicated by Pakistan’s renewed interest in Bangladesh. Reports indicate that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has sought to cultivate networks in Dhaka, including contacts with extremist groups linked to Pakistan-based organizations. However, experts cited by Mathrubhumi argue that Pakistan’s involvement is likely to remain indirect, relying on diplomatic posturing and proxy activity rather than risking open conflict with India. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, estimated at roughly 170 warheads in 2025, is designed to deter Indian action against Pakistan, not to intervene in third-party conflicts such as India–Bangladesh tensions.
Within Bangladesh, the political climate remains volatile. The interim government has banned Awami League activities, and the party’s leaders are on trial at the International Crimes Tribunal. Economic growth has slowed to an estimated 3–4 percent amid the unrest. The ban on the Awami League has drawn criticism from international observers and Bangladeshis alike, with many warning that millions could be disenfranchised in the upcoming elections. As Hasina put it, “Any government that emerges from such an exercise will lack the moral authority to govern. This would be a terrible missed opportunity at a time when Bangladesh badly needs a process of genuine national reconciliation.”
Despite calls from diplomatic analysts to de-escalate, reality has moved in the opposite direction. The persistence of anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh and the refusal by India to extradite Sheikh Hasina have further complicated matters. According to Ashok Swain, professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, “a large section of India’s media has exaggerated developments in Bangladesh, portraying the country as sliding toward communal chaos.” Yet, he cautions, Bangladesh’s stability is crucial for India’s own security, particularly for its vulnerable northeastern region.
As both nations edge closer to a crossroads, the future of Bangladesh–India relations hangs in the balance. The coming months—leading up to the February 2026 elections—will test the resilience of diplomatic ties and the capacity for both sides to step back from the brink. The choices made now will shape not only the fate of their bilateral relationship but the stability of the broader region.
