Bangladesh is bracing for a pivotal moment in its political history as it prepares for its first national election since the dramatic ouster of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina. The country, long beset by cycles of "revenge politics" and economic turbulence, finds itself at a crossroads, with the 13th parliamentary elections scheduled for February 12, 2026. For many, the stakes could hardly be higher: Will this be the democratic "reset" so many have longed for, or just another swing of the political pendulum?
The run-up to the vote has been anything but calm. The interim government, led by Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, assumed power in August 2024 after weeks of student-led protests forced Hasina from office. According to Chatham House, Yunus has faced mounting pressure to organize elections before Ramadan begins in mid-February—a tight deadline that has only added to the sense of urgency and uncertainty in the air.
Sheikh Hasina, a three-time prime minister and head of the Awami League, was toppled amid widespread accusations of corruption and state repression. The final straw came in the form of a crackdown on mass protests, which the United Nations reports left as many as 1,400 people dead—the deadliest violence Bangladesh has seen since its 1971 Liberation War. Hasina fled by helicopter to India just hours before protesters stormed her residence in Dhaka. In November 2025, a special tribunal sentenced her in absentia to death for crimes against humanity, including her role in ordering the crackdown. She remains in exile in India, a country seen as unlikely to extradite her.
The Awami League, which had ruled for 15 years, was barred from contesting the upcoming election months ago—a move that critics warn could undermine the credibility of the vote. The July Charter, a reform package agreed upon by 25 parties in 2025, will also be put to public referendum alongside the election. The proposals aim to overhaul the electoral system, the Constitution, and key state institutions, but whether any new government can actually implement them remains an open question. As Chietigj Bajpaee, a senior research fellow for South Asia at Chatham House, put it, "What happened last August—the so-called Monsoon revolution—was referred to as the country’s second liberation, but I think the reality will be more continuity than change."
Indeed, the familiar cycle of political purges and reprisals appears unbroken. "In terms of the cycle of often violent revenge politics that we’ve witnessed throughout Bangladesh’s history, we haven’t really seen any movement towards a genuine national reconciliation. We merely see the pendulum swinging from one extreme to the other," Bajpaee continued. Under Hasina’s government, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami were persecuted; now, with the Awami League out of the picture, the BNP—led by Acting Chairman Tarique Rahman, who has lived in exile in London for nearly two decades—is widely expected to return to power. According to Chatham House, the Jamaat-e-Islami party, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist group, is likely to become the main opposition.
Yet the BNP’s own record is hardly inspiring for many voters. Naomi Hossain, a professor at SOAS University of London, told Chatham House, "But the BNP are very unpopular and people will be holding their noses and voting. Anyone who remembers them from the early 2000s will recall how violent, thuggish and corrupt they were." The sense of disillusionment is especially pronounced among younger activists, including those linked to the National Citizen Party (NCP) student movement, as established political dynasties reassert themselves.
On the ground, the tension is palpable. Just days after the election date was announced, masked attackers shot Sharif Osman Hadi, a senior leader of the student protest group Inqilab Mancha and a candidate in the upcoming elections, as he left a mosque in Dhaka. Hadi, a vocal critic of India—where Hasina remains in self-imposed exile—was critically wounded by a gunshot to the ear. The interim government quickly announced it would pay for Hadi to be flown to Singapore for advanced medical treatment, with an air ambulance and team of doctors on standby, as reported by AFP and Dawn.
The attack on Hadi sent shockwaves through the capital. Hundreds of protesters gathered in Dhaka to denounce the shooting. "It’s an attack on our political solidarity," Gazi Sadia, a 21-year-old student, told AFP. The rally brought together supporters of Inqilab Mancha, Jamaat-e-Islami, and the NCP—underscoring how the student-led uprising of 2024 continues to shape the country’s political landscape.
The unrest hasn’t stopped there. On December 15, 2025, just two months before the election, veteran journalist Anis Alamgir was arrested under the Anti-Terrorism Act, accused of "anti-state activities" and promoting the banned Awami League. Three others, including actress Meher Afroz Shaon, were also named in police documents. The interim government’s decision to ban the Awami League in May 2025, under amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act, drew sharp criticism from Human Rights Watch, which called the move "draconian." Rights group Ain o Salish Kendra echoed this sentiment, stating, "Using a law, originally enacted to prevent terrorist activities, against freedom of expression and journalism is against the fundamental principles of a democratic state."
Corruption and the hollowing out of state institutions have only deepened the malaise. Bangladesh ranked a dismal 151st out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index. According to Chatham House journalist James Orr, the separation of powers has eroded under Hasina’s tenure, with the civil service, accountability bodies, military, police, and media all increasingly politicized. Bajpaee observed, "Under the previous Hasina government, we saw the persecution of BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, and now we’ve seen a purge of the Awami League. So the question now becomes—how do you break this cycle? There has been a lot of positive intent from the interim government but there’s a gap between rhetoric and reality."
Economic uncertainty adds yet another layer of complexity. While Bangladesh enjoyed robust GDP growth over the past two decades, the momentum has slowed since the COVID-19 pandemic. The nation imports all of its energy and has limited natural resources, making it particularly vulnerable to global price shocks. Recently, Bangladesh has shifted away from close economic ties with India in favor of deeper engagement with China, Pakistan, and Turkey—a strategic realignment that carries both risks and opportunities. "Governments of Bangladesh really depend on economic development performance for their legitimacy, and this new government is going to have very little fiscal space to help the poor and rebuild the economy," Hossain noted. Whether the BNP, if victorious, will replicate the Awami League’s model of crony capitalism remains to be seen. As Hossain put it, "The only restraint on them is likely to be the possibility of another uprising—there’s not much else."
As Bangladesh approaches its most consequential election in years, the nation’s future hangs in the balance. The hope for a genuine democratic reset persists, but the shadows of violence, repression, and economic hardship loom large. Whether the cycle of revenge politics will finally be broken—or simply begin anew—remains the question on everyone’s mind.
