The Asia-Indo-Pacific region is rapidly emerging as the central battleground in a new kind of global contest—one that sidesteps traditional warfare in favor of subtle, persistent political and irregular strategies. As outlined in a December 5, 2025 analysis published by Small Wars Journal, this contest is being driven by a loose but potent alignment of four authoritarian powers: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Collectively dubbed the “Dark Quad” or CRInK, these nations have fused their ambitions and operations to challenge the established international order across both Eurasia and the Pacific.
Unlike the great power confrontations of the past, the current struggle is not defined by open battles or dramatic military clashes. Instead, it is waged in the shadows—through influence, legitimacy, and the strength of alliances. The front lines run through villages, ports, digital networks, and, perhaps most critically, the hearts and minds of the people living under daily pressure from authoritarian influence. As Small Wars Journal warns, "Our adversaries are already waging war. They accept Mao’s maxim that politics is war without bloodshed. They see conflict as permanent."
At the heart of this contest is what experts call irregular warfare—the military arm of political warfare. Irregular warfare, as defined by joint doctrine and reinforced by recent Congressional action, encompasses campaigns that assure or coerce through indirect and asymmetric means. These activities are conducted by, with, and through both regular and irregular forces, often operating below the threshold of open conflict to achieve national objectives. The adversaries in the Dark Quad have mastered this approach, leveraging a mix of disinformation, cyber operations, economic coercion, and covert action to expand their influence and undermine free societies.
China, for instance, wields its so-called "three warfares" doctrine—combining psychological, legal, and public opinion warfare—with remarkable discipline. Russia employs a blend of intelligence, cyber, information, and paramilitary tools in what it calls "new generation warfare." Iran spreads its influence through proxies and a light-footprint approach, while North Korea relies on political warfare and blackmail diplomacy as its main levers of power. All four have demonstrated a keen understanding of the power of narrative, corruption, and covert action to achieve their goals without firing a shot.
Against this backdrop, calls are growing in Washington for a more coherent and proactive U.S. strategy. The Small Wars Journal article draws a direct parallel to President Reagan’s Cold War-era National Security Decision Directive 32 (NSDD 32), which provided a unified political warfare strategy that integrated economic, informational, diplomatic, and covert actions to counter Soviet power. Advocates now argue that a modern equivalent is urgently needed, one tailored specifically to the Asia-Indo-Pacific and focused on irregular and political warfare as core missions, not niche activities.
Congress has already taken a significant step in this direction with the introduction of the bipartisan DISRUPT Act. This legislation directs key U.S. agencies—including the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, the CIA, and the Director of National Intelligence—to develop a whole-of-government strategy aimed at disrupting and constraining CRInK cooperation. The Act recognizes that a crisis involving any one of these four adversaries could quickly escalate into a multi-theater challenge, and it calls for intelligence integration, technology controls, sanctions, and coordinated planning across government agencies.
However, as the Small Wars Journal analysis cautions, "legislation alone cannot create a campaign." To operationalize the DISRUPT Act in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, experts are urging the creation of a new political warfare agency—essentially a modern version of the World War II-era Office of Strategic Services (OSS), but designed for the digital age. This new entity, whether called a Political Warfare Service 2.0 or an Office of Strategic Disruption, would be tasked with fusing intelligence, influence operations, cyber and economic warfare, resistance support, and covert action into unified campaigns. Its primary mission: to lead the implementation of DISRUPT against the Dark Quad in the region where the stakes are highest.
Central to this approach is the recognition that the security challenges of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait are deeply interconnected. Treating them as separate planning problems, the article argues, is a recipe for failure. Instead, a modern NSDD must integrate these challenges into a single, comprehensive strategy that sees the region as a unified theater of contestation. The ultimate objective, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, should be a free, unified, stable, and non-nuclear Korea anchored in liberal constitutional governance.
But strategy alone is not enough. The article laments what it calls "definition paralysis" in Washington—a tendency to debate labels and terms rather than taking decisive action. The greatest obstacle, it suggests, is not a lack of capability but a lack of mindset. In the words of the article, "Irregular warfare forces us to think about people first. It demands we understand the psychological, cultural, and historical foundations of conflict. It reminds us that legitimacy is more powerful than fear."
Meanwhile, real-world events are underscoring the urgency of this strategic shift. On December 5, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in New Delhi for his first state visit to India since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to reporting from Bloomberg. Welcomed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi with an embrace and a private dinner, Putin’s visit highlights the complex, shifting alliances that define the region. Despite U.S. disapproval and hefty trade tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump’s administration, India is seeking to assert its strategic autonomy and deepen ties with Russia—a move that complicates Western efforts to isolate Moscow and illustrates the multi-dimensional nature of the current contest.
The Asia-Indo-Pacific thus stands as the decisive theater for irregular warfare, where the authoritarian powers of the Dark Quad are applying pressure most aggressively and where American allies face daily coercion. As Small Wars Journal puts it, "If we wait for crisis, we will find ourselves reacting to a script written by Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang." The region’s future—and, by extension, the character of the international order for the coming century—will be shaped not by who has the biggest arsenal, but by who can most effectively wield influence, build legitimacy, and sustain resilient alliances.
The choice before policymakers is stark: organize, resource, and conduct political and irregular warfare on terms favorable to free societies, or allow the Dark Quad to dictate the pace and terms of competition. The tools are at hand—a modern NSDD, the legislative foundation of the DISRUPT Act, and the potential for a new agency dedicated to political warfare. What remains is the will to act.
As the world’s attention remains fixed on flashpoints from the Korean Peninsula to New Delhi, the Asia-Indo-Pacific’s fate will hinge on how well free nations adapt to the realities of twenty-first-century political warfare. Those who understand and embrace this new form of contest may yet shape the future—before it is shaped for them.